






























People’s transnational mobilities, their activities to build homes in their countries of residence and their connectivities have resulted in multiplicities of belonging to encountered, 
imagined and represented communities operating within various political contexts. Migrants 
and their descendants labor to form and transform relations with their country of origin and of 
residence. People who see their origins in India but are now living elsewhere are a case in point. 
They have been establishing worldwide home places, whose growing number and vibrancy 
invite reconsideration of Indian diasporic communities and contexts in terms of ‘India(s) 
beyond India.’ Issues of belonging in Indian diasporas include questions of membership not 
only in the nation of previous and present residence and/or the nation of origin, but also in 
other communities and networks in political, economic, religious and social realms at local, 
regional or global levels. Yet, belonging – and especially simultaneous belonging – to various 
formations is rarely unambiguous. Rather, belonging in all its modes may entail dilemmas that 
arise from inclusions and exclusions. Bearing in mind such processes, the contributions to this 
volume endeavor to provide answers to the question of what kinds of diiculties members 
of Indian communities abroad encounter in connection with their identifications with and 
participation in specific collectivities. The underlying argument of all the essays collected is 
that members of Indian diasporas develop strategies to cope with the dilemmas they face in 
connection with their sense of belonging to particular communities, while they are subjected 
to specific power relationships. Thus, the volume sheds light on the ways in which dilemmas of 
belonging are being negotiated in intercultural fields.
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Introduction:  1 
Dilemmas of Belonging in Indian Diasporas
Elfriede Hermann and Antonie Fuhse
People’s transnational mobilities, their activities to build homes in their countries of 
residence and their connectivities have resulted in multiplicities of belonging to en-
countered, imagined and represented communities operating within various political 
contexts . Migrants and their descendants labor to form and transform relations with 
their country of origin and of residence . People who see their origins in India but 
are now living elsewhere are a case in point . They have been establishing worldwide 
home places, whose growing number and vibrancy invite reconsideration of Indian 
diasporic communities and contexts in terms of ‘India(s) beyond India .’ Issues of be-
longing in Indian diasporas include questions of membership not only in the nation 
of previous and present residence and / or the nation of origin, but also in other com-
munities and networks in political, economic, religious and social realms at local, 
regional or global levels . Yet, belonging – and especially simultaneous belonging – to 
various formations is rarely unambiguous . Rather, belonging in all its modes may 
entail dilemmas that arise from inclusions and exclusions . Bearing in mind such pro-
cesses, the contributions to this volume endeavor to provide answers to the question 
of what kinds of difficulties members of Indian communities abroad encounter in 
connection with their identifications with and participation in specific collectivities . 
The underlying argument of all the essays collected is that members of Indian diaspo-
ras develop strategies to cope with the dilemmas they face in connection with their 
sense of belonging to particular communities, while they are subjected to specific 
power relationships . Thus, the volume sheds light on the ways in which dilemmas of 
belonging are being negotiated in intercultural fields .
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Indian Diasporas
The Indian diaspora is a global phenomenon . Thirty-one million Indians live out-
side India, as estimated by the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (now under the 
Ministry of External Affairs) .1 Migrants stemming from India and the surrounding 
states that once formed part of the British Raj can now be found in just about every 
country in the world (Lal 2006 a: 10) . These millions of people comprise not one 
homogenous Indian diaspora but mirror, in fact, the many different waves of In-
dian migration over hundreds of years . Motivated to leave India for multiple reasons 
– trade, work, security, education – they landed on many different shores . In con-
texts where their relation to India is at stake, these migrants and their descendants are 
referred to as ‘persons of Indian origin’ (PIO) and ‘non-resident Indians’ (NRI) (Lal 
2006 a: 11; Bhat this volume) . The Indian diaspora is already, as many publications 
demonstrate, a considerable field of study in the humanities (see e .g . Vertovec 2000; 
Lal, Reeves and Rai 2006; Oonk 2007; Jacobsen 2008; Safran, Sahoo and Lal 2009) . 
Indeed, this field has been attracting increasing attention from a plethora of disci-
plines – among them, cultural and social anthropology, gender studies, history, liter-
ary studies, religious studies, sociology and South Asian studies . The topics covered 
have been many and multiple: The nation, migration and transnational processes, 
identity, ethnicity and diversity, social relationships and gender, economics, politics, 
religion, the media, the performing and other arts, as well as studies delving into 
intercultural, transcultural and global processes .
Taking our lead from The Encyclopedia of the Indian Diaspora (Lal, Reeves and 
Rai 2006), we have decided to retain the term ‘Indian diaspora,’ which lends it-
self particularly well to the historical perspective we are including . Alternatively, we 
could have chosen to talk of a ‘South Asian diaspora’ – a term consonant with the 
fact that the migrants did not stem solely from India within its present borders, but 
rather from territory in what is now Pakistan, Bangladesh, Burma and Sri Lanka (see 
e .g . Vertovec 1991; van der Veer 1995; Shukla 2001) . When referring to the Indian 
diaspora as configurations of persons who trace their origins, wholly or partly, back 
to the Indian subcontinent, we do not wish to suggest they are fixated on this fact . 
Rather, we can safely assume that this relationship is only one among many, each one 
having its own weighting .
In choosing the title ‘India beyond India’ we disavow any intention of viewing 
either India or the Indian diaspora as a solid or homogeneous block . Even if we 
have opted for generic concepts, we construe India – both as a historical presence 
and contemporary state – and South Asia generally no differently than the multiple 
Indian diasporas, i .e . as heterogeneous configurations which have been exposed to a 
diversity of associations – at times, even dissociations – and which find themselves 
in a state of permanent transformation . ‘India beyond India,’ a designation Roman 
Loimeier (this volume) devised, has the potential of going beyond the common 
1 http://mea .gov .in/images/attach/NRIs-and-PIOs_1 .pdf (accessed 18 June 2018) .
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phrase of ‘Little Indias .’ If ‘India beyond India’ seems, at first glance, to foreground 
the relationship between Indian diasporas and India, it should be emphasized, how-
ever, that Indian communities abroad have also been forging particular relationships 
with the states in which they are located . In addition, Indians have been creating 
networks between their communities worldwide . All these relationships are of the 
utmost importance regarding issues of belonging .
Historical Contexts of Indian Diasporas
Foreign trade of South Asian merchants can be dated back to around the second 
century AD (Mann 2015: 216) . In the following centuries, different merchant com-
munities (Chettiars, Khojas, Sindhis) developed further trading networks that even-
tually spanned the East African coast and Southeast Asia (Brown 2006; McPherson 
2006; Mann 2015) . Indian trading posts were established in ports such as Mogadi-
shu, Mombasa and Zanzibar . These were the beginnings of permanent settlements 
in these areas and the formation of an Indian diaspora on the Swahili coast (Mann 
2015: 216) . This diaspora was a complex network of traders and sailors, in fact, a 
collection of communities defined by language, religion and regional background 
(McPherson 2006: 34; Sheriff 2010) . The arrival of the Portuguese, Dutch and Eng-
lish trading companies and their subsequent fight over trading monopolies for spices 
and textiles had a major influence on the activities of the Indian merchants in the 
Indian Ocean and in Southeast Asia (Mann 2015: 216–218) . Several trading com-
munities, such as the Sindhis, were able to take advantage of the structures of the 
British Empire and expand their own trade; others were less fortunate . Nevertheless, 
these communities have been of great importance for the structure and develop-
ment of the Indian diasporas that followed . Communities that go back to these 
trading networks still exist in many parts of the Indian Ocean world (east and west) 
(Loimeier this volume) .
Many parts of South Asia had been under the control of the British Empire since 
the 16th century and India was incorporated as a crown colony in 1858 . This devel-
opment had a great impact on the Indian migration, especially after the abolition of 
slavery and the subsequent introduction of the system of indentured labor (Mann 
2015: 219–225) . As there was a constant need for cheap laborers for the plantation 
economies, millions of people were sent to the Caribbean, the Indian Ocean, Africa, 
the Pacific, and South and Southeast Asia (Lal 2006 b) . Fleeing bad conditions (such 
as famines and unemployment) in India at that time, many of the indentured labor-
ers were hoping to improve their economic situation and return to India after their 
work contracts expired (Mann 2015: 225–226) . In fact, many of the laborers did 
return to India, but more decided to stay in their new homes . The system of inden-
tured labor and everything connected to it – the travel on the kalapani (black water), 
the work and living conditions on the plantations, the relationship to the colonial 
power and the other communities in the new country – have been the starting point 
14 Elfriede Hermann and Antonie Fuhse
for the formation of a lot of different Indian diasporas in many parts of the world . 
Furthermore, this development was an important historical event not only for India 
or the Indian communities, but also the many different communities and countries 
that have been involved in this process . This is clearly shown by the histories of 
Mauritius (see e .g . Eisenlohr 2006; Schnepel this volume), Trinidad (Vertovec 1995; 
Munasinghe 2001; Khan 2004; Munasinghe this volume) and Fiji (Lal 2004; Trnka 
2008; Kaplan this volume; Kelly this volume) and the postcolonial struggles fought 
in these countries to define who belongs to the newly established nations .
Indian migration changed in the middle of the 20th century . For the first time, 
not only students from the Indian upper class, but also larger groups of migrants were 
drawn to the center of the empire and later the Commonwealth . Great Britain had 
been the main destination until the liberalization of immigration laws in Australia, 
Canada and New Zealand in the 1960s intensified the migration to the Common-
wealth . Part of these waves of migration were the so-called ‘twice displaced,’ Indians 
who left East African countries for reasons of insecurity (Khadria 2006, 2012) . The 
USA and the Gulf region have become important destinations for different groups 
of migrants since the 1970s . The oil-rich Middle East has attracted laborers who 
worked on the many construction sites and had a considerable impact on the Indian 
economy, especially in Kerala state, due to the remittances they sent to their families 
(Osella and Osella 2000; Vora 2008) .The introduction of flexible policies for highly 
skilled migrants in the USA and Canada spurred the migration of Indian engineers, 
doctors, scientists and managers (Brown 2006: 25) . Canada changed its immigration 
policies in the 1960s to admit people with much needed skills (Brown 2006: 54) . In-
dia soon became one of the most important sending countries for skilled immigrants 
to Canada . In this volume, Swati Shirwadkar focuses on Indian women in Canada .
The migration from South Asia to European countries had multiple causes and 
took many different routes . In the case of Germany, Indian migration was document-
ed from the early 20th century when Indian freedom fighters who sought support 
for their fight against colonial rule arrived and students were attracted by German 
universities (Gottschlich 2012: 1) . After World War II, it was again Indian students, 
mostly from the fields of engineering and natural sciences, who found their way to 
universities and companies in Germany . Germany has recently been facing a skills 
shortage, gearing its migration policies towards attracting highly skilled migrants 
and students from India (Fuhse this volume) . The Tamils in Kamala Ganesh’s study 
(this volume) fled Sri Lanka’s civil war and came to Germany and Switzerland in 
the 1980s and 1990s (Baumann, Luchesi and Wilke 2003: 8–9) . Most of the Tamil 
refugees were Hindus who started to found prayer groups soon after their arrival . By 
now, the Sri Lankan Tamils have built several temples in Germany and other Europe-
an countries, among them the Sri Kamadchi-Tempel in Hamm-Uentrop (Baumann, 
Luchesi and Wilke 2003: 11) .
The routes and destinations of Indian migrants have been various regarding the 
contemporary migration of Indian students, scientists, laborers and maids to many 
different parts of the world . Their roots in India have been as different as their routes 
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of migration . Various routes and roots are articulated by the many organizations that 
Indians have established on the grounds of a common background (e .g . regional, re-
ligious) or a common migration experience (Bhat this volume) . The Indian diaspora 
is, thus, highly heterogeneous and represents the linguistic, religious and cultural 
diversity of India . This fact evokes the question of how the dimensions and dynamics 
of belonging play out in India beyond India .
Debating Dilemmas of Belonging
Integrating historical contexts of Indian migration into their analyses, the contribu-
tions to this volume are alert to the extent to which issues of belonging in postcolo-
nial times bear the imprint of historical legacies, such as politics, religion, social and 
ethnic dynamics, as well as the attendant modes of ‘othering .’ In this context, we 
wish to investigate the challenges that go along with belonging .
A person usually experiences a sense of belonging to a variety of communities 
during their life (e .g . Cohen 1982; May 2013) . This also applies particularly to 
people whose personal history is shaped by their own or their forbears’ migration . 
Belonging is culturally constituted, while membership of as well as loyalties to local, 
regional or national communities and people’s emotional attachment to places de-
pend on sociopolitical processes and the accompanying power relationships (Kempf, 
van Meijl and Hermann 2014: 15) . If the granting of access or denial of membership 
to such collectivities and places is geared towards constructing fundamental ‘others’ 
and distancing ‘them’ from ‘us,’ political projects are at work that Nira Yuval-Davis 
(2006: 204), with reference to John Crowley, called “the politics of belonging .” Be-
ing fully, partly or hardly accepted in various communities, however, often causes 
people to feel torn between their acquired and more or less desired memberships . 
People find themselves in situations in which they have no choice but to choose 
between allegiance to one or the other community that is of emotional significance 
to them, or else between one or the other place, being aware of adverse effects this 
decision will, in all probability, have . They find themselves in what John Kelly (this 
volume) has aptly termed “dilemmas of belonging .”
In turning our attention to diasporic configurations of persons whose ancestors 
originated from the Subcontinent or else who left it during their own lifetime, we 
seek to elucidate how Indians beyond India cope with dilemmas of belonging . We 
ask: What are the kinds of dilemmas that emerge in specific configurations? What 
kinds of strategies do people develop to deal with the specific dilemmas of belonging 
they face? Our debate focuses on three fields of belonging and related dilemmas in 
three parts of this volume . The first part offers a broad perspective on various ways 
in which Indianness and multiplicities of belonging are articulated in transnational 
space . In the second part, we zoom in on issues of belonging that Indian diasporas 
have been facing in their efforts to contribute to the making of a nation in their new 
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countries of residence . In the third part, the politics and violence of belonging in 
Indian diasporas are explored .
Belonging in Transnationl Space
An ever-increasing number of people are becoming mobile and engage in social rela-
tions and practices that cross borders and, thus, live in a transnational social space 
(Pries 2001; Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004) . This space, of course, also includes 
those people who, for various reasons, are not mobile but are connected to migrants 
around the world . Living in a transnational space means the simultaneous connec-
tion to and embedding in many different lifeworlds (Luckmann 1978; Strauss 1978) 
and, thus, a multiplicity of belonging . This first part of the volume offers two differ-
ent perspectives on this multiplicity of belonging in transnational space . Chapter 2 
focuses on various Indian diaspora organizations . Chapter 3 engages with the topic 
on the level of the personal navigation of multiple modes of belonging .
Chandrashekhar Bhat, in chapter 2, regarding Indian diaspora organizations, 
shows the multitude of Indian organizations that developed based on different 
modes of belonging . After discussing four streams of migration that are the basis of 
today’s heterogeneous Indian diaspora, Bhat continues to describe two categories of 
Indian diaspora organizations: Global organizations that are based on the notion of 
a pan-Indian identity and those that are based on regional and linguistic, religious 
or caste identities . His discussion of different pan-Indian organizations reveals the 
interesting point that migration history can also be employed as a marker of belong-
ing . Hence, different pan-Indian global organizations developed for PIOs and NRIs . 
The former category consists mostly of the descendants of Indian indentured labor-
ers, the latter of Indian professionals whose migration to different parts of the world 
started in the middle of the 20th century . Both global organizations lobbied in India 
for the development of institutionalized connections between India and its many 
diasporas . Chandrashekhar Bhat summarizes the policies that were established by 
the Indian government in this regard and, thus, shows the success of the pan-Indian 
organizations in advocating for Indians beyond India . In addition to these organiza-
tions that are based on the notion of an Indian identity, Bhat discusses some of the 
many diaspora organizations that are based on regional and linguistic, religious or 
caste belonging . These organizations foster not only transnational networks among 
Indians abroad, but also links to their region of origin . The connections between the 
diasporas and India are visible in the many investments that Indians beyond India 
make in their respective regions and communities of origin . Thus, in his conclusion, 
Bhat argues for the notion of ‘Indianness’ that transcends geographical boundaries 
and is transnational in character .
In chapter 3, Antonie Fuhse focuses on a younger generation of mobile Indi-
ans: Students and researchers who come to Germany for the completion of a PhD 
or a postdoctoral fellowship . She uses the concept of ‘biographic navigation’ (Vigh 
2007, 2009; Pfaff-Czarnecka 2012) as a tool to analyze individual strategies in the 
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negotiation of the multiplicity of belonging . Antonie Fuhse discusses four facets of 
belonging that are central for the students and researchers’ biographic navigation in 
transnational space . One of these facets involves the practices of belonging at various 
festivals that are organized by the Indian association in Göttingen . These festivals 
provide a space for social interaction and a platform to perform the ‘Indian’ culture 
in familiar ways . However, these events also pose the question of what India and In-
dianness actually mean to the young students and researchers . The second dimension 
of belonging that the author discusses is the importance of the regional background 
for the formation of circles of friends and the organization of festivals . Fuhse shows 
that the formal organization for Indians in Göttingen can act as a regime of belong-
ing, as it tries to unite all Indian students and researchers under the common and 
rather apolitical notion of ‘unity in diversity .’ The third facet that the author analyzes 
is the young Indians’ professional belonging as ‘scientists .’ Coming to Germany and 
specifically to Göttingen, a well-known university city, is part of the students and 
researchers’ strategies to achieve certain professional and personal goals . Many ex-
pressed the feeling that Göttingen is the right place to fulfill these goals . However, 
a lot of the students and researchers do not plan to stay in Germany . Antonie Fuhse 
discusses the (imagined) futures of the young Indians as the fourth aspect of their 
navigation through transnational space . Many of the young students and researchers 
expressed their wish to go back to India at some point in time . The author argues that 
this idea of a return to India is an important anchor in the young Indians’ biographic 
navigation, irrespective of the realization of this vision . Antonie Fuhse concludes 
that being Indian is only one facet of the students and researchers’ multiple modes 
of belonging that intersects with other dimensions and is constantly constructed and 
reconstructed in their biographic navigation in transnational space .
Belonging and Nation Building
Belonging figures prominently in diasporic people’s efforts to contribute to nation 
building or seek other forms of self-determination in their countries of residence . As 
the contributions by Viranjini Munasinghe, Martha Kaplan, John Kelly, Burkhard 
Schnepel and Roman Loimeier show, this holds true for Indian communities in Trin-
idad, Fiji, Mauritius and Zanzibar . For the most part, Indian diasporas in Trinidad, 
Fiji, and Mauritius descend from indentured laborers who worked in sugar planta-
tions, and in the case of Zanzibar from trading communities . Historical legacies of 
colonial rule and racial discourses have shaped their conditions – and dilemmas – of 
belonging to their countries of birth, albeit to different extents . Thus, autochthony 
has played an important role in Fiji, where it was mobilized by ethnonationalist 
elements among ethnic Fijian iTaukei to counter the emotional belonging of vari-
ous other cultural communities, including the Indo-Fijian part of the population, 
but it did not feature in either Trinidad or Mauritius . In postcolonial times, Indian 
diasporic communities in all these countries have developed strategies to pursue 
equal citizenship rights . However, they are still seeking recognition of their sense of 
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belonging in terms of political representation in Trinidad and Fiji, whereas they have 
achieved full electoral and citizenship rights in Mauritius . In Zanzibar, political op-
pression prevented the development of feelings of belonging to the nation . Rather, 
the sense of belonging to distinct religious and / or ethnic communities shapes the 
presence of Indians in Zanzibar today .
Viranjini Munasinghe, in chapter 4 “Anxieties of Belonging: East Indians and 
the Cultural Politics of the Nation in Trinidad,” turns analytically to emotions of 
belonging that were involved in Indo-Trinidadian strategies to achieve full inclusion 
in the nation . She traces the history of Indian indentured laborers who, after their ar-
rival in the middle of the 19th century, were positioned outside the ‘incipient nation’ 
in Trinidad by colonial discourses of race . From then on, Indo-Trinidadians were 
constructed in opposition to ‘Creoles,’ a broad category that came to include people 
of African and European ancestry and signified local, indeed native status . Descen-
dants of Indians came to be seen as culture bearers, being accorded an exceptional 
status in the colony and the Caribbean state of Trinidad and Tobago . Focusing on 
a span of time of intensified cultural and political contestation of the nation in this 
postcolonial state, Viranjini Munasinghe argues that the cultural excess ascribed to 
Indo-Trinidadians prevented them from being fully included in discourses that have 
constituted the nation of Trinidad . Members of the Indian diaspora in Trinidad have 
faced a dilemma of belonging by claiming national sameness as Trinidadians and eth-
nic difference as Indians . While Indo-Trinidadians, mobilized by their anxieties of 
belonging, have developed discursive strategies for national inclusion that reproduce 
difference, they have also engaged in processes of interculturation that connect them 
with Afro-Trinidadians . This intercultural space of commonalities is still, however, 
dominated by discourses of difference that all communities in the country adhere 
to and are perpetuating Indo-Trinidadian dilemmas of belonging to the Trinidadian 
nation .
In chapter 5, Martha Kaplan introduces us to “Dilemmas of Belonging in Fiji,” 
focusing on “Constitutions, Coups, and Indo-Fijian Citizenship .” Analyzing the 
struggle for national belonging fought by descendants of Indian migrants in the con-
text of the political history of Fiji in the southwest Pacific, she pleads for a historical 
anthropology of dilemmas . From a historical perspective, postcolonial Fiji emerges 
with a baggage of legacies from the colonial era . Among these legacies were racial 
discourses ascribing fundamental difference to autochthonous Fijians, called iTaukei 
(owners of the land), by comparison to descendants of Indians, most of whom had 
come as indentured laborers to work on Fijis sugar cane plantations in the late 19th 
and early 20th centuries . Among these historical legacies were also political privileges 
the colonial British had accorded to the autochthonous Fijians . Thus, structures had 
been put in place for an unequal belonging in terms of citizenship when Fiji gained 
its political independence in 1970 . Since then, postcolonial Fiji has had a number of 
constitutions that have followed not only democratic elections, but also and especial-
ly a number of coups . In 1987 and 2000, these coups espoused, once again, political 
privileges for autochthonous Fijians, whereas the coup of 2006 did not proclaim 
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iTaukei political paramountcy but imposed military rule until general elections were 
held in 2014 . Confronted with ethnonationalist discourses, Indo-Fijian aspirations 
of national belonging have frequently been frustrated . In view of these sociopolitical 
processes, Martha Kaplan argues that the dilemma of belonging for Indo-Fijians is 
linked to the question of self-determination: Should they stay and pursue a with-
drawal strategy as a minority, or pursue a strategy of seeking self-determination by 
emigration and the hardship this might bring?
John Kelly in chapter 6 zooms in on “Dilemmas of Belonging in Fiji” with an 
analytical eye on “Shanti, Swaraj, and the Problem of Political Armies .” Like Mar-
tha Kaplan, he sees the dilemma of belonging that Indo-Fijians have been facing in 
postcolonial Fiji crystallized in the question of whether they should stay, aspiring to 
a minority status, or take on the burden of emigrating . Turning to cultural concep-
tions, he argues that the Indo-Fijians’ specific dilemma is one between the virtues 
of shanti, meaning peace, and swaraj, self-rule . He calls this dilemma a “dilemma 
of virtue” and explains that this means whether to define the situation, to valorize 
or even transvalue possible courses of action, in one light or the other . When, in 
Fiji’s postcolonial history of successive coups, Indo-Fijians doubted the prospect of 
national belonging, their tactic was to act according to their value of shanti as emo-
tional peace in the face of hardship . However, they were not only seeking shanti, but 
also pursuing the tactic of swaraj, self-rule, and this in a political context of military 
omnipresence . Talking of political armies, John Kelly compares Fiji’s political trajec-
tory to military occupations in the Asian Highlands . He finds that the wisdom of 
Indo-Fijian commitment to non-violence, the complexity and tragedy in their cul-
tural dialogue with ethnic Fijians, and even some tangible grounds for hope become 
clearer when the political dynamics of the Asian Highlands and the Fiji Islands are 
understood in one analytic field . In his conclusion, Kelly points to the prerequisites 
for self-determination of both of the largest groups and continuing peace in Fiji de-
spite all the ruptures: Whether autochthonous Fijian mana, power, and Indo-Fijian 
shanti, peace, can be reconciled in moves toward a common future .
In chapter 7, Burkhard Schnepel writes about “Guests without a Host: The In-
dian Diaspora(s) in Mauritius .” He describes the specificity of the Indian diaspora 
– understood as a plurality of diasporas – in this state in the southwest Indian Ocean 
by discussing seven characteristics of Indo-Mauritian groups . These particularities 
are: 1) The Indian diasporas in Mauritius have many different roots and routes, with 
the majority of today’s Indo-Mauritians having descended from indentured laborers 
who came after 1834; 2) Indo-Mauritians have established a new life relatively close 
to ‘home’; 3) the Indian diaspora in Mauritius is substantial in absolute numbers but 
even more so in relative numbers; 4) the Indian diaspora in Mauritius is not the only 
one there; 5) all Mauritians come from elsewhere, value their diasporic links and 
have a diasporic consciousness; 6) the Mauritian kind of nationalism can be called 
‘(multi)ethnonationalism,’ based on the idea of the legitimate existence of a number 
of different ethnic groups building their nation; and 7) the role model for ethnic-
cum-diasporic identity on Mauritius is provided by the Indian diaspora, especially 
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its Hindu variant . Taken together, these particularities offer Indo-Mauritians a fill of 
opportunities for belonging to various communities, be they characterized by roots 
in different regions in India, language, ethnicity, religion, education, rural or urban 
location, economic success or professional standing, or be they the larger entities 
of the Mauritian nation or the broad category of Asians . As Burkhard Schnepel 
observes, Indo-Mauritians may select from and mobilize some part(s) of their iden-
tifications with these communities depending upon contexts . During the democ-
ratization processes, all citizens of Mauritius achieved equal citizenship rights with 
Indo-Mauritians being successful in terms of political representation .
Roman Loimeier looks closely at the historical development of the Indian diaspo-
ra in East Africa and particularly Zanzibar in chapter 8 . Through his detailed ac-
count of the history of the highly diverse Indian diaspora, he illustrates how political 
agendas and sentiments influence the possibilities of having a place in a nation and, 
thus, of creating a sense of belonging . He also shows how most of the Indian com-
munities in East Africa have maintained strong religious and social boundaries and 
thus remained fragmented even under political and economic pressure . Thus, most 
Indians decided not to abandon their identification with the Indian diaspora and 
their roots in India, even during the independence movements in East Africa and the 
accompanying pressure to commit themselves to new identities . The Indian diaspora 
has also maintained exclusive practices among themselves . The many different places 
for religious practice in Zanzibar – temples, mosques and churches – illustrate the 
plurality of the Indian community . In view of these facts, Loimeier concludes that 
communal divisions along the lines of regional and social descent, occupation and 
religion have continued to define Indian communities in East Africa .
Politics of Belonging and Violence
The third part of this volume is concerned with the relationship between belonging 
and violence in two very different ways . Swati Shirwadkar in chapter 9 on domestic 
violence in Indian diasporas in North America demonstrates how modes of belong-
ing influence the access to policies and programs to reduce domestic abuse . She 
argues for paying greater attention to the intersection of gender and ethnicity in 
the analysis of domestic violence and, thus, for policies that take the women’s com-
munity belonging into account . Shirwadkar’s analysis shows that there are multiple 
obstacles that prevent Indian immigrant women in Canada and the United States 
from taking the measures available against their abusive husbands . Among other 
things, the women fear losing their connection to the Indian community and to their 
families, while they also fear the stigma of divorce . Furthermore, the author shows 
that Indian immigrant women prefer the intervention from within the community 
and are, thus, reluctant to call for “outside” help from social workers . Domestic 
violence, thus, also becomes an issue in the negotiation of more general concerns of 
‘Indian’ and ‘Western’ values and what it means to belong to the Indian immigrant 
community in North America .
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In chapter 10, Kamala Ganesh shows that how the Sri Lankan Tamils relate to their 
homeland is influenced by the experience of forced displacement and the civil war . 
Ganesh stresses the importance of religious practices and temples for coping with the 
stress of leaving home and building a new life in a foreign country . Tamil religiosity is 
not only an existential response to the loss of the homeland, but also a political one . 
The temples in the diaspora become forums for LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam) propaganda and mobilization . However, Ganesh makes a point of showing 
that the responses of Sri Lankan Tamils to trauma and feelings of loss are various . 
Some become active in homeland politics and even support violent methods, others 
criticize the LTTE and violence . The articulation of belonging to Sri Lanka is mul-
tiple and depends on personal history and values .
Conclusion: Diversities of Dilemmas and Coping Strategies
It becomes clear in the debate in which the contributors to this volume engage that 
dilemmas of belonging have been emerging that differ in their degrees of intensity in 
the Indian diasporas in which they have worked . Dilemmas often arise from the diffi-
culty in choosing which of one’s manifold memberships of collectivities to prioritize: 
Belonging to a diasporic Indian or South Asian community that is characterized by 
religion, region of origin, language or caste; or belonging to a group that is putting 
great emphasis on their roots in India and is globally organized; and, importantly, 
belonging to the supraregional Indian diaspora in a particular country and / or to the 
nation of the country of residence, as diverse as this may be . A comparison between 
the ethnographic case studies collected in this volume suggests that the degree of 
intensity of dilemmas is determined by a number of factors . The first factor to be 
considered is that of the type of diaspora: Is it a diaspora that grew from an ear-
lier community of merchants (i .e . in East African countries), a diaspora founded 
by former indentured laborers (i .e . in Mauritius, Trinidad and Fiji) or a diaspora 
mainly constituted by labor migrants who travelled to other countries in the past 
few decades (i .e . in Canada and Europe)? The second factor to be considered is the 
extent of relationships that current diasporic groupings maintain to the country of 
origin in South Asia . The third factor that plays a crucial role in the constitution and 
maintenance of belonging is the politicization of cultural similarities or differences 
regarding religion, region of origin, language, class or caste – all of them aspects that 
are mobilized for the purpose of inclusion or fundamental exclusion . Dilemmas of 
belonging arise frequently if not always, so our debate showed, from historical pro-
cesses and political contexts . The existence of ethnonationalist claims on the part of 
one or more of the other ethnic communities in a given country poses a special chal-
lenge to belongingness . A fourth factor is composed of legal, economic, religious, 
social and moral orders – in short, cultural configurations – in postcolonial countries 
that are the home for Indian diasporas . All these factors may come together, be 
complemented by yet other factors and unfold their efficacy .
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As the contributions to this volume show, members in Indian communities abroad 
have to cope with the specific dilemmas they encounter . They are subjected to power 
relationships, structures, events and encounters that may entail hostilities and set up 
conditions for their belonging that are hard to accept . But they have also been de-
veloping cultural strategies for dealing with these dilemmas of belonging – strategic 
practices that confirm, alter or even dissolve attachment to particular communities . 
In any case, members of the many Indias beyond India are exercising their agency in 
relating to their past, making their living in the present and imagining their future .
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Part I:  
Belonging in Transnational Space

Indian Diaspora and Global Organizations: 2 
Communities and Contested Boundaries
Chandrashekhar Bhat
Introduction
This chapter focuses on the emergence of Indian diaspora organizations operating 
at the global level to articulate their socio-cultural, economic and political interests . 
The Indian diaspora comprises communities no less diversified than those found in 
the land of origin, often reflecting these diversities through a wide variety of ethnic 
minority associations . Unlike the ethnic associations of Indian immigrants, which 
are formed specifically to address their immediate concerns in the context of adjust-
ment and integration into the ‘host society,’ the diaspora organizations are essentially 
transnational, uniting global collectives based on national, subnational, linguistic, 
caste or religious identities . These diversities are further compounded on a tempo-
ral plane, differentiating the descendants of early colonial indentured immigrants 
(PIO, i .e . the Persons of Indian Origin diaspora) from later immigrants who left after 
India’s Independence (NRI, i .e . the Non-Resident Indian diaspora) . The dynamics 
of these diversities carry implications for the grouping and regrouping of Indian 
diaspora communities: all of them compete and contend in their efforts to form 
global organizations .
This chapter explores the formation of pan-Indian Global Organizations of Peo-
ple of Indian Origin (GOPIO) and the regional / linguistic organizations formed, 
for example, by the Telugu, Gujarati and Punjabi communities . The state response, 
which is to engage these diaspora organizations at both the national and sub-national 
levels via new policy initiatives, is another significant development in the new mil-
lennium toward bridging India beyond India .
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Recent population estimates suggest that the Indian diaspora has grown far be-
yond 25 million, scattered as it is around the globe in more than 110 countries . 
The numbers run to over 10,000 in 48 countries and have reached the half million 
mark in 11 countries (Ministry of External Affairs 2002) . People of Indian origin 
represent a significant proportion of the population in countries such as Mauritius 
(60 .69 %), Trinidad and Tobago (38 .63 %), Guyana (51 .93 %), Surinam (36 .04 %), 
Fiji (41 .34 %), South Africa (2 .3 %) and Malaysia (7 .2 %) and Singapore (9 .71 %) . 
Presently they constitute nearly ten million, according to the Ministry of External 
Affairs,1 and are spread across all continents . The descendants of the indentured 
labor immigrants from the erstwhile Central Provinces – Bhojpuri-speaking people 
from the present day states of Bihar and Eastern Uttar Pradesh – form the largest 
cluster of the PIO Diaspora, followed by those originating from the Tamil, Telugu 
and Malayalam speaking regions of South India . Indian immigrants constitute a 
‘visible’ or ‘model’ minority in countries like Canada (2 .8 %), the United Kingdom 
(2 .11 %), New Zealand (1 .45 %), Australia (1 .02 %), and the USA (0 .6 %) . Almost 
all countries in West Asia or the Gulf Region have a substantial workforce (above 
3,000,000) recruited from India, even though workers return to their places of origin 
after termination of their contracts . The Indian diaspora today comprises – broadly 
speaking – four streams following the diverse situations under which they emigrated . 
The nature and process of emigration and the destinations in question are briefly 
explained in terms of these distinct streams of emigration and settlement .
The First Stream
The first stream includes 3rd to 5th generation descendants of the early emigrants who 
migrated during the mid-nineteenth century . The main destinations were the British 
and European colonies in Africa, Southeast Asia, Fiji, and the Caribbean, where the 
newcomers were used as plantation labor and railway workers under what the British 
colonizers called ‘indenture system,’ which Tinker (1974) has rightly described as “a 
new system of slavery .” According to Clarke, Peach, and Vertovec (1990), under this 
system some 1 .5 million persons migrated to the above destinations . Robin Cohen 
(1997) has classified them as a “labor diaspora .” Many lost contact with their ‘moth-
erland,’ including their mother tongue, despite otherwise retaining salient features of 
their culture, including regional identities and religions . They may be called the ‘PIO 
diaspora,’ which is indeed how they call themselves, and should be distinguished 
from the later emigrants after India’s independence, the ‘NRI diaspora .’ The former 
often recall that their great-grand parents and ancestors were enticed, or forced, to 
immigrate to unknown destinations on ships as ‘cargo’ from Calcutta and other 
ports, while the latter left on flights from airports for destinations in developed coun-
tries (the jahaji and the havayee jahaji ) .2
1 Figures compiled from Ministry of External Affairs (2002: xvii–xx) .
2 Indenture laborers were transported to plantation colonies on ships chartered by recruiting agencies 
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The Second Stream
The second stream consists of professionally trained and skilled emigrants to the de-
veloped countries of the West during the second half of the 20th century, who settled 
down initially as Non-Resident Indians (NRIs) and in due course became ‘green 
card’ holders and naturalized citizens in their host countries . The NRI diaspora con-
tinues to take an interest in their place of origin, paying frequent visits to India and 
maintaining a vibrant interaction .
The Third Stream
The migrant labor force, semi-skilled and unskilled, to the countries of West Asia 
and the Gulf, including a few professionals like engineers and doctors, followed in 
the wake of the oil boom and forms the third stream . Many members of this stream 
have left behind their families in India and contribute to family maintenance with 
remittances; what is left of their saving they invest . The volume of remittances made 
by the Indian immigrants from West Asia is great, exceeding payments received from 
all other countries . They form the majority among the Non-Resident Indians (NRIs) 
or expatriate Indians and remain so till they return to their places of origin on termi-
nation of their work contracts, since they are invariably denied any citizenship rights 
and permanent residency in all the West Asian countries .
The Fourth Stream
Over the past three decades there has been unprecedented movement of highly 
trained professionals in the fields of information and communication technologies 
(ICT) and management and nursing, in order to meet the increasing demand for 
these services in the developed countries . These skilled workers initially emigrate 
to take up short term assignments ranging from 6 to 10 years under schemes like 
US H1 B VISA, paving the way for the ‘green card,’ which entitles bearers to perma-
nent residency and, ultimately, naturalization and citizenship . They form the fourth 
stream .
Each stream of emigrants differs from the others in terms of the socio-economic 
and educational background under which the workers emigrated from India, the 
overseas destinations in question, and their socio-economic location in the host so-
ciety . During their long stay and interactions with the host society, they further ac-
quired certain distinctive socio-cultural features that often differentiated them from 
communities who immigrated elsewhere, but also from their kith and kin or descen-
dants back home in their places of origin . However, the identities of belonging to a 
location or region or nation – say Bhojpuri, Punjabi, Tamil, Telugu, or some other 
and during the course of their long journeys laborers unknown to each other evolved endearing bonds 
of brotherhood calling themselves jahaji or jahaji bhai. 
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Indian region – emerge as a significant factor in the grouping and regrouping of 
diverse diaspora communities .
The Diversity of the Indian Diaspora
That the Indian diaspora is perhaps the most diversified among the world’s diasporic 
communities cannot be overstated . Indeed, one recent Oxford University publi-
cation (Jayaram 2011) is exclusively devoted to Diversities in the Indian Diaspora. 
Foremost among these diversities is the distinction between the PIO and the NRI 
diasporas, as mentioned earlier . Not only have the workers varied in the contexts of 
their emigration and destinations, but they also differ in terms of their socio-eco-
nomic background and degree of interaction with the motherland . While the NRI 
Diaspora has retained vibrant relationships with their families and communities in 
India, the majority of the PIO Diaspora have lost all contact with the motherland . In 
the course of their long journeys made by ship to distant destinations, the unknown 
co-passengers became jahaji bhai (literally meaning ‘ship brother,’ a brotherly affin-
ity owing to the fact that they were all sailing away together) . In such a situation the 
emigrants lost their caste and religious identities to a large extent .
The overseas Indian communities formed during the colonial era were not even 
allowed access to members of their own folk who were attached to different planta-
tions under the ‘indenture’ system, let alone to then existing means of transportation 
and communication that might have permitted them to engage with the mother-
land .
The Indian emigrants after India’s independence, however, not only enjoyed the 
advantage of being professionally trained, urban middle class and Anglophone, but 
also earned an adequate income that could facilitate frequent visits home, as a result 
of which they could maintain their socio-economic and cultural networks with their 
places of origin .
Language and Region
Language and region are the next significant parameter of identity articulation and 
differentiation among the Indian diaspora . Following the States Reorganisation Act 
of 1956, language came to assume greater significance in the reorganization of India 
into federal states . The Indian diaspora, too, is differentiated on the basis of linguistic 
and regional belonging – there are, for instance, Bhojpuri, Gujarati, Punjabi, Tamil, 
and Telugu diaspora communities connected and networking across several nation 
states .
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Religion and Caste
Religion is yet another aspect of the multiple diversities within India, and so too 
is it within the Indian diaspora . As a result, we may distinguish between a Hindu 
diaspora (Vertovec 2000), a Muslim diaspora (Brah 1996), a Sikh diaspora (Tatla 
1999), and a Jain diaspora (Jain 2009) .
One cannot underestimate the importance of caste in contemporary India, so 
much so that the Government of India decided to reintroduce caste for purposes of 
classifying India’s population in the most recent census of 2011; it will be recalled 
that classifying the population in terms of caste was discontinued after India became 
independent . It is therefore not surprising to find diaspora communities articulating 
their caste identities, especially among the NRI Indian diaspora . While browsing 
online for ‘Patidar Samaj’ in the United Kingdom, I discovered several diasporic or-
ganizations of Kadwa and Leuva Patidars based on regional and sub-caste identities . 
Immigrants belonging to the dominant castes of the Reddys and Kammas of Andhra 
Pradesh, the Vokkaligas and Lingayats of Karnataka, the Jats of Punjab and Haryana, 
for instance, maintain distinctive diasporic formations and networks worldwide to 
promote their socio-cultural, economic, and political interests .
Early Ethnic Formations
Pursuit of diversities is not new to Indian immigrants, a sizable population of whom 
have formed ethnic collectives on the basis of regional, religious, linguistic, or caste 
affiliations . Overseas Indians, as they were popularly known for decades until the 
1990s, have been distinctively known for the maintenance of traditional culture and 
identity that they meticulously promoted in the countries of their settlement for 
almost two centuries . Although the emigration of Indians has been taking place 
since the early Christian era, the bulk of the Indian migration leading to diaspora 
formation occurred mainly during the colonial period from 1830s to 1920s, and 
after India’s independence .
The need for migrants to organize themselves to collectively respond to the di-
verse contexts of their settlement is not a new phenomenon; several such organiza-
tions have successfully articulated issues of great concern to them . Such organizations 
are primarily minority ethnic associations, essentially local, regional, or national in 
their outlook . An important feature that distinguishes an ethnic association from 
other kinds of voluntary groups is the criterion of restricted membership . Whereas 
membership of an ethnic association is based on certain primordial features such as 
language, religion, race and culture, the voluntary associations are open to anyone 
who wants to be a member . It is common to find, for instance, associations formed 
by Gujarti, Punjabi, Tamil, Telugu, Bengali and Bhojpuri communities in the coun-
tries where such clusters of Indian immigrants are found . These associations reflect 
the magnitude and diversity of the diaspora . The Commission for Racial Equality in 
32 Chandrashekhar Bhat
the United Kingdom, for example, listed as many as 577 associations of immigrants 
from the world over in Greater London alone . In each Borough Council area, there 
are as many as 20 to 25 associations (Bhat 1993) that serve one or multiple purposes, 
covering almost all immigrant requirements .
What has transformed over the past two to three decades is the networking of 
these immigrants and associations with their kith and kin, either back in the place 
of origin or in the other countries to which they have immigrated, resulting in the 
establishment of diasporic relations . As observed by James Clifford (1994: 311), the 
“diasporic language appears to be replacing, or at least supplementing, minority dis-
course,” a phenomenon that was noted by the mid-1990s in the wake of contempo-
rary globalization and is being mediated by great advances in technologies of travel 
and communication .
Contemporary Globalization and Global Organizations
By the end of the 20th century, the process of globalization had moved beyond its 
initial association with the liberalization of markets and the growth of multinational 
corporations (MNCs) and transnational corporations (TNCs) and had spread over 
several nation states to include “…worldwide diffusion of practices, expansion of 
relations across continents, organization of social life on a global scale and growth 
of shared global consciousness” (Lechner 2005: 330) . There is now an ever greater 
interdependence between nation states across borders, not merely in trade and com-
merce but in almost all aspects of life, ranging from, say, food, clothing, sports, music 
and entertainment to ideology and spiritualism . With the revolutionary advance-
ment in technologies of information, communication and travel during the 1980s 
and 1990s, there has been steep increase in the global transfers of people, capital, 
technology, cultural commodities, media and ideologies across several nations .
The process of globalization is so complex today that no single theory can hope 
to explain its multifaceted manifestations . Hence scholars have attempted to con-
ceptualize globalization from different perspectives . For instance, Robertson (1992) 
looked at the process from a cultural stance, demonstrating how the world is being 
compressed as global consciousness is spreading . He argued that technological and 
organizational (as I would emphasize) developments lead to the compression of the 
world and the creation of a global field, in which individuals and societies become 
part of a larger system of societies and come to identify themselves in relation to 
global standards . Globalization, according to Robertson, has produced a more inte-
grated yet also differentiated world society . For instance, there is the phenomenon 
of glocalization (Robertson 1995), incorporating some of the global or universal 
features in local cultures while also incorporating local specificity at the global level . 
Taking the local – culture, commodities, media, cuisine – to global destinations is of 
particular interest to diaspora communities .
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Robin Cohen prefers to use the term ‘diasporization’ as a concept akin to globaliza-
tion, for the two are inseparably enmeshed . According to Cohen (1997), globaliza-
tion has enhanced the practical, economic and effective roles of diasporas, showing 
them to be particularly adaptive forms of social organization . The rise of global civil 
society, global citizenship, global governance, border-crossing nongovernmental or-
ganizations emerge as institutional arrangements of this globalization project .
Contemporary globalization is propelled by “sociotechnological infrastructure” 
(Nonini 2005: 565) – social uses and application of new technologies of communi-
cation and transport – accelerating the scale of movements of people, commodities, 
ideas and capital more than ever before .
India today has spread far beyond being a mere nation state; it is not just a place, 
space or territory, but encompasses the entire globe and is there wherever Indians 
are found, dispersed in countries like the United Kingdom, The Netherlands, Trini-
dad, Guyana, Surinam, Fiji, Malaysia, Uganda, South Africa, the USA, Canada, and 
Australia . India now stretches to all corners of the globe, to wherever Indians have 
remained Indians; as a result, we can speak without hyperbole of a global Indian fam-
ily . Globalization today has given rise to a huge transnational social field (Levitt and 
Glick Schiller 2004) where Indian families and organizations extend their family, 
caste, linguistic, regional, or national ties across the globe .
Emergence of Indian Diaspora Global Organizations
The Indian diaspora launched the first Global Organization of the People of Indian 
Origin in 1989 at its New York Convention . There have been, of course, several 
religious organizations networking for the promotion of religious activities, such 
as Vishwa Hindu Parishad, International Swaminarayan Satsang Organization 
(I .S .S .O .), the World Sikh Organization, and the International Sikh Youth Federa-
tion . Operating across the globe, they pursue limited objectives . In addition, there 
are a variety of associations (often referred to as ethnic minority organizations in 
those countries where Indian immigrants are in a minority), all of which articulate a 
specific interest . One cannot underestimate the role of such associations, especially 
the support they offer immigrants in safeguarding their culture, economic interests, 
and political rights . A number of global diasporic issues, as well as leading personali-
ties, have emerged from these structures operating at the grassroots level .
Diaspora, as an idea and a reality, today occupies a key position in the transna-
tional space that is increasingly rendered accessible by contemporary globalization . 
Diaspora communities dispersed around the world have established global organiza-
tions, transcending the boundaries of multiple nation states . In addition, they have 
initiated dialogue among themselves and with their countries of origin and residency 
in order to provide mutual support for socio-economic and political advancement . 
The term ‘diaspora global organization’ is used here to refer to voluntary associations 
formed by diaspora communities, or a single community, that enrolls members from 
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across all nations . They reach out concerning the issues that possess relevance for 
those now dispersed from their original homeland or place of origin .
Global organizations initiated by the Indian diaspora may be broadly assigned to 
two categories:
global organizations based on pan-Indian identity, and•	
global organizations based on regional / linguistic, religious and caste identities .•	
Pan-Indian Global Organizations
In the First Global Convention of People of Indian Origin (New York, August 28 – 
September 3, 1989), the largest representation ever of Indian immigrants from dif-
ferent parts of the world, it was decided to set up the Global Organization of People 
of Indian Origin . GOPIO is a voluntary, non-partisan, non-sectarian, global orga-
nization mandated to promote the interests of people of Indian origin worldwide . 
Over 3000 delegates attended it, representing almost all countries where an Indian 
diaspora is present . The Convention passed a number of resolutions to promote the 
interest of the entire diaspora community, addressing issues ranging from the viola-
tion of the political and civil rights of the Indian community, to seeking human 
rights and gender justice, and also changing the image of India .3 But soon (within a 
span of just three years) there emerged serious differences pertaining to leadership, 
causing a split to open up between the PIO and NRI .
The split came to the fore when a section of GOPIO, who subsequently es-
tablished the PIO capital in Mauritius – henceforth referred to as GOPIO (M) – 
organized the 2nd GOPIO International Convention (Paris, 1992), whereas the 
other section, mostly comprising NRI, continued to run GOPIO from its New York 
headquarters and proceeded to hold their own 2nd Global Convention (New Delhi, 
1993) . Both GOPIOs have successfully mobilized Indian diaspora the world over . 
While GOPIO (M) traces its origin to a first meeting held in the United Kingdom 
back in 1988, followed by the First Global Convention held in New York a year 
later, GOPIO (NY) claims that it was established after that First Global Convention 
organized by the National Federation of Indian American Associations (NFIA) .
Global Organization of People of Indian Origin (Mauritius)
Following the Global Convention of New York, GOPIO (M) has so far organized 
eleven International conventions: from Paris they moved to Montreal, Canada for 
the 3rd convention in 1994, to Mauritius in 1996 for the 4th convention (at which 
time Mauritius was declared PIO Capital with state support), to Durban for the 
3 GOPIO website (http://www .gopio .net/first_convention .htm) provides detailed information on the 
First Convention, Convention Resolutions, formation of Global Organization of People of Indian 
Origin (GOPIO), Constitution etc .
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5th convention in 1998, to New Delhi in 2000 for the 6th convention, and the 7th 
convention was held again in Mauritius during 2003 . The 8th and the 9th conven-
tions were organized in Singapore and Kuala Lumpur respectively in 2005 and 2008 . 
Durban was again the venue for the 10th convention in 2010 to commemorate the 
160th year of Indian arrival in South Africa, and the 11th convention was recently 
held in Kuala Lumpur . GOPIO (M) is supported by diaspora communities in Fiji, 
Malaysia, Singapore, Mauritius, Reunion, Guadeloupe, France, and South Africa . 
They consider themselves an inclusive Indian diaspora, as demonstrated by incorpo-
rating Francophone Indians . Mauritius is Francophone by choice, though the official 
language is English, so there is the advantage of bringing together diasporic commu-
nities that are either Francophone or Anglophone .
GOPIO (M) has 15 members in the Executive Committee, out of which 10 
members are from the PIO diaspora, 2 from the NRI diaspora, and 3 from India . 
Among the prominent leaders responsible for the promotion of GOPIO (M) was the 
late Sri Dhundev Bahadoor, a social worker who established the Human Service Trust 
of Mauritius . Others included Sri Baleshwar Agrawal, the founder of Anther Rastriya 
Sahayog Parishad in Delhi, Mr . Selvarajoo Sundaram, a businessman from Malay-
sia, Mr . Mahendra Utchanna (President, GOPIO International), a former minister 
in Mauritius and businessman, Prof . Dasrath Chetty of Kwazulu-Natal University, 
South Africa, and Mr . Devraj, a former MP from Sri Lanka .
GOPIO (M) has been holding its conventions in Delhi at the ICCR auditorium 
or the ASSOCHEM Hall, which are not expensive venues . Recently they have been 
organizing their meetings at the Hotel Meridian, a French franchise, symbolizing 
their affinity and concern with the Francophone Indian communities residing in the 
former French colonies .
Global Organization of People of Indian Origin (New York)
GOPIO (NY), which draws its support from the National Federation of Indian 
American Associations (NFIA), the Associations of Indians in America (AIA), and 
the Indian American Forum for Political Education (IAFPE), organized its Second 
Global Convention in 1993 in New Delhi . It organized the Global Convention ’99 
to mark its 10th Anniversary Celebrations (New York, September 24–26, 1999), as 
well as holding Global Conventions in various European cities (Zurich in 2000 and 
Leiden in 2002) .
An analysis of the leadership pattern in GOPIO (NY) points to a controlling in-
fluence over the organization by the elite of the NRI diaspora, who are first generation 
immigrants to the United States . GOPIO (NY) appears to be synonymous with the 
person of Dr . Thomas Abraham, who holds a doctorate in chemistry from Columbia 
University, in the role of the President / Chairman of GOPIO International . Then 
there is Dr . Jagat Motwani, who holds a doctorate from Fordham University, NY, 
and is a practicing psychotherapist, his role being that of Secretary General / Inter-
national Coordinator . Also playing a leadership role are Inder Singh, a businessman 
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from California, and Sunny Kulathakal, a businessman from Saudi Arabia . Except 
for the two office bearers – Mr . Ashook Ramsaran, the current president of GOPIO 
(NY) International, is an engineer of Guyanese origin with his own company, and 
Deo Gosine, a New York businessman of Trinidad and Tobago origin – all the rest 
(on the current committee of 19) are first generation immigrants from India . The 
majority of members of the GOPIO (NY) Executive Committee come from affluent 
sections of first generation Indians living in North America or Europe .
Today GOPIO (NY) has 25 chapters spread among 19 countries; of the 148 life 
members, most of them (about 96) come from the USA . The others are from India, 
Australia, the United Kingdom, Germany, Middle Eastern countries, and the Carib-
bean . The organization successfully runs a monthly online e-news bulletin, provid-
ing information and covering events in North America and Europe . GOPIO (NY) 
is organized along chapter lines: the United States and India have 6 chapters each, 
established in different parts of their respective countries, while the remaining 13 
chapters are located in Australia, Europe, Fiji, Trinidad, Guyana, Suriname, South 
Africa, Mauritius, and Zimbabwe . They have been holding most of their programs 
in India at expensive locations, such as the FICCI auditorium and Hotel Claridges 
in Delhi .
Both the GOPIOs were about a decade old when the Government of India, 
under Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, decided in 2000 to set up a High Level 
Committee on the Indian Diaspora (HLCID) . The Ministry of Overseas Indian Af-
fairs was established much later in 2004, after some of the significant recommenda-
tions of the HLCID were implemented . There was also the rejuvenation of activities 
of both GOPIOs following official recognition of the diaspora community by the 
government of India and the pro-active role assumed by the Ministry of Overseas 
Indian Affairs .
The GOPIOs and the  
High Level Committee on the Indian Diaspora
Both GOPIO (NY) and GOPIO (M) claim a significant role in lobbying for the 
formation of the HLC on the Indian Diaspora as well as formulating various policy 
recommendations promoting matters of mutual interest and advancement . Both 
GOPIOs claimed a role in persuading the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) gov-
ernment to set up a High Level Committee to examine various issues and concerns 
of the overseas Indian community . And so a High Level Committee on the Indian 
Diaspora was duly appointed by the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of In-
dia, in September 2000, with the approval of the Prime Minister . Its mandate was to 
recommend a broad and flexible policy framework after reviewing the status, needs 
and roles of People of Indian Origin (PIOs) and Non-Resident Indians (NRIs) .
The Committee was presided over by Dr . L . M . Singhvi, an MP and former In-
dian High Commissioner to the UK Members included Shri R . L . Bhatia, MP and 
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former Minister of State for External Affairs, Shri J . R . Hiremath, Indian Foreign 
Service (Ret .), and Shri Baleshwar Agarwal, Secretary General of the Antar Rashtriya 
Sahyog Parishad . Shri J .C . Sharma, Secretary (NRI & PV) of the Ministry of Exter-
nal Affairs, handled the secretarial duties . The Committee was expected to look at 
the role of PIOs and NRIs in India, the rights and facilities extended to them, and 
also to examine such matters as the denial of their rights and much else, including 
discrimination in the countries of residence .
The Committee submitted its report to the Prime Minister in January 2002, rec-
ommending various measures to resolve the problems faced by NRIs and the PIOs, 
drawing up, for example, country-specific plans for forging a mutually beneficial 
relationship, not to say facilitating their interaction and participation in India’s eco-
nomic development .
The HLCID has extensively examined the contemporary context of the Indian 
Diaspora in most of those countries where people of Indian origin have a significant 
presence and has tabled several recommendations for the Government to consider . 
Apart from its many policy recommendations, the Report of the High Level Commit-
tee on the Indian Diaspora offers a wealth of information on the Indian diaspora .
HLCID Recommendations
In its interim report, the High Level Committee on the Indian Diaspora (HLC) rec-
ommended that the government should prioritize some of the significant issues that 
had figured in discussions with the members of the Diaspora communities . These 
included:
The observation of Pravasi Bharatiya Divas•	  on January 9th (the day Mahatma 
Gandhi returned to India from South Africa); the point of marking this an-
nual event, which is of great significance to Indians at home and abroad, was 
to recognize and appreciate the role of Indian Diaspora in the promotion of 
India’s interests .
The institution of Pravasi Bharatiya Samman Awards to recognize eminent •	
PIOs and NRIs .
The establishment of Pravasi Bharatiya Bhavan, an administrative center •	
offering a ‘single-window mechanism’ to facilitate diaspora interaction and 
engagement with India .
The HLCID has examined all the major issues – culture, education, media, econom-
ic development, health, science and technology, philanthropy, and dual citizenship – 
with a view to recommending concrete steps for bringing the Indian Diaspora closer 
to their old homeland, doing so for the first time in an institutionalized manner . In 
order to facilitate closer interaction between India and the Diaspora and to be able 
to continuously monitor these evolving ties, the HLCID has suggested setting up 
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an autonomous and empowered body, similar in kind to the Planning Commission, 
and also constituting a Standing Committee of Parliament . On some major issues 
like culture and the media, it is envisaged that the people and government of India 
will take effective steps to promote languages, philosophy, spirituality, performing 
arts, and ethnic Indian media among Indian Diaspora communities, with especial 
reference to the PIO diaspora . The HLCID has drawn a list of programs and activi-
ties through which Indian culture and media can effectively reach the younger gen-
eration in the diaspora .
The HLCID has made several recommendations in the areas of education, eco-
nomic development, healthcare, and science and technology that require active par-
ticipation from all three parties: the people of India, the Indian Diaspora, and the 
government of India . The Report of the HLCID (Ministry of External Affairs 2002) 
suggests that the government of India and the various state governments should 
try to remove all obstacles standing in the way of philanthropic and voluntary or 
welfare activities, especially those involving NGOs, that the members of the Indian 
Diaspora might wish to pursue in India .
Dual Citizenship
A significant but controversial issue – that of dual citizenship – came up for con-
sideration by the HLCID, particularly when meeting with prominent members of 
the Indian community in North America and a few other advanced countries (NRI 
diaspora) . It was argued that the granting of dual citizenship would foster invest-
ments, trade, tourism, and philanthropic contributions in India . According to the 
Citizenship Act of 1955, an Indian forfeits Indian citizenship when he / she acquires 
citizenship of a foreign country . The HLCID recommended embracing dual citizen-
ship, but only after appropriate safeguards had been put in place pertaining to India’s 
security concerns; that said, they saw amendments to the Citizenship Act of 1955 
as inevitable . However, the HLCID did not see dual citizenship as conferring any 
right to participation in the electoral process, neither as a voter nor as a candidate 
for office, and employment in the Indian civil services was out of the question . The 
Government of India had already approved a scheme for granting Overseas Citizen 
of India status . The so-called OCI card was designed as an alternative, not as a step 
toward, to dual citizenship, a concession made especially to those who left India after 
1947 . But there is the hope that dual citizenship might prove an attainable goal in 
the near future . At any rate, this agenda is being actively pursued by the resolutions 
of GOPIO (NY) .
The PIO Card
The Government of India introduced the PIO Card scheme in 1999 for all persons 
of Indian origin down to the fourth generation, with exceptions made for citizens of 
Bangladesh, Pakistan, and some other designated countries . It conferred on holders 
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several economic, educational, financial and cultural benefits, placing them on a par 
with Non-Resident Indians . A central provision was a visa fee regime for 20 years set 
at US$ 1000 . The HLCID, after considering several representations, recommended 
that the fee and the period of validity should be reduced . In 2015, the PIO Card 
scheme has been merged with OCI Card, providing a lifetime visa . According to the 
HLCID Report, most of the PIOs, except for those living in North America, Europe, 
Australia, New Zealand, and Singapore, have not evinced interest in dual citizenship 
and prefer PIO Cards .
Hence, in a series of game-changing initiatives, the Government of India un-
dertook to recognize the presence of the 20+ million-strong Indian Diaspora, for-
mulating new policies for building sustainable links between homeland and emi-
grants . Implementing the new policy initiatives, a first global meeting – the Pravasi 
Bharatiya Divas – between the Indian diaspora and the Indians, operating under the 
logo ‘The Global Indian Family’4, was organized for January 9–11, 2003 . Subsequent 
conventions are being held every year in January . A new ministry was created in 2004 
– the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA) – a nodal body that functions as a 
‘one-stop shop’ in all matters pertaining to overseas and non-resident Indians .
Pravasi Bharatiya Divas and Pravasi Bharatiya Samman
Pravasi Bharatiya Divas and Pravasi Bharatiya Samman are two important events for 
both GOPIOs, permitting them to engage in an annual stocktaking of their activi-
ties and achievements, as well as to lobby and make their resolutions and demands 
known to the government . It is also an occasion for the latter to showcase India’s 
achievements, while stressing the opportunities for involving the ‘diaspora as part-
ners’ in India’s growth .
Pravasi Bharatiya Divas (PBDs) offer enormous opportunities for interaction be-
tween members of the Indian diaspora from different countries, but also with the 
Indian entrepreneurs, professionals and businesspersons who attend them . The first 
and the second PBDs (2003 and 2004 respectively) were held in Delhi by the Minis-
try of External Affairs . Soon afterwards, the newly constituted Ministry of Overseas 
Indian Affairs (MOIA), following the change of government in Delhi, took over the 
charge of organizing the PBDs from 2005 onwards in different state capitals such as 
Bombay, Hyderabad, Chennai, and Jaipur .
The 10th Pravasi Bharatiya Divas was organized for January 7–9, 2012 in Jaipur, 
the city of palaces and gardens in Rajasthan . It was an ideal time and location for 
such an event, and huge crowds turned up from all over the diaspora . As on earlier 
occasions, the Confederation of Indian Industries managed this event, attended by 
4 The organizing committee of the first Pravasi Bharatiya Divas designed a logo with the slogan ‘Global 
Indian Family – Celebrate Pravasi Bharatiya Divas’ especially to reach out to the diaspora hitherto 
not duly recognized by the government until the Report of the High Level Committee on the Indian 
Diaspora recommended it in 2002 .
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more than 2500 registered delegates from different countries, including India . The 
Minister for Overseas Indian Affairs hosted a banquet for the delegates to PBD fol-
lowed by a cultural program . The PBD was formally inaugurated, as always, by the 
Prime Minister, who announced some of the policy initiatives the government pro-
posed to take . Then followed panel discussions on issues of industrial, economic, and 
technological progress, the panelists being ministers and bureaucrats and members of 
the diaspora . The chief guest was the Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago, Kamla 
Persad-Bissessar . The second day ended with a cultural evening and dinner with 
cocktails . The third day commenced with the chief ministers of various states ad-
dressing the delegates, underlining the scope for participation in the developmental 
programs of their states and pointing to a range of incentives offered to the diaspora . 
The next session was interactive: delegates were able to interact directly with chief 
ministers, as well as with other ministers and bureaucrats, for purposes of seeking 
clarification on the schemes / opportunities proposed by the states . The PBD was for-
mally declared closed by the President of India after presentation of Pravasi Bharatiya 
Samman to a dozen or so diaspora personalities, recognizing their contribution to 
community service, science and technology, or some social cause .
On the sidelines of the PBD, different states were provided with space to high-
light what they are doing to promote industries and tourism . There were also stalls 
showcasing, for instance, the banking services, real estate, jewelry and handicrafts of 
Rajasthan .
GOPIO (NY) and Pravasi Bharatiya Divas
Since 2003, GOPIO (NY) has held its annual two-day convention in India, gener-
ally on January 5th and 6th, coinciding with the Pravasi Bharatiya Divas . The PBD 
program offers special provision of tax-free accommodation (about 30 % discount 
on hotel tariffs), 50 % discount on the PBD registration fee, and free transport from 
designated hotels for delegates to the venue of the PBD conference programs .
GOPIO (NY) encourages and assists its members in booking accommodation 
and in PBD advance registration, making sure they attend the pre-PBD convention 
held on the eve of PBD . They identify one of the 5-star hotels in the city hosting 
the PBD as the venue and book accommodation for all of the overseas delegates . On 
the first day, they hold the Executive Committee and General Body meetings, fol-
lowed on the second day by country-specific presentations by the GOPIO executives 
of the respective countries . The highlight of the convention is on the first evening, 
which includes an address by one of the VVIPs . This could be a Chief Minister or a 
Cabinet Minister of the state hosting the PBD, or it might be the Minister of Over-
seas Indian Affairs, or even an Indian diplomat . Afterwards, the GOPIO presents 
its achievements during the year under review . The event culminates in a banquet 
honoring some distinguished Persons of Indian Origin for their community service 
or professional achievements .
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GOPIO (M) and Pravasi Bharatiya Divas
GOPIO (M) holds a one day convention – PIOs Dialogue with India – generally 
after the PBD program; the date is January 10th and the venue is one of the hotels 
where their members are staying . The GOPIO (M) executive coordinates and or-
ganizes this event . Three panel discussions are convened after an inaugural session 
addressed by the Minister of Overseas Indian Affairs, Ministers from PIO countries 
such as Mauritius, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, and Singapore . The post-PBD 
Convention ends with a decision being taken about GOPIO (M)’s next event – a 
mini-PBD, say, or the International GOPIO Convention . The Malaysian delegation 
generally outnumbers all other delegations to the PBD, followed by Sri Lanka and 
the United States .
Bringing the GOPIOs together
Attempts have been made to bring the two GOPIOs together by the Chairman of 
the HLC on the Indian Diaspora, Dr . L .M . Singhvi, as well as several well-wishers 
from the diaspora . The international convention of Pravasi Bharatiya Divas is a sig-
nificant achievement on the part of the Indian Government, mobilizing both PIO 
and NRI diaspora segments around a common platform, but the effort to unify 
them still has some way to go . The Executive Committees of both GOPIOs were 
persuaded to attend each other’s Conventions during the PBD in January 2010 but 
as of 2016 no solution is in sight for their merger .
The differences between the two streams of the Indian diaspora – PIO and NRI – 
can be traced to their very formation . As mentioned earlier, the PIO diaspora, con-
stituted by the 3rd, 4th or 5th generation of descendants of ‘indentured laborers,’ 
was recruited predominantly from the poorer, deprived and untouchable sections of 
Indian society, who were even forced to board the ships chartered to take them to the 
various European plantations . Their further subjugation as ‘slaves’ under the ruth-
less British and other European planters only added to their misery, distancing them 
from their own people left behind in India . The majority of these emigrants under 
the indentured labor system, as we saw, lost contact with their families back home 
in India, and they also became alienated from their mother tongue in the course of 
settling down in the plantation colonies .
The PIO diaspora consider themselves denied of their due position as the Indian 
diaspora, since the new policy initiatives by the government primarily address the 
needs of the ‘Dollar Diaspora,’ i .e . the NRI diaspora . They believe that NRIs and 
NRI diaspora members, particularly those from North America and Europe, are 
well connected with India and already have a firm foothold there . They were neither 
persecuted nor deterritorialized, but had immigrated to greener pastures for lucrative 
jobs and business careers . They are affluent and have bank balances to invest in India 
or carry out business with India, as a result of which they demand dual citizenship . 
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The PIO diaspora, on the other hand, see themselves as the ‘unfortunate children of 
Mother India,’ deserving attention and support as the true Indian diaspora, rather 
than the much later NRI diaspora from the developed countries .
The NRI diaspora, as mentioned earlier, comprises the first or second generation 
of Indian immigrants from the middle and upper classes and castes of urban India, 
who had opportunities for an elite education and job placement . They have the best 
of both worlds, the world of India and the world of the developed countries . Besides 
frequent family visits, they evince a keen interest in economic and political spheres 
in their places of origin . They have gained leverage with the Ministry of Overseas 
Indian Affairs, not only in seeking favorable policy initiatives but also in having their 
candidature considered for the award of Pravasi Bharatiya Samman .
The diversity and the distance between the NRI and the PIO diaspora are emi-
nently visible where they have an opportunity to converge . For instance, the Indians 
who have directly immigrated to New York largely head for Jackson Heights, where 
they have created a ‘Little India,’ while the ‘East Indians,’ as they are popularly called 
in the Caribbean countries of Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana and Surinam, generally 
head for Richmond Hills, where the ‘twice migrant’ Indian community has created 
its ‘Little India’ along with dhal-roti and goat, ‘doubles,’ chatney music and dance .5 
Except for the Indian national celebrations of Independence Day and Republic Day, 
organized by the Indian Consular Office, they hardly come together for any family 
or socio-cultural events . Jackson Heights and Richmond Hills seldom meet, clearly 
drawing boundaries between the two . The barriers are unlikely to disappear in the 
near future .
Global Organizations of the Regional / Linguistic Diaspora
The articulation of regional, linguistic or caste identities and belonging has given 
rise to a regrouping of diaspora communities at the global level . These regional / lin-
guistic groups have established their own global organizations to promote their cul-
tural, socio-economic, political, regional and linguistic interests across nation states, 
including their region of origin . For instance, there are Telugu, Gujarati, Punjabi 
global organizations that have their patronage in states like Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat 
and Punjab (briefly discussed below) . It is interesting to note the absence of a NRI 
and PIO diaspora distinction among these regional / linguistic global organizations . 
In fact, initiatives for diaspora involvement in developmental activities are taken at 
the local or regional levels to which the diaspora originally ‘belonged .’ While the 
diaspora policies are initiated at the national level, it is the state / provincial govern-
5 Chatney is a word used in Indian languages for the spicy accompaniment served with snacks and this 
word is used to refer to the music and dance form – chatney music and dance – created from the fusion 
of Bhojpuri folk songs and dances accompanied by dholak (drum), harmonium and Western guitar by 
Indo-Caribbean singers and dancers . 
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ment that pursues ‘their’ diaspora pro-actively, partnering with them for advance-
ment in all spheres of life . The regional diaspora has emerged as a significant player 
in the growth story of its place of origin . Some of the members of pan-Indian global 
organizations like GOPIO (NY) or GOPIO (M) may also be members of regional 
diaspora organizations, provided that they, their parents or ancestors originally ‘be-
longed’ to that region and vice versa.
The World Telugu Federation (WTF)
The World Telugu Federation (WTF) is an NGO set up in 1992 to promote Telugu 
language and culture among overseas Telugus . The initiative came from Chennapuri 
Andhra Maha Sabha, the Telugu Association of North America (TANA), and the 
Tamil Nadu Telugu Federation (TNTF) . The First Convention of the WTF was 
inaugurated by Sri N .T . Rama Rao, the then Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh, 
and was duly held in New York in 1992 . Today WTF has emerged as a coordinat-
ing body for most of the Telugu associations worldwide, including the International 
Telugu Institute . In addition, it liaises with Andhra Pradesh government and other 
organizations .
The leadership came from leading Telugu film producers such as Dr . V .L . Dutt 
and V .S . Rao . The first WTF conference was held in Madras (December 1994) with 
a second following in Hyderabad (December 1996) . The third Conference was or-
ganized in New Delhi (December 1998), followed by a fourth at Visakhapatnam 
(December 2000) . The only conference held outside India so far was in Singapore 
(December 2002) . Besides promotion of Telugu language and culture, the WTF has 
broadened its canvas to include business, tourism, education, and collaboration in 
science and technology . The Federation has also emerged as a forum to attract trade, 
commerce and investments in Andhra Pradesh by the Telugu diaspora . Members of 
both the PIO and New Telugu diasporas attend these conferences in large numbers 
and renew their links with the motherland . Regional and linguistic sentiments of 
‘belonging together’ are often stronger than pan-national identity .
Vishwa Gujarati Samaj (VGS)
Founded in 1989, Vishwa Gujarati Samaj (VGS) is an International Organization of 
the global Gujarati community . It has grown from strength to strength over a span of 
22 years and can boast membership from 101 countries . VGS is registered as a Public 
Trust under the registration no . F-1927, Ahmedabad under the Bombay Public Trust 
Act, and is a registered society under section 80 (G) of the Indian Income Tax Act . 
VGS is governed by its members and office bearers settled throughout the world . 
The apex body of Vishwa Gujarati Samaj is registered as ‘Vishwa Gujarati Samaj 
(USA)-INC .’ under section 402 of the Not-For-Profit Corporation Law of the state 
of New York . It has its head office in Ahmedabad, India and enjoys exemption from 
Federal Income Tax under section 501 (A) of the Internal Revenue Code (USA) . 
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Membership is open to all Gujaratis, and to all those who understand the Gujarati 
language or belong to Gujarati associations throughout the world and accept the 
aims and objectives of the organization . VGS also undertakes projects and programs 
in accordance with broad objectives, such as organizing social, cultural, educational, 
environmental, and humanitarian activities for Gujaratis settled around the world .
The Government of Gujarat set up the Non-Resident Gujarati Foundation 
(NRGF) in 1998, besides launching many schemes targeting NRGs, not only to at-
tract investment in Gujarat but also to enhance communication . The World Gujarati 
Meeting held at Vadodara on January 4th, 1999 attracted NRGs from many parts of 
the world, such as Uganda, New Zealand, the United States, the United Kingdom, 
UAE, Australia, and South Africa . Gujaratis are well known for their close network-
ing along family, caste and religious lines, both in India and abroad .
International Gujarati associations and organizations play a very significant role 
in promoting transnational networks; they seek to unite all Gujaratis for the benefit 
of Gujarat and to preserve Gujarati culture, its traditions, and folklore . There are 
considerable numbers of Gujaratis living in the United States, the United Kingdom, 
Canada, and East Africa . Overseas Gujaratis have formed these associations to pur-
sue and safeguard their interests at the local and global levels . Their solidarity with 
fellow Gujaratis could be gauged by the global response to the crises in Uganda, the 
Middle East, and Fiji . The unprecedented earthquake of January 26, 2001 brought 
together Gujartis worldwide, mobilizing men and materials to enable immediate 
and long-term recovery from the massive damage . In order to rebuild economy and 
infrastructure, they raised funds on a grand scale – not just at a personal but also an 
organizational level .
The Global Punjabi Community
Punjabis have maintained strong networks – sociocultural, economic, religious and 
political – with their kith and kin around the world, as well as with their relatives 
back home in Punjab . These networks are manifested in remittances sent to the 
families left behind, by involvement in various national and international associa-
tions, and by visiting the homeland for manifold reasons . Further, the process of 
maintaining these networks is facilitated by the spectacular progress in global media 
and communication technology .
With the help of the Internet, the world wide web and news groups, plus inter-
active communication via email, diasporic Punjabis form today the ‘Global Punjabi 
community .’ As a pro-active state, the Government of Punjab has operated Pravasi 
Punjabi Divas since 2003, inviting Non-Resident Punjabis (NRPs) to interact with 
the leading industrialists and businessmen of Punjab . Following the Government of 
India, distinguished members of the overseas Punjabi community were honored with 
the status of ‘Punjabi Gaurav Sanman .’ The state of Punjab offers incentives to NRPs 
for setting up industrial enterprises on a preferential basis, providing ‘Single Window 
Clearance’ for investment proposals . The state established a Ministry of NRP Affairs 
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in 2002, with its Secretariat at Chandigarh; it created an NRP Helpline to obtain 
feedback from NRPs, especially those from Canada, the United Kingdom and the 
United States . The Government of Punjab started a new scheme called the Mera 
Pind Initiative in 2002, offering matching grants (50 %) to NRPs for funds invested 
in ‘development projects’ such as rural infrastructure or investment in ancestral vil-
lages (Kaur 2011) .
In Conclusion: Observations and Reflections
Diaspora global organizations play a significant role in articulating issues, challenges 
and opportunities facing the diaspora community and the motherland / ancestral 
land, keeping in mind the protection and promotion of wellbeing and common 
interests of both parties . Contemporary globalization has facilitated more than ever 
before the bringing together of dispersed people and communities, taking those who 
‘belong’ to a common place of origin and connecting, or rather reconnecting, them 
on a truly global basis . The global organizations of the Indian diaspora, based as they 
are on pan-Indian, regional / linguistic, religious, or caste identities, have emerged 
during the last decade of the 20th century following the advent of technologies of 
superfast travel and also information and communication highways .
Today the Indian diaspora communities, no less diversified than India itself, are 
actively engaged in reconnecting with the people and places of their origin, extend-
ing what it means to ‘belong’ to those communities or regions that they, or their 
ancestors, left when they immigrated to global destinations . Perceptions of Indian 
identity among the Indian diaspora vary based on how members are situated in the 
host country . In Mauritius, for instance, where PIOs form a majority, Indian identity 
is perceived through its constituents of Hindus, Tamils, Telugus and Marathis (Bhat 
and Bhaskar 2011), while in Trinidad they are primarily categorized as PIOs, with 
little deviation . However, the NRI diasporas in the United Kingdom and United 
States exhibit all the diversities for which India itself is known . Thus, depending on 
context, the Indian diaspora responds to the situation on the ground by forming 
‘Little India,’ ‘Little Punjab,’ or ‘Little Gujarat’; thus, communities assume one or 
other of multiple identities and come to define themselves as belonging to a nation, 
region / language, religion, or caste . Another significant distinction that vertically dif-
ferentiates the Indian diaspora is that between its PIOs and NRI sections . The former 
are largely ‘children of the indentured,’ whose parents or grandparents immigrated 
to colonial British and other European plantations, whereas the latter immigrated to 
the developed West after India gained independence .
Despite the diversities, Indians have a strong sense of unity that is often described 
in terms of ‘unity in diversity’:
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Though the concept of India is barely 53 years old, ‘Indianness’ has evolved 
over the centuries . Certainly the freedom movement against the British saw 
its consolidation further . Indianness has a geographical connotation but is not 
any longer spatially limited . It includes the notion of a nation marked by its 
cultural confluence not bound by frontiers, for it is transnational in character . 
(Bhat 2006)
India today stretches far beyond her borders, and the Indian diaspora, thanks to 
the new policy initiatives of the Government of India, is set to take India beyond 
India . It shares equally in the achievements of the Indian Space Research Organi-
zation and in the dynamism of Silicon Valley in California . Needless to say, any 
disaster or tragedy striking any Indian anywhere in the world is a matter of concern 
to all Indians wherever they may be . The news of 27 September (Hindustan Times 
2016) from Washington that the Indian American community in the United States 
has petitioned the White House to designate Pakistan a state sponsor of terrorism, 
this coming only days after a bill to this effect was tabled in the US Congress by 
two powerful lawmakers (following an incident where Pakistani terrorists killed 18 
Indian soldiers at Uri in Jammu and Kashmir), amply illustrates the reality of India 
emerging beyond India .
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Navigating Belonging in a Mobile World:  3 
Young Indian Students and Researchers  
in Germany
Antonie Fuhse
Since 1998, there has been an ongoing internationalization of higher education . One 
result of this has been an increase in student mobility . The OECD estimated in 2013 
that more than 4 .5 million tertiary education students were internationally mobile 
(OECD 2013) . To attract students and researchers to Germany, the government as 
well as research institutes and universities have developed numerous programs and 
advertising strategies . Institutions such as the DAAD (German Academic Exchange 
Service) and the International Max Planck Research Schools (IMPRS) court young 
students by offering attractive financial and scientific opportunities . In doing so, 
Germany has attempted to brand itself as the “land of ideas,”1 a land of innovation, 
and science . Statistics show that India is one of the top three sending countries for 
postgraduate students and postdoctoral researchers .2 With its university and vari-
ety of research institutes (mostly Max Planck Institutes), Göttingen, or the “city of 
science,”3 is one center attracting Indian students and researchers . As of 2017 around 
300 Indian postgraduates and postdoctoral fellows are studying or working in the 
1 The ‘Germany – Land of Ideas’ initiative is supported by the German Government, the Foreign Of-
fice, the Ministry for Education and Research and various companies (https://land-der-ideen .de/en/
partners) .
2 Data from the website http://www .wissenschaftweltoffen .de/daten/1/2/1, run by the German Aca-
demic Exchange Service (DAAD) and the German Centre for Higher Education Research and Science 
Studies (DZHW) .
3 “Göttingen – City of Science” (“Göttingen – Stadt, die Wissen schafft”) is the slogan of the city . 
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city, mostly in the fields of engineering, natural sciences, and mathematics . There 
are also about 30 Indian students and researchers in the humanities and social sci-
ences . Only about 30 percent of the Indian students and scientists in Göttingen are 
female .4 These students and researchers come from different regions, are from the 
heterogeneous Indian middle class, are mostly single, and typically aged between 22 
and 35 . Most of them plan to stay in Göttingen until they complete a certain aca-
demic degree, and thus their stays are limited in duration .
In the following pages, I sketch out strategies the students and researchers adopt 
to navigate their lives between ‘home’ and abroad, what being a scientist means for 
their biographic navigation, and how the presence of India influences their feelings 
of belonging in a mobile world . My findings are based on data from qualitative inter-
views, participatory observation, and online research on Facebook between August 
2010 and April 2016 .
Theoretical and Methodological Framing:  
Studying Belonging in a Mobile World
Because “all the world seems to be on the move” (Sheller and Urry 2006: 207), we, as 
social scientists, have to ask how we can study the dynamics of belonging in a mobile 
world . Sheller and Urry propose the “mobility paradigm” (ibid .), which asserts that 
mobility (physical, virtual, material) is an important part of most people’s lives . At 
the same time, they note that spatial, infrastructural, and institutional “moorings” 
(ibid .: 210) enable and shape the mobility of individuals . This underlines the fact 
that mobility is influenced by multiple structures of power and inequality, for not 
everyone has the same access to mobility (Hannam, Sheller and Urry 2006: 3) . This 
is elaborated in Glick Schiller and Salazar’s (2013) concept of “regimes of mobil-
ity,” which emphasizes that individuals are not free to move as they want, not even 
the highly skilled . Building on this, I have developed the concept of the “regime of 
student mobility” as a tool for analyzing the biographic navigation of the young stu-
dents and researchers (Fuhse, forthcoming) . This concept takes into account that my 
respondents navigate in a transnational space that is shaped by multiple actors, struc-
tures of power (international, national, regional, familial), inequalities, discourses, 
and imaginations . The process of biographic navigation entails the positioning and 
negotiation of multiple formations of belonging and conscious and subconscious 
constructions of the self (Pfaff-Czarnecka 2011: 10–11) . The students and research-
ers balance different modes of belonging, create new ones, combine them creatively, 
and thus reestablish their “social location” (ibid .: 2) in a new context .
4 This imbalance is also indicated by statistics that include all Indian students in Germany and stud-
ies about Indian students in other countries (Sondhi 2015) . The reasons for the gender imbalace are 
discussed in Sondhi (2013) and Fuhse (forthcoming) .
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In moving – both physically and virtually – between India and Germany, the stu-
dents and researchers negotiate different social spaces, and therefore different modes 
of belonging . As Pfaff-Czarnecka (2013:13) argues: “Belonging is an emotionally 
charged, ever dynamic social location – that is: a position in social structure, expe-
rienced through identification, embeddedness, connectedness and attachments .” If 
individuals or groups feel threatened or insecure, feelings of belonging tend to be-
come increasingly relevant . In this process, people start to (re)consider the normal, 
self-evident and unconscious feeling of belonging (Yuval-Davis 2011: 4) . That leads 
to the articulation, (formal) structuring, and in some cases, to the politicization of 
belonging (Pfaff-Czarnecka 2012: 16), or what Yuval-Davis (2011:4) calls the “poli-
tics of belonging .”
Belonging is multidimensional and consists of different elements which are often 
difficult to combine (Pfaff-Czarnecka 2013: 9, 21) . Over the course of their lives, in-
dividuals encounter and therefore navigate through diverse constellations of belong-
ing (ibid .: 21) . In this process, the individual person negotiates collective constella-
tions and hence (re)creates belonging (ibid .: 20) . As an analytical tool to capture this 
dynamic relationship between individual agency and the social environment (see 
also Vigh 2009) I use the concept of „biographic navigation“ (Pfaff-Czarnecka 2012, 
2013; Vigh 2009) .
I studied young Indian students and researchers in Göttingen and their indi-
vidual strategies of navigating the diverse constellations of belonging in their mobile 
“life-worlds” (Schütz and Luckmann 1973) . In this chapter, I focus on different di-
mensions of belonging central to their biographic navigations: regional and national 
identifications, professional belonging, and imagined futures . All four revolve around 
different articulations of belonging: social relations, practices, and narrations . I use 
‘articulation’ in the twofold meaning of ‘to express’ and ‘to connect,’ as proposed by 
Hermann and Kempf (Hermann and Kempf 2005: 313–315, referring to Comaroff 
1985, and Hall 1980, 1986) . Social relations, narrations and practices are not only 
expressions of belonging, but also ways to connect oneself with other people, places, 
or discourses . These articulations take place in specific situations and are individual 
or collective ways of expressing and negotiating different modes of belonging, such 
as nationality, religion, region, profession, gender, and class .
Organizations and Festivities as Spaces for Practicing Belonging
Steven Vertovec (1999: 450, referring to Gilroy 1987, 1993) states that “the aware-
ness of multi-locality stimulates the desire to connect oneself with others, both ‘here’ 
and ‘there’ who share the same ‘routes’ and ‘roots .’” In the case of the young Indians 
I studied, this awareness is reflected in formal and informal organizations, festivities 
and leisure activities . Analyzing these aspects and the processes connected to them 
– such as the construction of organizations and groups – and the dynamics of exclu-
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sion and inclusion, can reveal a lot about the dynamics of belonging in the form of 
negotiated and performed commonality (see also Pfaff-Czarnecka 2013: 14–15) .
Nirmiti, the “Indian fraternity in Göttingen,” states on its website: “We sowed 
the seed of our association in 2009 and now aim to create an environment of mutual 
support, social interaction and a blend of two countries and cultures – India and 
Germany . Our name and logo thus signify creation .”5 As a student association with 
an elected committee, Nirmiti organizes several events each year, including a Sports 
Day, Indian Independence Day, and Diwali,6 and attempts to integrate newcomers 
from India into the group . This organization is founded on a common notion of In-
dianness, and tries to acknowledge the diverse meanings of this concept . In practice, 
this means selecting events that are considered Indian (that is, events not especially 
connected to one region or religion), and to organize these events as representations 
of India’s diversity, such as in the event’s cultural program . As an increasing number 
of Indians are coming to Göttingen, the events are becoming larger, and the task of 
organizing them to everybody’s satisfaction is becoming increasingly complicated . 
Aside from these difficulties (which will be described in the following section), these 
events provide the young students and researchers with an important space for so-
cializing and self-expression . In addition to allowing Indians to meet each other and 
eat Indian food together, the cultural program is an essential part of these functions . 
Everybody who wants to is allowed to perform dances, songs, or other pieces, thereby 
offering each an opportunity to enact what he or she considers to be Indian culture . 
In Butler’s (1990, 1993) concept of performativity, these practices are not only the 
expression, but also constitutive elements, of belonging . In performing, the individ-
uals connect with each other through their collective belonging as Indian, and evoke 
norms and values already associated with these performances . Festivals are therefore 
a space to meet other Indians, and to socialize and perform ‘culture’ in familiar ways . 
These two aspects are described by a member of the Nirmiti committee:
[We] started these celebrations just like fun-feel party . And then as time went 
on, [we] moved on so . We wanted to use this get together function – I mean 
mainly after Nirmiti started to take this over, so we started to organize celebra-
tions in more Indian way, so [that] every little thing started to remind us of 
our home . So we wanted to celebrate Diwali at the closest weekend possible 
and … crackers and every little thing, the puja, everything, the cultural activi-
ties, the quiz . … So we wanted to recreate our Indian celebration in a foreign 
land . So this not started out like this, [at the time] we just wanted to get every-
5 Website Nirmiti (https://www .uni-goettingen .de/de/132691 .html) .
6 As did my respondents, I will use the English spelling without diacritics . Diwali is the ‘festival of 
lights,’ celebrated almost all over India, which commemorates the return of the mythical couple Rama 
and Sita to Ayodhya (there are also other stories about the origin of this festival) (Malinar 2009: 164) . 
A presentation is held on Diwali to inform the non-Indians colleagues and friends about the reason for 
the festival .
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body together and have fun . That’s what happened in [the] first or three Di-
wali’s, but after [that] Nirmiti started to take [over] this thing themselves…  . 
I think the main reason why it attracts more people is the togethership they 
can find more Indians here and it brings back the Indian celebration, the 
whole mood, everything . Nirmiti was successful in achieving this to the full-
est level, to the complete level . We, they give attention to minor details that is 
very nice . … Food will also be one of the most important factors . (Interview 
R .7, 15 .09 .2011)
Some respondents stated that the time of the festivals was when they missed home 
and family the most . In recreating the festivals in the most Indian way possible, the 
young Indians try to build a ‘home away from home’ and “reroot” themselves (Ghosh 
and Wang 2003: 274) . Thus, the festivals could be understood as providing a place to 
practice, perform, express, and articulate multiple modes of belonging and identities 
(such as national, regional, religious, and class identities) . Diwali, which many of 
my respondents consider to be celebrated more or less all over India (sometimes also 
regardless of religion), is one of the main events for coming together . Every year, the 
Diwali celebrations are organized by the Nirmiti members, with planning starting 
months before the event . The celebration is almost the same every year: It starts with 
a short presentation about Diwali, followed by a puja8, the cultural program, games, 
dinner, sparklers, another game, and ends with people dancing to the newest music 
from India . Both my observations at the event and interlocutors statements suggest 
that the religious aspect of Diwali is not so important for most present . Although 
pujas were performed by a student with a Brahmin background at the Diwali celebra-
tion in 2010, 2011, and 2012,9 the other aspects of the celebration, like the food, 
games, cultural program, and the presentation language are given significantly more 
attention in the organizing phase and during the event itself . Indeed, the choice of 
clothing, participation in the cultural program, the choice of food and so on are the 
central platforms for the articulation of the group’s perceived diversity, and therefore 
also of multiple ways of belonging (such as regional, class, caste) .
The importance of socializing with other Indians is not restricted to the festivities 
and important events . The circles of friends and thus the day-to-day interactions also 
show that belonging to the Indian community is an important part of life for most 
of the young Indians I spoke to . As one respondent stated:
7 Male, early thirties, PhD, was a founding member of the Nirmiti committee . Has been in the USA 
for a postdoctoral fellowship since 2012 .
8 Puja (Sanskrit) “Worship” is a religious ritual where offerings are made to a deity . Done at multiple 
occasions and settings: from the daily puja at home, to elaborate temple ceremonies and large festivals 
(Oberlies 2008: 23–24) .
9 I was not present in 2013 . No puja was performed in 2014 and 2015, as, according to one respon-
dent, no one there had the ceremonial knowledge to perform it . 
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I know that people from my land are here, my own people are here . And 
then the Nirmiti’s Diwali program … it brought me in contact with so many 
Indians, Bengalis, Non-Bengalis, Maharashtrians, Gujaratis, so many Indians . 
And then the bond started increasing and it increased like anything, and now-
adays I feel like I’m not alone here…  . [In my] first month, I had the feeling 
that I should escape from here, this is not for me . But now it feels like I could 
stay here for three more years or four more years for PhD … The friends’ circle 
is something which Germany gave to me . (Interview An .10, 20 .02 .2013)
As these groups of friends are often organized around regional affiliations, they pro-
vide a place for speaking in the same mother tongue, eating regional dishes and 
watching movies . This points to the importance of regional identification and be-
longing, and leads to the next aspect I focus on .
Dilemmas of Belonging: The Importance of Regional Identities,  
or the Difficulties of Being ‘Indian’
For many of the Indian students and researchers that I met in Göttingen, one of the 
key dimensions of belonging is the regional background, which seems to play an 
important role in forming a circle of friends, leisure time activities, and organizing 
events (regional and Indian) (see also Bhat this volume) . Aside from Diwali, which is 
understood as an Indian celebration, there are other celebrations that are organized 
around regional and / or religious belonging . In 2013, for example, a group of mostly 
Bengalis organized Saraswati Puja which was also announced as the “Bengali Spring 
Festival .” As the invitation stated:
We are now named as Bangladesh and West Bengal (part of India) . Politically 
and officially we are two different countries . Somebody had drawn a fractal 
boundary and we are divided . But, we still share the same culture . Our cul-
tural authenticity, our language transcend the political boundaries . One of 
our cultural events to welcome the spring is Saraswati pujo11 . It is a Bengali 
Hindu religious custom of worshipping the goddess of education and culture . 
But, we celebrate all Bengali cultural events without maintaining any barrier 
of religious and political boundaries . We carry our culture beyond the geogra-
phy, surpassing the religious view . So, come and join us in this joyous moment 
to welcome the spring .12
10 Female, 23 years, from Calcutta, doing her master’s degree in sociology, short-term DAAD stipend 
for Germany, plans to do PhD in Germany .
11 ‘pujo’ is the Bengali version of puja. 
12 The invitation was circulated via the Facebook group “Nirmiti: Indians in Göttingen” (04 .03 .13) .
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As the authors of the invitation use words and phrases like “we,” “our cultural authen-
ticity,” “our language,” and “same culture,” and point out that “the Bengali culture” 
transcends religious and political boundaries; they highlight the common belonging, 
culture, and language of Bengalis, be it in India or Bangladesh . This emphasis on a 
common background is also reflected in the event program: “Breakfast with typical 
Saraswati pujo food”; “games that will remind your childhood with some gifts”; “all 
homemade typical Saraswati pujo food made with the spirit of Charuibhati (picnic): 
Khichuri, Aloor dum, Payesh, Pantooa .” Although not only Bengalis were invited to 
the event, at least 80 percent of the participants had Bengali roots, be they in India or 
Bangladesh . In offering an opportunity to speak Bengali, eat Bengali food, sing Ben-
gali songs, play Bengali games, and perform a Bengali Hindu ritual, the celebration 
provided Bengalis with a space for articulating their belonging, both to their region 
as well as to their group and each other as Bengalis . As inclusive as this event was for 
Bengalis with different national citizenships and religions, it excluded non-Bengalis, 
especially through language . While language can be a strong factor in exclusion, for 
people with the same mother tongue, it can also be an important means of creating 
feelings of familiarity and belonging (Antonsich 2010: 648) . As one respondent told 
me:
If I get to talk in my language I feel most happy and you know . And I might 
tend to talk to people who are talking in my language … you know [this is] 
the thing which happens in India, so which we do not realize it…  . (Interview 
S13 ., 26 .01 .2013)
The importance of speaking or writing in one’s mother tongue is also illustrated on 
Facebook . A few of the young Indians (almost) exclusively use their mother tongue 
in posts or comments . Language use is typically related to the people they are con-
nected with via Facebook (family and friends from the same region) and the topics 
they are discussing, such as regional politics, music, or movies . Language is also a 
sensitive topic in the organization of Diwali and other major events . In 2012, a 
committee member noted that the previous year some students from Tamil Nadu 
had commented on the use of Hindi in the presentation and the music . As such, 
the committee decided to pay more attention to language and ensure the presenta-
tions, the cultural program, and the music choice was multilingual . This illustrates 
the importance of language in articulations of belonging, and the powerful role that 
language can play in including people in or excluding them from a defined group .
In attempting to reconcile the importance of regional belonging with the wish to 
unite Indian students and researchers of all backgrounds and religions in Göttingen 
under the umbrella of Nirmiti, members of the organization emphasize the notion of 
‘unity in diversity .’ Especially when there are occasions for the representation of India 
or the Indian students and researchers in Göttingen, a lot of thought is put into the 
13 Female, early thirties, PhD, back in India and searching for postdoctoral position . 
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program . At the annual Indian Cultural Night (ICN) for example, master’s students 
from one of the MPI programs in Göttingen are asked to represent the country . For 
the 2013 Indian Culture Night, as the host of the evening stated, organizers chose 
‘Indian festivals’ as the theme to showcase India’s diversity . Different regional and 
religious festivals (Hindu and Muslim, but no Christian or Buddhist festivals) were 
presented and demonstrated through songs and dances . The Indians in the audience 
I spoke to were impressed by the choice of the topic and the attempt to represent 
India’s diversity . But not everybody was content with the presentation . One inter-
locutor stated that some regions were not represented, such as Northeast India . So 
how much diversity is enough? Is being diverse part of being Indian? It seems to be 
so in the perception of a former Nirmiti president:
So now the aims of Nirmiti team as such is to promote this mixing of different 
cultures, which is like, if you are in India from a region and you did not have 
a chance to go to other region and study or, for some reason, then you are 
somehow confined to that region and then you take values only from there . 
But when you come here then you get a value from this country and also of 
your own country from [a] different region . And we want to promote this 
really, and we wanted people to recognize this difference and also to respect 
this in a way . Because there are been instances where people confined from 
a particular region did not respect the differences from the other region, and 
they somehow tried to either dominate or suppress others, which we do not 
really want to happen . So that’s one thing we wanted to promote: that India 
is of different values and different diversity and this need to be respected and 
accepted as a fact, and that’s where it brings in more spice I guess . Because if 
you expecting your Indian food to be spicy it’s not just one spice that brings 
in, but it’s different a lot of things that brings in that taste, so I believe this . … 
[S]imilarly, Indian community is also a masala of something . (Interview V .14, 
26 .03 .2013)
Employing the image of the Indian community as a “masala“, a mixture of differ-
ent spices, V . illustrated that he understood being Indian as being diverse (to have 
different mother tongues, different religions, different food), and he wanted to ac-
knowledge this diversity . The discourse on ‘unity in diversity,’ and the attempt to 
implement it in the events, is a way of trying to integrate everybody into the ‘Indian 
masala .’ But this rather apolitical view of India masks the problems that India actu-
ally has with regionalism and communalism (among others), and therefore excludes 
the more critical or political young Indians in Göttingen, who find it difficult to 
relate to Nirmiti and its events .15 In this process, Nirmiti as an organization acts as a 
14 Male, 24 years old, pursuing PhD at MPI for Biophysical Chemistry, member of the Nirmiti com-
mittee .
15 I realized this aspect in an interview with an Indian social scientist whom I had never met at any 
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“regime of belonging” (Pfaff-Czarnecka 2013: 19) that influences individual persons 
and defines its boundaries . Nevertheless, in trying to define for themselves what 
India and Indianness mean, the Indian students and researchers in Göttingen are 
part of a larger process of defining and redefining India in and beyond its territorial 
boundaries .
Being a Scientist in “Göttingen – City of Science”
One spatial and social location for the young Indians I worked with is Göttingen, the 
“city of science”, in Lower Saxony . Although it only has about 130 000 inhabitants, 
Göttingen is a well-known university city, highly regarded for its achievements in 
mathematics and the natural sciences, and boasts over 40 Nobel Laureates . In telling 
me about leaving India and coming to Göttingen for their studies, my interlocutors 
provided me with narrations on who they think they are, on what is important to 
them at this stage in their lives, and how Germany provides them the opportunity 
to achieve these goals .
A common topic in the narrations about the decision to leave India for studies 
is competition at home . As one interlocutor told me, “there are a lot of students in 
India, and it’s always a kind of competition, which happens especially in the study 
place” (Interview Ar .16, 14 .12 .2011) . The selection of Germany is also partly con-
nected to this spirit of competition:
One [reason to come to Germany] is to be [a] little bit different from where 
others are going . Second is, like, to learn from the place where – especially in 
my field – where it came from . All the technology is [from] there / here, so I 
thought “okay .” (ibid .)
In their narrations my interlocutors represented India as a country full of skilled 
people, but with few good opportunities for study . Germany, however, is understood 
as a country that has a lot of quality institutes, charges no tuition fees, and offers the 
possibility of achieving a doctoral degree within three years . For my respondents, it 
is clear that mobility is the key to career success . In order to achieve a good posi-
tion in the future, it is necessary to go abroad, work in well-respected institutes 
with established researchers, and to be part of a scientific community . However, it 
is not only important for the success in one’s work life; a career is also a “cultural 
product” (Cohen, Duberley and Ravishankar 2012: 106) that is situated in dynamic 
contexts . It is not only formed by the scientific community (in this case), but also 
by the expectations of one’s family, peers, and society . My interview partners repre-
Nirmiti event, but at other events like Saraswati Puja . She made it clear to me that it is hard for her to 
relate to the apolitical and sometimes idealized manner in which India is represented at the events . 
16 Male, 28 years, pursuing PhD at MPI for Biophysical Chemistry, member of Nirmiti committee .
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sented migration as something which everybody does, and which makes the family 
proud . The “diasporic path” (ibid .: 116), and the social capital that can be ‘earned’ 
by fulfilling it, is sanctioned by families and communities, and provides a feeling of 
security in a situation characterized by temporality and social, financial, and other 
forms of insecurity . This means career and national and / or cultural affiliations are 
interrelated, as “ongoing facets of individuals’ identities as they develop diasporic 
careers” (ibid .:106) .
Providing the young Indians with a space for scientific research, networks, and 
contact with colleagues from various countries, the workplace is a space for negotiat-
ing different aspects of belonging . One aspect is the work itself . For my respondents, 
being a researcher and belonging to a scientific community is important . This is 
reflected in the time they spend at work – most say they work 10 hours a day, up to 
six days a week – and in their narrations about the decision to come to Germany . As 
one said:
Germany, for many reasons . One of the reasons is [that] Germany is very 
famous for physics . You know the modern physics have started in Germany: 
Max Planck, Heisenberg, Einstein . All are from Germany . And Germany has 
this rich tradition of producing wonderful physicists . And I’m a physicist so it 
is quite natural selecting Germany . (Interview P .17, 10 .07 .2011)
The freedom of research at the Max Planck Institutes, the easy availability of resourc-
es like chemicals and laboratory equipment, and the work environment, which is 
often described as very liberal, are understood as central in providing the possibility 
of achieving one’s full scientific potential .
Aside from being a place of research and work, the institutes are also a space for 
meeting people and socializing . For some, it is the only place where they socialize 
with non-Indians on a regular basis . It is thus also a space for the negotiation of 
belonging to different nation-states, ‘cultures,’ religions, and so on . This becomes 
obvious in the various cultural evenings organized by the students, which include 
Slavic Culture Night, German-Swiss Night, Arabian Culture Night, Nepali Culture 
Night and, of course, Indian Culture Night . At these events, students and research-
ers are expected to represent their country, and thus their ethnic-national belonging, 
to their colleagues, professors, and friends through food, a cultural program and 
games .
Depending on the stage they are at in their careers, the young Indians are ei-
ther planning to finish their PhD, or are applying for a postdoctoral fellowship or 
a permanent position . However, a foreign doctoral degree appears to be regarded 
as only the first step on the diasporic path . Completing at least one postdoctoral 
fellowship outside India is perceived as the next imperative in working one’s way 
17 Male, early thirties, in Göttingen as a postdoctoral fellow, shifted to Weizmann Institute in Rehovot 
in January 2013, has been in the USA for another postdoctoral fellowship since 2014 .
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up . My interlocutors’ ideas about the necessity of going abroad, about where to go, 
what to achieve and when to go back ‘home’ are related to the structures, inequali-
ties, images, and discourses that constitute the regime of student mobility (Fuhse, 
forthcoming) .
Almost every respondent formulated the wish to return to India at some point 
in time, though this was likely to be (repeatedly) delayed on the basis of pursuing 
further qualifications, be it a PhD, or a (second or third) postdoctoral fellowship . 
I now turn to how this narrative of returning to India is part of the negotiation of 
belonging .
“One Day I’m Going Back to India”: (Imagined) Futures in India
Still India is, well for me, Delhi is the best city . [That] means, no mat-
ter how unsafe it is or how much crime levels are there, I still want to 
stay in Delhi forever, like really forever, the life kind of thing .
(Interview S ., 26 .01 .2013)
This statement reflects the sentiment of many of my respondents: there is a definite 
wish to go back to India, but exactly when and how has not been planned in detail . 
I argue that it is not important if the young Indians return or not: the very concept 
of India as the ‘arrival point’ (cf . ‘arrival points,’ Baas 2010: 3) and as a permanent 
‘anchor’ in their biographic navigation is what is of interest here . Baas (2010: 3) 
defines arrival points as “imaginary moments in the future when migrants imagine 
themselves as having arrived at where they intended to be by going through a partic-
ular migration process” (Baas 2010: 3) . In a time of insecurity concerning their per-
sonal and professional future (being away from family, searching for a partner, hav-
ing temporary employment, and so on), India and being Indian provide the young 
students and researchers with continuity and rootedness . One of my respondents, 
who in fact returned to India in summer 2013, expressed it in the following way:
There were times that I wanted to leave but I always had the hope that I’m go-
ing anyway . So this was very good . For me this surety of going back was very 
important . (Interview G .18, 19 .01 .2013)
Thus the simple knowledge that one will go back, even if it is not clear when exactly, 
can provide the individual with a feeling of security and certainty, and may even help 
to continue through hard and frustrating times .
The idea that the migratory process leads to a certain arrival point reveals another 
important facet of the students’ and researchers’ biographic navigation: coming to 
18 Male, finished his PhD in theology in Göttingen in April 2013, has been back in India since May 
2013, holds a position at a theological college in his hometown . 
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Germany is part of the fulfillment of long-term goals . Completing a degree, a PhD, 
or a postdoctoral fellowship in Germany or another ‘western’ country is perceived as 
a requirement to create a certain imagined future – a future that many of my respon-
dents envisage in India, and that will hopefully include a well-paid job and finding 
a partner . International mobility is thus a strategic means not only of shaping one’s 
scientific career, but also one’s personal future, by accumulating the social capital 
important for marriage .19 Underlying these perceptions are discourses that are part of 
the regime of student mobility . These discourses naturalize international mobility as 
something everybody does and you have to do if you want to be successful in India 
or internationally (Fuhse, forthcoming) .
Yes, yes, yes, given the chance I want to go back . I’m here to fulfill that require-
ment. No, I have respect on this country, but I think it is quite natural, you 
know it is quite natural that, I have some social obligations as well, I have to 
go and serve my people: something like that . I feel like that I have to go back 
and I have to take up some job in India . If I take [a] job outside India, it is 
out of compulsion, not out of choice . Because if I don’t get any job in India, 
good job I mean, which can suit my qualification and my interest, then I may 
take up some job in Europe or US . But it is definite[ly] not by choice . I will, 
given the chance, I want to go back…  . (Interview P ., 10 .07 .2011; emphasis 
added)
In other words, there are not only clear ideas and discourses on how to make a career 
(by going abroad), but also how this path should end – in India . How this will be 
accomplished, and how the feelings of responsibility and the wish to find a job that 
suits the acquired qualifications are consolidated, depends on the individual and 
poses a number of challenges .
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have outlined four facets of the biographic navigation of young 
students and researchers from India in a mobile world . Firstly, formal and informal 
organizations and festivals provide the Indian students and researchers the oppor-
tunity to meet and socialize, as well as practice, perform, express, and articulate 
multiple modes of belonging . Secondly, the importance of regional background in 
this belonging is demonstrated in the way regional festivals and get-togethers are 
organized, circles of friends are formed, and in the use of regional languages . The 
relevance of regional belonging can also be recognized in the organization and the 
19 Education and degrees are very important in the process of finding a spouse . Many of my respon-
dents married after completing their PhD . At least half of the marriages were arranged with the help 
of the parents . 
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realization of important events that are considered to be Indian such as Diwali and 
Independence Day . At such events, organizers try to prevent the predominance of 
one Indian language, and the cultural program aims to represent India’s diversity . In 
doing so, the organizers try to unite all students and researchers from India in Göt-
tingen into a big ‘Indian masala’ that is ‘united in diversity,’ thus seeking to avoid the 
broader dilemma of trying to define what it actually means to be Indian . As I argue 
above, this does not mean that all of the students and researcher from India are able 
to relate to Nirmiti and its goals .
Thirdly, for my respondents, being a scientist is another important aspect of be-
longing . Expressed in their narratives about the decision to come to Germany, the 
time they spend at their workplace, and their future plans, it is apparent that mobil-
ity and being part of an international scientific community are understood as crucial 
to career success . Since a career is a cultural product, the international mobility of the 
students and researchers from India is sanctioned by families and communities, and 
thus leads not only to professional success but also to social capital . That means that 
career and national and / or cultural affiliations are interrelated facets of individuals’ 
belonging . For professional and personal reasons, most of my interlocutors envisage 
their diasporic path ending back in India . In this way, India becomes a permanent 
anchor in their biographic navigation and provides them with continuity and root-
edness in a time of insecurity . My respondents understand their international mobil-
ity as a step to the fulfillment of specific long-term career and personal goals . I under-
stand this imagination and working for an aspired future as an important strategic 
means of coping with living in mobility and in avoiding dilemmas of belonging . In 
this dynamic, to be Indian is only one facet of their multiple modes of belonging that 
intersects with multiple other dimensions, including professional or regional iden-
tifications and imagined futures . In other words, in navigating these new, multiple 
and challenging social spaces, these young students and researchers from India are 
constantly constructing and reconstructing their belonging .
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Part II:  
Belonging and Nation Building

Anxieties of Belonging: East Indians and the 4 
Cultural Politics of the Nation in Trinidad
Viranjini Munasinghe
Introduction
I begin with a controversy that erupted in January 2012 in Trinidad1 when the In-
do-Trinidadian Prime Minister Kamla Persad-Bissessar attended the major annual 
conference for the Indian diaspora, the 10th Pravasi Bharatiya Divas (Non-Resident 
Indian Day), held in India . Persad-Bissessar was one of a few “eminent overseas 
Indians” honored with a Pravasi Bharatiya Samman (award) . The anxieties burden-
ing the fault line between diaspora and nation came to a head, at least for many 
Trinidadians, when after accepting the award, the Indo-Trinidadian Prime Minister 
bowed and touched the feet of the Indian President Pratibha Patil . This gesture of the 
Indo-Trinidadian Prime Minister touching the feet of the Indian President was cap-
tured vividly in the media and provoked heated debate . Of the many concerns raised 
regarding the Prime Minister’s gesture, the most salient demonstrated a familiar 
anxiety that haunts Trinidad’s cultural politics – the ambivalent national subjectivity 
1 The ethnic composition of the two islands of the nation-state Trinidad and Tobago is significantly 
different . In 2011, East Indians constituted 35 .4 % and Africans 34 .2 % of Trinidad and Tobago’s total 
population of 1,328,019 . In contrast, East Indians accounted for 2 .5 % and Africans 85 .3 % of Tobago’s 
population of 60,874 (Central Statistical Office of Trinidad and Tobago 2012) . Given the large pro-
portion of East Indians in Trinidad relative to Tobago, the chapter addresses the situation in Trinidad . 
This is not to say, however, that the cultural politics dominating Trinidad has little or no bearing on 
Tobago .
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projected on to Indo-Trinidadians2 because of their allegedly excessive identification 
with India and things Indian . To allay fears that Trinidad’s sovereignty may have 
been compromised by Persad-Bissessar’s ‘deferential’ act, some in the Hindu estab-
lishment argued the gesture was in keeping with religious traditions . This defense, 
however, only heightened the controversy by foregrounding the Prime Minister’s 
Hindu subjectivity . Current Prime Minister Keith Rowley, who was then Opposition 
Leader, expressed his umbrage: “Nobody sent the Prime Minister abroad to represent 
her religion or her race . She went abroad to represent all the people of Trinidad and 
Tobago and, however, she feels when she stands in front of the head of government 
or the head of state she must stand there proud representing the people of Trinidad 
and Tobago” (Daily Express 2012) .
This story illustrates that in the Caribbean, East Indians’ relationship to India 
and things Indian is a highly contested field because this identification threatens 
their capacity to legitimately represent the nation . In comparison to other diasporic 
groups, East Indian culture does not easily translate into Trinidadian national cul-
ture . This chapter is an inquiry into the challenges of cultural translation and Indo-
Trinidadian efforts to circumvent it .
Made 26 years after independence, Trinidadian novelist Earl Lovelace’s assess-
ment of Caribbean culture reflects dominant assumptions about East Indians and 
their apparent cultural excess .
It is the Africans who have laid the groundwork of a Caribbean culture – those 
Africans who struggled against enslavement and continued their struggle 
against colonialism – and the reason that they did so is that they had to . They 
had no choice but to become Caribbean and address the Caribbean landscape 
and reality . No other group had to . The Europeans didn’t have to … they 
retained their culture . They couldn’t change it because it was through their 
institutions at home that they were culturally and politically empowered . … 
The Indians also were tied to their culture because in this new land where 
they were strangers, it gave them a sense of being . They had their pundits and 
divali and hosay and their weddings and teeluck and had no reason to want to 
change them . (Lovelace 1988: 340)
Here, Lovelace is doing much more than merely registering differences in contribu-
tions to Caribbean culture . By comparing each ancestral group’s contribution to 
Caribbean culture based on respective capacities, Lovelace elevates Afro-Caribbeans 
2 Ethnic terminologies are highly complex in Trinidad and seemingly arbitrary changes in terminology 
signify contested ideologies of belonging to the nation . Here I use the term ‘Indo-Trinidadian’ to refer 
to Trinidadians claiming Indian ancestry because it situates this group within the nation of Trinidad, 
unlike the more common term ‘East Indian .’ Historically, the term ‘East Indian’ developed in opposi-
tion to the category ‘creole,’ which signified native status par excellence (Munasinghe 2001 and 1997) . 
My use of terms registers not only their respective histories but also their symbolic investments in rela-
tion to the nation .
Anxieties of Belonging 69
to the level of ‘culture creators .’ He harnesses different groups racialized attributes to 
single out and align ‘Africans’ with Caribbean cultural authenticity, thereby engaging 
in the comparative exercise of race making that is critical for nation building . Com-
parison is constitutive of nations in several ways . As a “tactic of rule” (Stoler 2001), 
comparison is used to classify, valuate, and hierarchically place different ancestral 
groups in relation to the nation’s patrimony . In its more subtle forms, comparison 
performs symbolic political work for the nation by attending to the contradictions 
of its ontology and historicity – namely, the impossibility of living up to the preroga-
tives of a general / universal form with a culture history that is always particular .
The nation – at least as we know it – is paradoxical . While it is the most common 
geopolitical unit shaping the twentieth century, each unit must claim its own excep-
tionality, its own national genius, in order to ‘exist’ and be recognized as a sovereign 
entity among other sovereign entities . In this sense, every nation is both the same 
and unique, with its own claim to exceptional status . Claims of exceptionalism based 
on national genius are possible only because they imply comparisons to other such 
‘exceptional’ units . Claiming national genius for one’s people, in turn, is a crucial 
strategy in race making, where sameness and difference are carefully calibrated and 
ideologically grafted onto the racially mapped national geo-body . Though this ideo-
logical racial mapping may be taking place within the nation state, the exceptionalist 
ontology of the nation state renders race making an inevitably comparative exercise, 
implicating entanglements with other nations and imperial projects .
This chapter therefore examines how exceptionalism was produced and claimed 
on the basis of a Creole3 genius in the Trinidadian nation . The ideological produc-
tion of this Creole genius involved a comparative project of race making that ossified 
the preexisting colonial racial caricatures of a ‘culturally naked’ African, who could 
then become the ‘culture creator’ in the New World, and a ‘culturally saturated’ In-
dian, who remained a ‘culture bearer’ (Munasinghe 1997) . I argue that the cultural 
excess attributed to East Indians prohibited their inclusion in the indigenizing narra-
tive of creolization and symbolically positioned the group as outsiders to the nation 
of Trinidad . In arguing this, I focus on the late 1980s and early 1990s, a period of 
heightened cultural and political contestation of the nation in which Indo-Trinidadi-
an leaders challenged their group’s outsider status . These challenges, however, tended 
to reproduce rather than unravel the comparative logics of race that rested on the 
exclusivity of the Indo-Trinidadian and the Afro-Trinidadian, with Indo-Trinidadian 
strategies for national inclusion reinforcing earlier colonial and nationalist discourses 
on the fundamental differences between the African and the Indian .
The particular historicity of Trinidad (and the Caribbean generally) posed certain 
challenges to conventional narratives on the nation . The almost total destruction of 
the Native American population meant that the colonizers were able to treat the Ca-
ribbean as empty lands . The Caribbean colonies were also extractive colonies, as op-
3 To mark the distinction between creole as a theoretical concept and Creole as a noun to signify per-
sons of African and mixed African and European ancestry, I capitalize the “C” in the latter . 
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posed to settler colonies, where every aspect of these societies was geared toward the 
efficient production of sugar for the sole benefit of the metropolis . Unlike settler col-
onies, the logic driving development in extractive colonies like Trinidad undermined 
the cultivation of belonging . The relation of the colonizers or of the enslaved to the 
land, at least initially, was not one of home . These features combined to demand new 
narratives of indigeneity to the nation that did not revolve around normative ideas of 
autochthony . Having annihilated the ‘native,’ the ‘native’ had to be redefined in this 
New World nation . In turn, defining the native subject was significantly informed 
by colonial race-making projects .
Colonial Project of Race Making
When East Indians arrived in Trinidad as indentured laborers in 1845, the associated 
planter and colonial race discourses that legitimated the labor scheme positioned 
them outside the ‘incipient nation’4 of Trinidad, and in opposition to those of Af-
rican ancestry . After Emancipation in 1834, planters in Trinidad faced a dire labor 
situation . Although they phrased it as a ‘labor shortage,’ the planters’ real concern 
was the procurement of a cheap and easily manageable labor force, a demand the freed 
slaves could not and would not satisfy . However, with humanitarian concerns gain-
ing currency in Europe, planters had to cloak their interests in a moral discourse . To 
do so, they claimed that the injection of a new labor force would create competi-
tion among labor, ultimately benefiting the existing labor force by improving their 
‘moral character .’ To legitimate this claim, the planters had to prove to the colonial 
authorities that the Black labor force was morally degenerate . To support their case 
for immigrant contract labor, big sugar planters, much to the detriment of the Black 
labor force, actively generated a specific discourse on the alleged ‘labor situation’ in 
Trinidad (Munasinghe 2001 and 2009) . Planters targeted the ex-slaves as the cause of 
their problem and emphasized contract immigrant labor as the only possible solution . 
Making a case for immigrants entailed derogation of the Black laboring population 
as dishonest, immoral, improvident and of limited mental capacity, the planters’ 
character attacks on ‘the Negro’ served to forge a stereotype of Creoles in Trinidad 
as ‘free spending, luxury loving and improvident,’ in contrast to the ‘industrious, 
diligent, self-sacrificing’ East Indian . As the ‘big sugar planters’ solution’ to the ‘labor 
shortage,’ East Indians came to occupy a position antagonistic to the Black labor-
ing population . In time, many of the planters’ characterizations of Creoles and East 
Indians became seen as characteristics inherent to the groups, and were later used by 
4 My use of the phrase ‘incipient nation’ does not denote a teleological unfolding of a predetermined 
‘national essence .’ Rather, it suggests that a symbolic space for the nation – in identifying ‘legitimate 
national subjects’ who will assume the mantle of state power with independence – can be constituted 
even during the period of colonial domination, when the ‘nation’ was being positioned against the state, 
as was the case in Trinidad and, indeed, in all colonies .
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the groups themselves to undermine one another . Thus, the ‘Negro’ carried the same 
prejudices and contempt as the White man for the ‘Coolie,’ as did the ‘Coolie’ and 
the White man for the ‘Negro .’
Almost 144,000 Indians were brought to Trinidad between 1845 and 1917 to 
work the sugar plantations . The circumstances under which Indians entered the 
country relegated them to the lowest status . The Afro-Trinidadian workers viewed 
the Indians as ‘scab’ labor who diminished their own bargaining power with planters, 
a view intensified by the ‘Coolies’ agreement to do work that slaves had only done 
under coercion . Moreover, Afro-Trinidadian’s regarded Indians as culturally inferior: 
their forms of dress, especially the loin cloth, invited ridicule, as did their ‘heathen’ 
ceremonies . In a colonial milieu where Christianity stood for civilized behavior, the 
practice of an alien, ‘pagan’ culture further consolidated the Indians’ social isola-
tion . It was under such hostile conditions that Indians first established their roots in 
Trinidad .
Indenture not only pitted the East Indian against the majority Black population, 
but a host of related factors also conspired to symbolically situate the East Indian 
as the ‘outsider’ to the incipient nation of Trinidad . When East Indians first arrived 
in 1845, they were latecomers to Trinidadian colonial society . By that time, the so-
ciety had thoroughly creolized, with an elaborate system based on race and color 
structuring social relations among people of different ancestries . In certain respects, 
nineteenth-century Trinidad conformed to the classic three-tier social structure: 
Africans and their locally born descendants, the majority population, formed the 
base; people of mixed descent and ‘free-Blacks’ comprised a middle tier; and those 
of European descent (British, French, and Spanish) were situated at the apex . This 
three-tier structure altered with the arrival of Indians . Indeed, according to Brere-
ton, in colonies like Trinidad, Guyana and Surinam, Indians were distinguished as a 
fourth tier (Brereton 1993: 36) . The material, social structural, and cultural factors 
that relegated Indians to a fourth tier situated them symbolically outside the core of 
Trinidadian society .
The legal status of indenture restricted the mobility of East Indians and mini-
mized their interaction with the wider society, thus intensifying their social and spa-
tial isolation . On arrival in Trinidad, East Indians were almost immediately banished 
to the sugar estates . Planters also developed legal mechanisms such as contracts, va-
grancy laws, and fines to further curtail East Indian mobility . Indentured laborers 
were prohibited from leaving the plantations unless they carried an official pass, and 
even Indians who had completed their term of ‘industrial residence’ had to carry a 
‘free paper’ to prove they were indeed ‘free .’ Living conditions for the Indians were 
similar to those under slavery – wretched . Moreover, as Indians were perceived as 
sojourners, little was done to improve their circumstances or integrate them into the 
wider society through education or other institutional mechanisms .
The ideological race-making projects which produced East Indians as ‘outsiders’ 
to Trinidad were equally formidable . Trinidad’s colonial racial order was founded 
on the distinction between ‘pure’ races, which characterized the Old World, and 
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the ‘mixing’ of races, which characterized the New World . ‘Mixing’ was a condition 
specific to Trinidad and, by extension, to the West Indies as well (Segal 1993) . The 
notion that to be West Indian was to be indeed ‘mixed’ and that ‘pure’ races belonged 
outside of Trinidad constituted a major ideological axiom through which East Indi-
ans came to be defined as ‘outsiders .’ In these colonial racial caricatures, East Indians 
were simply deemed ‘unmixable .’ This idea was based on Orientalist understanding 
of the Indian as a person saturated with an ancient (albeit inferior) culture which 
resisted mixing, and was thereby always rooted in the Old World . The African, in 
contrast, was seen as lacking an ancestral civilization, and was therefore in a state of 
imputed ‘cultural nakedness’ that allowed ‘mixing .’ This state became privileged as 
the necessary condition for creating novel constellations native to the New World 
(Segal 1993; Munasinghe 1997) .
The trope of ‘mixing’ became crucial in casting a new narrative of indigeneity 
realized in the concept of ‘Creole .’ The most revealing exclusion is the one that re-
fuses East Indian entry into the category ‘Creole’ – a word broadly meaning ‘local’ or 
‘West Indian,’ signifying native status in the New World (Bolland 1992) . The term 
Creole is applied to all persons of White and Black ancestry that were represented in 
the color spectrum . East Indians were and are not considered to be a possible ingredi-
ent in the Creole mix . If mixing was the principle through which ‘nativeness’ was de-
fined, then to be ‘native’ or ‘local’ was to be Creole . Denied the capacity to mix and 
denied social recognition5 of their local connections to other ancestral groups, East 
Indians never became Creoles . In fact, one could argue that the terms ‘East Indian’ 
and ‘Creole’ developed in opposition . Even today, East Indians are not designated 
as Creole . Indeed, this exclusion from Creole status had significant implications for 
the group’s positioning vis-à-vis the incipient nation during decolonization, when 
Trinidadian identity became firmly anchored to Creole identity .
The National Project of Race Making
From the 1930s, political developments that augured decolonization in Trinidad 
went hand in hand with certain cultural alignments . In Trinidad, the Creole middle 
classes ‘discovered’ and appropriated Creole lower-class cultural patterns . In their 
search for ‘roots’ and a source of inspiration, middle-class artists turned to the for-
merly denigrated folk culture, spearheading interest in and recognition of the culture 
of the man on the street . Established Black lower-class cultural forms like carnival, 
steelband, and calypso assumed the stature of national symbols, though these forms 
were somewhat domesticized and institutionalized to suit middle class sensibilities .6
5 In practice, there was ample evidence of East Indians mixing with other groups, but it is the absence 
of social recognition that is significant here .
6 There is substantial literature on this topic .
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While Creole middle classes were mobilizing Creole culture in anticipation of inde-
pendence, East Indians’ public activity reinscribed their status as bearers of a foreign 
culture . Indeed, during the postwar period, Indian culture in Trinidad became in-
creasingly identified with India . During the centennial celebrations of Indian Ar-
rival Day7 in Trinidad in 1945, leaders referred to ‘mother India’ as their source of 
inspiration and vowed to preserve Indian culture and their community . Visits by a 
host of Indian missionaries and cultural performers generated new interest, espe-
cially among the East Indian middle class, in cultivating connections with India . In 
other words, both Creoles and East Indians were actively fashioning their respective 
cultures during the postwar period, but the social and political significance of the 
two trajectories were significantly different . While Creole culture gained greater le-
gitimation through its incorporation into the nationalist agenda, East Indian culture 
(with its emphasis on ‘mother India’), was increasingly perceived as a threat to the 
emerging nation . The particulars of Caribbean history, in concert with the divergent 
trajectories of Creole and East Indian cultures, set the limits and possibilities of nar-
rating the Trinidadian nation .
Caribbean historicity also posed a peculiar dilemma for the aspiring nations in 
the region . The almost total annihilation of its native peoples, and its status as an 
extractive colony, meant that former subordinate ancestral groups had to create nar-
ratives of belonging which were not contingent on autochthony . But on what basis 
can one group claim native status when historical memory dictates Old World ori-
gins for all ancestral groups? Narrating the nation in the Caribbean context called 
for a reformulation of the origins and the concepts of Creole . Indeed, creolization 
would become central to this new narrative of origins . In this narrative, only the 
products of creolization – the very embodiment of mixture – could legitimately 
claim New World origins and therefore indigenous status . Creole was about invent-
ing new identities out of many old identities . Ironically, it was precisely the Africans 
alleged state of cultural nakedness that allowed them to emerge as culture creators 
in the New World . This putative lack of culture was harnessed and transformed by 
nation-builders into Trinidadian attributes of dynamism, creativity, and multiplicity . 
Since Creole was projected in opposition to East Indian identity in the Trinidadian 
racial economy, the collapse of Trinidadian identity to Creole during the different 
phases of nation-building carried the disturbing implication that East Indians were 
not really Trinidadians . The native privilege accorded to Afro-Trinidadians has his-
torically legitimized their claims to the state, both prior to and since independence 
in 1962 . In contrast, East Indian bids for the state had, until recently, been impeded 
by their symbolic representation as ‘outsiders’ within the nation . As late as 1990, the 
political mood suggested that an East Indian as Prime Minister was ‘unthinkable .’ 
But in November 1995, the unthinkable happened, with the East Indian domi-
nated coalition United National Congress (UNC) coming to power with Basdeo 
7 On 30 May 1845, the first Indians arrived on the island . The date is marked each year by Indian 
Arrival Day .
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Panday, an East Indian, serving as Prime Minister . The UNC lost power to the Afro-
Trinidadian PNM in 2002, before the People’s Partnership coalition came to power 
under Kamla Persad-Bissessar in May 2010 .While Indo-Trinidadians securing state 
power is significant, it does not necessarily suggest symbolic equivalence with Afro-
Trinidadians in regard to cultural citizenship . Indeed, the anxiety created by Prime 
Minister Persad-Bissessar’s gesture illustrates this continuing asymmetry . The ensuing 
exploration of Indo-Trinidadian efforts to redefine the nation is less concerned with 
making a causal connection between such efforts and the subsequent ascendance of 
Indo-Trinidadian political parties than with analyzing the particular style in which 
Indo-Trinidadians have framed their cultural and political struggle for belonging . In 
their efforts to redefine terms of belonging to the nation of Trinidad, East Indians 
have strikingly deployed the comparative logic of the culturally naked African and 
the culturally saturated Indian . I turn to this now .
Contesting the Nation
In October 1989 I heard a lecture on “The History, Life and Contribution to the De-
velopment of Trinidad and Tobago of East Indians” by prominent Indo-Trinidadian 
lawyer Suren Capildeo .8 It was the fifth in a series of government-sponsored lectures 
entitled “Let Us Discover Ourselves” to commemorate the 500th Anniversary of Co-
lumbus’s arrival in the New World . Unlike the previous four lectures, which related 
the experiences of Amerindians, Syrian-Lebanese, Chinese, and Europeans, Cap-
ildeo’s lecture took a dramatic turn and provoked an explosion of rhetoric on race 
relations . Newspapers ran headlines such as “Bacchanal at City Hall,” with editorials 
chiding the audience Trinidadians for their unseemly behavior . When some realized 
that I had witnessed the fiasco, they urged me to relate the story and even borrowed 
my taped recording to figure out “what all de fuss was about .”
Capildeo began with a warning:
The regulars, let me caution you, this is not the usual lecture you have heard . 
This is a horror story . … Now let us consider, you and I, the Indian . An ex-
traordinary specimen of the species Homo Sapiens . A remarkable survivor . 
You are looking at one, a real true, true Indian . … We are like no other race. 
We are different. Indians are a world unto themselves . We regard ourselves as the 
eternal people . … We have been and are witness to a continuous unbroken 
thread of Indian civilization, which began before the memory of man . We 
8 Suren Capildeo is the first cousin of the author V . S . Naipaul and the nephew of Rudranath Capildeo, 
who assumed leadership of the Opposition (Democratic Labor Party) in 1960 . The DLP was formed in 
1956 by a merger of the PDP (the largely Hindu-based party), the Party of Political Progressive Groups 
(POPPG), and the Trinidad Labor Party (TLP) .
Anxieties of Belonging 75
have customs, we recite prayers, we do things Indian, as our ancestors have 
done thousands of years before, you say, Christ set foot on this earth . So when 
you look at an Indian in Trinidad, or wherever, you just remember that . An 
Indian is no ordinary being . He belongs to a special race . (Emphasis added)
Capildeo then depicted the history of his people as one checkered by successive 
waves of conquering invaders, beginning with the Greeks and culminating with the 
British . Despite their history of victimization, he declared that
the Indian mind does not submit to slavery . You cannot enslave the Indian 
mind . … That is our legacy . That is our heritage . Indians do not seek refuge 
behind the skirts of indentureship . That is history . History has its lessons . But 
we must learn and move on . The Indian experience is not to blame the Arka-
tiah and the Empire . It is to absorb, assimilate and create .
He argued that the Indian saved Trinidad from impending ruin after Emancipation, 
when Europe, America, and Africa failed to come to the rescue . Capildeo then de-
scribed the East-Indian experience, emphasizing the hardship, ridicule, and discrimi-
nation the Indians faced, before discussing their achievements and contribution to 
agriculture:
The Indians … began to change the face of this land . Defying all efforts to 
confine them to the cane estates, Indians began in true frontier style to open 
up undeveloped areas of Trinidad . … By the time immigration ended [in 
1917], Indians in Trinidad owned one-fifth of the total land owned and culti-
vated in Trinidad . An extraordinary feat, remarkable more so when you realize 
that chattel who were imported to plant cane ended up by being land owning 
cane farmers themselves .
Capildeo showed slides of early Indian migrants whose stature, adornment, and 
poise explicitly questioned the stereotype of the indentured laborer, the barefoot, 
meagerly-clad, illiterate ‘Coolie .’ He repeatedly stressed the contribution of Indians 
to Trinidad with comments like
above all, the Indians had brought with them the stabilizing factors of a strong 
family system, thrift, a penchant for savings and enthusiasm for hard work 
and a burning zeal for education . The Indians have not only rescued Trinidad 
in no uncertain manner, but have (also) laid the foundation for its future 
transition into a modern model nation-state .
Toward the end, he discussed the increasing alienation and frustration experienced 
by the Indo-Trinidadians:
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Throughout the tenure of his history here, the Indian has been made to feel 
alienated, that he does not belong… . That this is a Black country for the Black 
Caribbean man . God knows how much longer it will take to accept us as part of 
this nation. … By 1990 there will be an Indian majority in this nation still 
believing and behaving as a minority . If you want to dramatically consider the 
impact that the Indians have on this country just imagine the scenario if the 
Indians were to cease all criminal activity, drug related and otherwise, with-
draw their money from the Banks, cease doing business, leave the fields, stop 
producing food and dairy products, withdraw from all services . … Imagine 
the country then – top heavy with Central Bank and statutory bodies; filled 
with form but empty of substance . Law and order will collapse . Bankruptcy 
will be the norm . Starvation will be your daily wage . Life here will cease . 
(Emphasis added)
He then offered an alternative to this gloomy scenario:
But really, seriously, what of the future? I, me, make bold to say that it shall be 
a great and glorious future . That given an equal chance the Indian community 
will take this country to heights unimagined .
At the end of his oration Capildeo received a thunderous applause from the pre-
dominantly Indo-Trinidadian audience . It soon became evident to the audience that 
Capildeo was making a significant deviation from what the establishment had had in 
mind when they originally sponsored this series of talks . The ambience was at once 
both electrifying and tense, punctuated by the comic relief supplied by Trinidadians’ 
flair for Picong .9 The ‘bacchanal’ erupted during question time, with people repre-
senting the whole spectrum of the Trinidadian ‘rainbow’ (those of African, Indian, 
Chinese, and mixed race ancestries) patiently waiting for their turn to speak . Many, 
even Indians, pointed to the bias in Capildeo’s speech . The turning point came when 
an Afro-Trinidadian political scientist made a lengthy speech accusing Capildeo of 
racism . The scholar put forward an alternative view of Trinidad history in which the 
introduction of indentured laborers retarded the development of an independent 
peasantry . Capildeo supporters sprang to their feet, grabbing the microphone from 
the speaker . The hall erupted into chaos, forcing the organizers of the event to declare 
an end to the evening .
This event provides an appropriate point of entry to examine the dynamics of 
the political and cultural struggle waged by Indo-Trinidadians to reconfigure the 
Trinidadian nation . Rhetorically, Capildeo identified East Indians as the propellers 
behind the modern nation-state, anchoring their contribution to the nation in their 
culture . In this rhetorical move, he sought to undermine the projected dichotomy 
9 A Creole style of speech conveying satire and irreverence, expressive of an attitude that refuses to be 
impressed by anything or anybody .
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between Indian ethnic and Trinidadian national identities by placing the very par-
ticularism attributed to Indian culture at the core of the nation . Capildeo’s effort 
to insert East Indian culture into the national symbolic space was characteristic of 
the broader cultural struggle waged by Indo-Trinidadians during the late 1980s and 
1990s . In this period, both Indo-Trinidadian moderate and radical cultural activists, 
religious and political leaders were united in challenging the hegemonic Creole rep-
resentations of the nation . They undermined the notion that steelband, calypso, and 
carnival alone symbolized the national culture of Trinidad and Tobago and argued 
for the inclusion of East Indian cultural forms such as Chutney music and Tassa (an 
East Indian form of drumming) .
Indo-Trinidadian cultural activists challenged the notion that their ethnic iden-
tity was antithetical to their national identity by changing the culture-history refer-
ent10 of the nation . They argued for the inclusion of Indian elements alongside he-
gemonic Afro-Caribbean forms . In doing so, they aimed to become a legitimate part 
of the nation not by redefining what it meant to be Indian, but by redefining what it 
meant to be Trinidadian . Despite their seemingly radical stance, the assumptions un-
derlying the strategy reproduced, rather than challenged, colonial discourses about 
the nature of ‘African’ and ‘Indian’ culture . The strategies used to combat the Indian 
identity dilemma rested on a premise that resonated with earlier colonial discourses 
that posited an essential difference between Indian and Afro-Caribbean cultures and 
their respective identities . This approach therefore called for equal representation 
of heterogeneous elements at the national level, a multicultural or ‘tossed salad’ vi-
sion of the nation, where each unit preserves its identity, as opposed to stressing a 
common core of creolized Caribbean values and orientations, which would be the 
Callalloo11-metaphor of the nation .
Capildeo’s depiction of the Indo-Trinidadian saga provided a spectacular myth 
for his people . It incorporated all the essential ingredients of a nation-building char-
ter, including the claim of belonging to a pure, ancestral race . Capildeo’s portrayal of 
the Indian as unique, as the bearers of an ancient, rich and essential culture was an 
overt attempt to create a myth of homogeneity out of the heterogeneous East Indian 
population . Capildeo thereby challenged the state and the nation to recognize the 
immutable fact of difference between Afro- and Indo-Trinidadian, thereby denying 
the assimilability of the ‘Indian’ into the nation . It was this difference, rather than 
sameness, which had become the essential element of the Indo-Trinidadian vision 
10 Through its deployment of specific cultures and histories to represent the nation, nation-building 
invariably privileges certain human-made relations and features over others . Trouillot: “In a fundamen-
tal way, ‘nation’ has everything to do with culture, for culture and history are its sole constant referents . 
Claims of nationhood always imply a reference to some past and to the cultural present eventuating 
from that past . This reference is always a fiction, but only to the extent that all cultural constructs are 
somewhat fictitious . Cultural constructs always privilege some human-made relationships and features” 
(1990: 24, emphasis added) .
11 Callaloo is a popular local dish in the Caribbean in which a number of distinct ingredients are boiled 
down to a homogenous mush .
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of the nation . Moreover, he exalted India’s apparently great civilization and under-
mined the popular notion that only the dregs of Indian society set sail to Trinidad . In 
other words, Capildeo’s strategy mobilized the racial dichotomy between Creole and 
East Indian to displace Creole as the sole referent for the Trinidadian nation .
Yet, if that was all Capildeo inferred, the ‘bacchanal’ would probably not have 
erupted . But Capildeo’s depiction of the Indian story was tacitly juxtaposed to the 
Afro-Trinidadian story, demonstrating once again how comparison is used in nation-
al race-making projects . In his speech, Capildeo implicitly engaged the Afro-Trinida-
dians in dialogue . His caricatures of both groups drew on stereotypes that emerged 
during the early indenture period . Consider, for example, his characterization of East 
Indians as “pioneer” cultivators: Whereas land policies combining local government 
and planter interests had been instrumental in the ultimate consolidation of the In-
dians in the rural sector12 and the Afro-Trinidadians in the urban centers, he chose 
to downplay these structural elements, instead invoking a ‘natural will’ explanation 
to account for the East Indian dominance of agriculture . Today, Indo-Trinidadians 
highlight this contribution as a sign of their superior worth as citizens . Indeed, some 
Afro-Trinidadians resent the image of the Indian as cultivator, as it diminishes their 
own contribution to Trinidadian society, both prior to and following indenture . Af-
ter all, to claim a greater contribution to national development is also to stake a 
greater claim for the nation’s patrimony . In this context then, Indian claims that they 
saved the colony from ruin and became the nation’s primary food producers consti-
tute a major point of contention, as clearly demonstrated by the uproar greeting the 
suggestion that East Indians had retarded the growth of an independent peasantry .
Drawing on popular stereotypes that essentialize ‘Indian’ and ‘African’ mentalities 
and behaviors, Capildeo challenged Afro-Trinidadian definitions of the legitimate 
social order and the authentic national subject . In doing so, he trivialized the Afro-
Trinidadian story and created a new and particular kind of moral discourse . Cap-
ildeo did move beyond a mere discussion of racialized differences by also (and albeit 
indirectly) establishing a commonality between East Indian and Afro-Trinidadian 
suffering . Following his glorification of the Indian race, he focused on the suffering 
Indians (like Afro-Trinidadians) had endured under conquering invaders and later 
in Trinidad . He poignantly depicted the suffering Indians underwent in developing 
Trinidad by claiming “the life blood of this nation pulses through the Indian .” He 
was thus attesting to the fact that Indians, too, had “bled for the nation .” These dis-
12 The colonial government provided the first major incentive for Indians to settle permanently in 
Trinidad . In 1869 a law was passed whereby ‘free Indians’ could exchange their return passage for 
initially ten, and later, five acres of Crown Land . Indeed, “between 1885 and 1912, 89,222 acres were 
sold or granted to Indians” (Brereton 1985:28) . Many Indians chose to remain in Trinidad after their 
indenture had expired, forming a vigorous peasant class, so that by the 1890s villages of ‘free Indians’ 
began to emerge . Such an option was not made available to slaves after emancipation, when land poli-
cies made it prohibitively expensive for them to become small proprietors . Fearing a depletion of their 
labor supply, the planter class had been determined to prevent the laboring population of freed Blacks 
from becoming small farmers .
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cursive strategies provided the necessary moral capital to claim a stake in the nation, 
as for Indo-Trinidadians, the need to build moral capital was all the more urgent 
because Afro-Trinidadians had long owned the title of victims par excellence . Thus, 
the emphasis on East Indian suffering sought to undermine the notion that victim 
status was an exclusively Afro-Trinidadian privilege .
However, Capildeo’s discourse on suffering also reiterated essentialized differ-
ences . He cleverly counterpoised his illustrations of East Indian suffering to East In-
dian contributions to the nation . This mix overtly challenged (or at least minimized) 
Afro-Trinidadian suffering and contributions . Consider, for example, Capildeo’s 
portrayal of East Indian contributions to agriculture . While he did not explicitly 
deny the Afro-Trinidadian contributions to agriculture, he contrasted this to the East 
Indian contribution . He did so by arguing that, despite the numerous obstacles, East 
Indians had pursued frontier-style cultivation until they had gone from being “those 
who were imported to plant cane [into] … land owning cane farmers .”
In strategically associating suffering with contribution, Capildeo drew on the 
common belief that Afro-Trinidadians used slavery (suffering) as the excuse for 
their alleged failures . More importantly, in associating suffering with contribution, 
he sought to undermine another popular belief – that Afro-Trinidadians are ‘owed’ 
rewards for their historical subjugation . After all, Capildeo’s aim was to show that 
East Indians had secured and preserved phenomenal gains in the new society despite 
their suffering . Thus, the message he conveyed was that while East Indians had also 
suffered, they had made a positive contribution to the nation, without using their 
suffering as an excuse for failure . Indians had succeeded where Afro Trinidadians had 
failed because of innate Indian characteristics: “Indians do not seek refuge behind 
the skirts of indentureship . That is history . We must learn and move on .” The moral 
discourse both connected East Indians with Afro-Trinidadians through the trope of 
suffering, and distanced Indians from them through the trope of material uplift . In 
combining suffering with material success as a rhetorical strategy, Capildeo sought 
to gain the upper hand on the issue of moral capital – that is, which group has both 
suffered most and contributed most to the nation . Such a two-point argument was 
crucial, as even Indo-Trinidadians would be hesitant to claim greater suffering in 
comparison to those enslaved . In other words, it was by tethering ‘success despite 
suffering’ that East Indians gained the moral upper hand .
Capildeo’s zeal in portraying the Indian contribution and suffering was a direct 
challenge to the predominant Afro-Caribbean ideology of ‘racial paramountcy,’ in 
which Afro-Trinidadians had the moral right to rule because none had suffered for or 
contributed more to the nation . Direct attacks on the invisible Other were encoded 
in comments such as “the Indian mind does not submit to slavery,” “Indians do not 
hide behind the skirts of indenture,” and his prognosis about Trinidad’s future if 
the Indians were to leave . Of course, these attacks also drew symbolic traction from 
entrenched racial caricatures dichotomizing Indian and African .
Despite Capildeo’s and his supporters’ emphatic claims that the Indian was an 
essentially different being from the Creole, the fiasco at City Hall – with its impas-
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sioned and humorous exchanges – rather served to underscore the extent of creoliza-
tion that the Indian population had undergone . Indeed, many aspects of Indo-Trin-
idadian life, both in public and in private arenas, illustrate such a creole sensibility . 
Yet due to the ideological flattening of Creole with Afro-Creole, there is an almost 
in-built resistance to formally recognizing Indo-Trinidadian forms of creolization . 
As I have written elsewhere (Munasinghe 2001), the fluidity and multiplicity of 
Indo-Trinidadian practices do not reflect the acculturation into Afro-Creole cultural 
forms that conventional understandings of creolization would imply . Instead, they 
reflect processes of interculturation, which theories of creolization eloquently speak 
to: the simultaneous enactment of multiplicity drawing from a number of idealized 
cultural models . The multiplicity is evident in the Hindu weddings I witnessed in 
Cambio, a predominantly East Indian village situated in the heart of the sugar belt 
in Central Trinidad .
In Cambio, I was intrigued by the way villagers moved so easily among various 
culturally demarcated ‘spaces’ – movement not conceived here as linear temporality 
nor space to mean literal space . Rather, the wedding activities I witnessed those Sun-
day afternoons seemed to embody diverse cultural strains – that is, cultural practices 
that are ideally13 understood as East Indian, Creole, European, or even modern – si-
multaneously . Brides would sometimes wear a western type veil with a yellow sari for 
the initial part of the ceremony, but always, before departing to the in-laws’ house, 
would change into an elaborate white wedding gown . At the end of the marriage 
ceremony, grooms would also change into western attire . At the bride’s home across 
the cane fields, a hired group of Indian classical singers would perform, or Indian 
film music would blare in competition with the calypso and American pop music 
pounding from the cars parked on the road side . While the women and little chil-
dren would sit diligently, observing the ritual and helping out with the preparations 
for the feast, men would invariably hang out where liquor is in ample supply, either 
at the adjacent ‘snackettes’ (bars) at the road side, or at the neighbor’s house . Just as 
men had found creative ways to circumvent the prohibition of alcohol during Hindu 
ritual events, villagers also managed to get around the taboo of eating ‘fresh’ (meat, 
usually duck, chicken or goat) by arranging for the neighbor to prepare taboo foods . 
Guests, including my husband and I, were periodically invited next door for shots of 
rum and generous portions of deliciously ‘bitter’ (spicy hot) duck curry . As soon as 
the pundit leaves, the dancing begins . Men, by now intoxicated on rum or beer, usu-
ally begin ‘wining’ (a sexually suggestive Afro-Caribbean style of dancing involving 
the gyration of hips), and nearly always, a few ‘bold’ women join them . The spectacle 
of women ‘wining’ in public – a practice traditionally considered taboo, but which is 
increasingly violated in today’s Trinidad – is usually greeted with embarrassed shrieks 
13 For an excellent ethnographic analysis of how Guyanese peoples’ behavior can be interpreted through 
a linguistic model of the Creole continuum, one which emphasizes the simultaneous enactment of mul-
tiplicity while drawing on various idealized ‘pure’ cultures, see Drummond (1980) .
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of laughter and amusement . Invariably, a few men and women look on disdainfully 
and condemn the “vulgarity” of the “ladies getting on .”
At any given moment, these weddings drew upon a number of diverse cultural 
patterns that Trinidadians cognitively associate with idealized cultural spaces – that 
is, with cosmopolitan, western, Afro-Trinidadian and Indian norms and values . To 
reduce this complexity to a mere instance of acculturation is to deny East Indians 
the creative disposition to combine effectively diverse cultural strains in the process 
of becoming East Indians in an irrevocably Trinidadian or even Caribbean fashion 
that attests to their very creolization . The symbolics of the Trinidadian nation, in 
which Creoles metonymize creolization and, thereby, national belonging, resist rec-
ognizing this intercultural space of creole entanglement that includes East Indians . 
Whether for colonial or national imperatives, race-making projects in Trinidad have 
been built on distinguishing the Indian from the African . Today, in a nation founded 
on difference rather than creole (see footnote 3 for explanation of uses of ‘Creole’ and 
‘creole’) commonality, these distinctions remain central in shaping Indo-Trinidadian 
strategies for inclusion .
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Dilemmas of Belonging in Fiji, Part I: 5 
Constitutions, Coups, and Indo-Fijian 
Citizenship
Martha Kaplan
Introduction: Towards a Historical Anthropology of Dilemmas
Postcolonial nation-states and democratic electoral systems were meant to enable 
self-determination . Yet they have not resolved dilemmas of belonging . The Indo-Fi-
jians, descendants of Indians who came to Fiji in the 19th century labor diaspora, are 
currently a minority in the nation-state which they share with ethnic Fijians, descen-
dants of Pacific Islanders resident in the islands . This chapter describes the twentieth 
century history of how Indo-Fijian anticolonial spokesmen fought for independent 
Fiji and national belonging with a focus on ‘common roll’ electoral rights . But Fiji’s 
constitution at independence in 1970 was unusual for its continuation of implacable 
colonial race categories, its refusal of common roll, and its weighting against Indo-
Fijian political representation . And then, a series of coups were mounted by ethnic 
Fijian military leaders, not Indo-Fijians . Many Indo-Fijians have chosen emigration 
when possible, seeking self-determination by diaspora . Soberly, this chapter consid-
ers the history of plans for Fiji’s democracy embodied in constitutions, elections and 
other political rituals since 1970, the prospects for self-determination via democracy 
in Fiji, and the conditions for national belonging for people of Indian descent in 
Fiji .
In the twentieth century and into the twenty-first, across the globe, people have 
faced a common global situation: utopian hopes of the self-determining nation-state, 
within a post-World War II framework of states and institutions as the way out of 
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colonial domination, have been unsettled by “failure of the nation to come to its 
own” (Guha 1988: 43), by global dynamics pushing and pulling at the framework 
itself (Appadurai 1996), and by realizations of diverse potentials of democratic in-
stitutions in practice (Tambiah 1996) . Insistence on the contradictions inherent in 
social orders of Marxist social theory might suggest a set of inevitable crises provok-
ing new stages . But the kinds of contradictions of social systems, and their outcomes 
in peoples’ lives, are far from predictable . If we take seriously the egalitarian premises 
that anticolonial activists fought for, an anthropology of dilemmas leads us to sober 
consideration of what variously and less predictably may happen when egalitarian 
possibilities of democracy run into, or even generate, inequalities, especially in so-
cial fields rife with colonial insistence on racial otherness (Kelly and Kaplan 2001a, 
2001c) . Scholarly thinking about dilemmas of belonging in the Indian diaspora gen-
erally begin with India – dilemmas of leaving heritage connections behind . But here, 
let us focus on the other side of the coin: Belonging to what? Looking forward to 
what?
Let us consider new ways to respect the history of anticolonial nationalist visions, 
especially Gandhian explorations of independence and interdependence, while we 
also understand the often disappointing outcomes . These are not new challenges 
for political and historical anthropology .1 Anthropology complicated the proposal 
that cultural orders are unchanging templates for individual experience when Ruth 
Benedict discussed dilemmas of virtue in her 1946 Chrysanthemum and the Sword. 
Indeed, Benedict considered both individuals and the transformations of a sweep of 
Japanese political history in relation to dilemmas that are experienced individually, 
but culturally oriented, culturally distinctive but highly dynamic . Stanley Tambiah, 
scholar of dialectical tensions in the sweep of Asian histories, brings a similar focus 
on systemic possibilities in postcolonial states . In his 1996 Leveling Crowds, he con-
siders the dilemmas of democracies and draws our attention to the phenomenon 
of leveling, in which – under certain conditions – members of actual or potential 
electoral majorities nonetheless seek to dispossess others of rights or privileges, real 
or imagined .
This chapter provides a brief overview of Fiji’s wider multi-ethnic colonial his-
tory, and then considers national belonging through focus on three historical periods 
of Indo-Fijian experience of citizenship and democracy . First, in the colonial and 
decolonizing era up to 1970, Indo-Fijians were at the forefront of Fiji’s anti-colonial 
struggles . Indentured sugar cane workers and free immigrants to Fiji looked to Gan-
dhian leadership and tactics to challenge the British and work for ‘common roll’ 
electoral self-representation . Simultaneously, in the constituting of citizenship, long-
term colonial racism deliberately set the stage for uneven belonging through citizen-
ship in independent Fiji .
1 Dilemmas of social and policy sciences more broadly have also been considered insightfully, see Rittel 
and Webber (1973), who in the 1970s discussed challenges facing social planners along dimensions of 
goal formation, problem definition, and consideration of equity and justice . 
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Second, from independence in 1970 until 2006, democratic electoral possibilities 
were shaped and skewed by colonial ‘race’ categories . 1970 Independence images 
of a ‘three-legged stool’ envisioned national leadership by ethnic Fijian chiefly elites 
and interdependence of ethnic Fijian commoner landowners (83 % of Fiji’s land is 
owned by descendants of indigenes), with Indo-Fijians as economic backbone of 
the sugar industry, and the British crown as guarantor of the parliamentary system . 
But at independence, to participate as national citizens, Fiji’s citizens had to identify 
themselves ‘racially’ (as the colonial British termed it) for ‘communal’ (i .e . not ‘com-
mon’) voting rolls, as ‘Fijians,’ ‘Indians, or ‘General Electors .’ The complexities of 
ethnic Fijian and Indo-Fijian visions of belonging were channeled into a particularly 
persistent and unequal set of racist and ‘race’ categories . Thus colonial contradictions 
pervaded the post-colonial belonging, creating a political climate in which multiple 
Fijian ethnonationalist coups took place . In a hopeful moment in 1997, led by a his-
torically and globally aware constitutional commission, Fiji citizens, including Fiji’s 
Indo-Fijians (by then under 44 % of the population), contributed to the design of a 
new electoral system that was meant both to acknowledge historical community ties 
and to lead to a common feeling of belonging as citizens . But in 2000, another coup 
toppled the multi-ethnic government elected under the 1997 constitution . In 2006, 
the leader of Fiji’s military seized power and abrogated the constitution .
Third, thus, in 2013 common roll was instituted, but by a military government . 
To be clear, this coup was neither led by, nor on behalf of, Indo-Fijians . Nor is the 
current regime explicitly Fijian ethnonationalist (although the military forces and 
leadership are still overwhelmingly ethnic Fijian) . Instead, it came to power in a 
military coup similar to other military coups across the globe, in which the goals 
of military rule supplant other political stances . The regime propounded a modern-
izing, ‘anti-corruption’ message and imposed military rule, claiming provocation, as 
colonial governments did, by ‘disorder and disaffection .’ This chapter will thus end 
with questions, rather than conclusions, about the potential for national belonging 
in Fiji .2
2 This chapter draws upon previous publications, many co-authored with John D . Kelly (e .g . Kelly and 
Kaplan 1999, 2001b, 2001c, 2004, 2007, and Kaplan and Kelly 1994, 1999, 2017) . While my his-
torical and contemporary research initially focused only on anticolonial and postcolonial ethnic Fijian 
experience (Kaplan 1995, 2007, 2011), collaboration with John D . Kelly has shaped my appreciation 
of the relation of the Indo-Fijian experience to global South Asian and decolonizing culture and history . 
Touchstones for the understanding of these histories are the works of Bernard Cohn (1987, 1996, 2002 
(with Teri Silvio), 2013) and Stanley Tambiah (1996) . Brij V . Lal (1983, 1988, 1992, [1997] 2011a, 
2011b) is the author of a body of foundational political histories of Fiji which focus on Indo-Fijian 
experience . The work of Marshall Sahlins (1978, 1985, 2005) is crucial for an understanding of longue 
durée ethnic Fijian history and history-making .
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Narratives of Fijian Colonial History
The colonial experience was very different for Pacific Islander descended peoples and 
for Indian descended people in Fiji .3 Fijians resident in the islands when Europeans 
arrived in the late 1700s were organized in competing local kingdoms in the coastal 
and island areas, especially the largest island, Viti Levu, and in less hierarchical poli-
ties in the interior . Led by King Cakobau, most Fijians converted to Christianity 
in 1854 . In 1874, Cakobau and a group of high chiefs ‘gave’ the islands to Queen 
Victoria . This founding moment, and the document known as the Deed of Cession, 
can be understood in Fijian cultural terms as the installation of a king or chief, in 
which the leader is given rule over the people but not the land itself . Unusually for 
a colony, ethnic Fijians were administered through an early version of ‘indirect rule’ 
and ethnic Fijians retained over 83 percent of land, registered to kin groups and 
inalienable . The colonial alliance solidified the power of coastal Christian chiefs and 
their kingdoms, while dispossessing other Fijian groups (Kaplan 1995; Kaplan and 
Kelly 1999) . The colonial administration set up a sugar cane industry, but did not 
force ethnic Fijians to work in it .
Indians from British colonial India came to Fiji mostly as short-term indentured 
workers to work on British sugar plantations – part of the wide diaspora of Indian 
laborers in the colonial era (Tinker 1974) . They called themselves Girmityas, from 
the indenture contracts they signed (Kelly 1988b, 1999, 2004a; Kelly and Kaplan 
2008; Lal 1983; Sanadhya 1991) . Their experience in colonial plantation Fiji was 
of an exploitative racial hierarchy . Those who chose to remain in Fiji moved away 
from plantations to other occupations . Indenture across empire was ended as part of 
Gandhi’s and the Indian National Congress’s first global success . Indeed, the memoir 
My Twenty-one Years in the Fiji Islands (Sanadhya 1991) was an important polemic 
in Congress’s anti-indenture advocacy . Fiji’s colonial sugar industry was transformed 
into a system of share-cropping by Indo-Fijian tenant farmers, on land rented from 
ethnic Fijians . Other migrants to Fiji from India included ‘free’ (not indentured) 
people, including pandits, business people, and, importantly, lawyers sent by, or with 
ties to, the nationalists in India (Kelly 1992) .
3 The first group often call themselves ‘iTaukei,’ which can be translated as people of the land, or own-
ers of the land, or the common people in relation to the chief . Throughout the colonial era and until 
recently, this group were called ‘Fijians’ – an unmarked term . In the late twentieth century there was 
a scholarly and activist trend to use the term ‘ethnic Fijians’ to create a parallel to the marked ‘Indo-
Fijians .’ The Indians of Fiji were, initially, from India, and were called ‘Indians’ by the British . ‘Indian,’ 
as opposed to ‘Fijian,’ was a common usage in Fiji throughout the twentieth century, enshrined in 
electoral citizenship rolls, as this chapter describes . In the twentieth century, some activists and scholars 
used the term ‘Indo-Fijian’ to emphasize belonging . Thus, typically in late twentieth century Fiji, ‘Fi-
jian’ meant indigene-descended Fijians, and ‘Indian’ or ‘Indo-Fijian’ meant Indian descended Fijians . In 
the 1980s, the Fiji Labour Party proposed using ‘Fijian’ to apply to all Fiji citizens . As will be discussed, 
the 2009 Constitution refers to all Fiji citizens as ‘Fijians .’
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From initial Governor, Sir Arthur Gordon, onwards, colonial officials privileged eth-
nic Fijians, establishing an elaborate system of what in later colonies came to be 
called ‘indirect rule .’4 And backwater Fiji officials resented colonial officials with 
experience in India . For example, as John Kelly has chronicled, J .R . Pearson, who 
had spent 30 years in India, clashed with Dr . Victor McGusty, a Fiji-trained colonial 
officer: Pearson operated with a social evolutionary ‘progress’ model, finding Indians 
to have ‘progressed’ to a point where they had a role to play in governance, both in 
India and in Fiji . McGusty employed fixed ‘racial’ categories . Insisting that he was 
protecting ethnic Fijians from Indian threat, he defended European pre-eminence 
(Kelly 1991: 140–165) . In sum, throughout the colonial period, the British in Fiji 
regarded ethnic Fijians as their allies in the colony, especially ethnic Fijian chiefs . 
They regarded Indians as necessary laborers in Fiji, and denigrated their aspirations 
for belonging .
Visions of Self-Determination in Decolonizing Fiji5
Throughout the 20th century, Indo-Fijians led Fiji towards independence . Inden-
tured sugar plantation workers, their descendants, and other Indian migrants fol-
lowed, and sometimes influenced, Gandhian movements to end British colonialism 
in India, and to establish independence throughout empire . Representation through 
common roll was a key goal . For example, in 1929 Vishnu Deo, a prominent Arya 
Samaji6 and editor of Fiji Samachar, was a successful candidate for an ‘Indian’ seat 
on the Legislative Council .
Vishnu Deo argued for a common roll voting system as a matter of equal 
citizenship, fairness and justice . He denied allegations that Indians sought to 
dominate Fiji or make it an Indian colony, noting that the majority of official 
members over elected members on the Legislative Council precluded Indian 
dominance regardless of how many Indian voters could meet the standard of 
the Indian electoral roll . He argued that what Indians wanted was freedom 
(swaraj) for India and in Fiji, “a fair field and no favour .” He promised “co-
4 It is important to note the diverse ways in which ethnic Fijians encountered the colonial British . 
Whereas an alliance of Christian, coastal chiefs, and colonial officials developed, from the 1860s on 
there were also dynamic anticolonial movements, often associated with the less hierarchical polities of 
the mountainous interior or the western side of Viti Levu island (see Kaplan 1990, 1995) . Note as well 
the multi-ethnic appeal of the Fiji Labour Party . 
5 This section draws on Kelly (1988a, 1991, 1993, 1995b, 2004b), Kaplan (1988, 1998, 2004, 2008), 
and on Kelly and Kaplan (2001c) . 
6 The Arya Samaj was founded in Bombay in 1875 by Dayanand Saraswati . It advocated reform of 
Hinduism by return to Vedic principles, consistent with (western) science . It was anticolonial, counter-
Christian, and focused on Hindu uplift . Arya Samaj missionaries were the first Hindu missionaries to 
Fiji (Kelly 1991: 121–139) .
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operation” in Fiji but demanded “the full and unrestricted rights of British 
Citizenship .” (Kelly 1991: 145)
World War II saw the end of the British Empire and the beginning of the UN era 
of nation-states . In Fiji, the war was a watershed, bringing into focus and contrast 
the differing colonial pasts and different visions of the future of ethnic Fijians and 
Indo-Fijians . Ethnic Fijian chiefs envisioned a system that kept them at the center of 
political power, and a world in which aristocratic power remained a necessary politi-
cal form . Indo-Fijians, like the Indian nationalists, were more attuned to impending 
decolonization and democratization . Ethnic Fijians fought on behalf of the Empire 
during the war . Indo-Fijians followed Gandhi in refusing to fight for an imperial 
system that classed them as inferior . Faced with the Indo-Fijian challenge, the British 
claimed to represent Fijian interests, drawing upon ethnic Fijian fears of Indo-Fijian 
population growth, and denigrating Indian and Indo-Fijian anticolonial resistance .
At the so-called Deed of Cession debate in the Legislative Council in 1946, Euro-
pean members argued that the original deed of cession ‘giving’ Fiji to Queen Victoria 
and her heirs in 1874 provided that the British would preserve and protect Fijian 
interests . These arguments were clearly directed at quelling Indo-Fijian initiatives for 
greater legislative representation . Fiji Indian legislative council member A .D . Patel 
pointed out the irony of colonial claims to protect indigenous Fijians against foreign-
ers and made powerful arguments against the colonial position:
“As a matter of fact,” he argued, “if anything the coming of my people to 
this country gave the Fijians their honor, their prestige, nay indeed their very 
soul . Otherwise I have no hesitation in saying that the Fijians of this Colony 
would have met with the same fate that some other indigenous races in parts 
of Africa met with .” (Legislative Council of Fiji 1946: 48)
In the colonial era, it had been assumed that different populations, ‘races,’ or ‘com-
munities’ had different natures and roles to play in the colonial polity, and would 
each be represented separately in the governing bodies of the colony . As Fiji moved 
slowly towards independence, a model of representation based on ‘communal’ rather 
than ‘common’ electoral rolls dominated Fiji’s politics, with fundamental implica-
tions for the future of Fiji as a nation .
Common roll electoral systems regard all citizens as equal, with one person one 
vote, within a particular electoral district . Communal roll systems, on the other 
hand, require people to register themselves as members of particular communities, 
and to choose representatives of those communities . They are found primarily in for-
mer colonies that relied on ‘racial’ categories for political and economic structuring 
of the colony .7 Thus, until 2013 in every constitution in independent Fiji, citizens 
7 South Africa’s recently dismantled apartheid system is another inheritor of British colonial communal 
political divisions .
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have also had to identify themselves as ‘Indians,’ ‘Fijians,’ or ‘General Electors’ as 
they carried out the task of electing representatives and shaping the nation (see The 
Commonwealth, n .d .; Fiji Government 2013) .
Chronicling racial politics on the cusp of independence in Fiji (1969–71), a late 
colonial officer highlighted the implacable nature of colonial ‘race’ divisions . Tim 
Hardy (2009: 322) was a military and police specialist in the colonial service . In 
Fiji, he headed Special Branch, charged with identifying and dealing with threats to 
internal security . His sardonic and unsettling memoirs chronicle his working class 
origins, his distaste for empire and monarchy, and his service on behalf of a series 
of anti-communist colonial military and police agencies, from Africa, to Southeast 
Asia, to Fiji . In Fiji, Hardy belittles colonial fears of unrest in the 1960s, seeing 
instead the pathetic endgame jockeying of backwater colonial officials and offices at-
tempting to maintain funding and prestige . One theme stands out from his account: 
the enduring colonial tendency to find threats among Indians in Fiji . Hardy finds 
it amusing to tell of how, as head of Special Branch, he investigated 600 dossiers of 
people “fingered by Special Branch as potential insurrectionists: rabble rousers, left-
ies, trouble-makers, agitators, racists, anti-colonialists, would be revolutionaries, and 
so on” (Hardy 2009: 324) . He debunks the dossier of one man, a minor official of a 
provincial branch of the National Federation Party (the largely Indo-Fijian political 
party that grew out of cane farmers unions and other unions) .
Nair [a pseudonym] had come to have a personal dossier only because he hap-
pened to be a minor official of the Labasa branch of the National Federation 
party, the Indian-run political party which, because it stood for ‘liberation 
from colonialism’, had been well and truly smeared not only by the colonial 
establishment but by the council of Fijian chiefs, the English-language press 
and the Special Branch as ‘disloyal, subversive, ungrateful destructive, serving 
only Delhi’s interests and Moscow / Peking directed .’ … I liked Mr Nair . I saw 
no menace in him at all . I flew back to Suva and ordered that his dossier be 
shredded .
I repeated the Nair test over and over again, and although I wasn’t as capti-
vated by other National Federation Party Officials as I was with Mr . Nair, the 
result was always the same: files into the shredder . (Hardy 2009: 325–326)
Hardy’s voice is condescending . While avowing anticolonial sentiments himself, he 
shows little respect for the world-transforming bravery and insights that oriented 
Gandhian swaraj or Indo-Fijian platforms of ‘liberation from colonialism .’ And he 
didn’t shred A .D . Patel’s file (Hardy 2009: 327) . But he confirms what archives show 
as well: that throughout the twentieth century, colonial Fiji ran on ‘race’ categories, 
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in which the British privileged ethnic Fijians (especially their chiefs) and consistently 
denigrated Fiji Indians .8
The Skewed Democracy of Independent Fiji
The legacy of these colonial divisions was played out in independent Fiji . Repeat-
edly in independent Fiji, ostensible pluralism in policy coexisted with colonial con-
tinuations of ethnic Fijian paramountcy . The ceremonies of independence in 1970 
dramatized these ambivalences . On the one hand, for the first time in Fiji’s history, 
Indo-Fijians and other peoples had a major role in public ceremonies . The celebra-
tions were intended to represent Fiji as a ‘three-legged stool .’ Language policy gave 
equal status to English, Fijian, and Fiji Hindi . But in fact, the independence ceremo-
nies themselves, presided over by Prince Charles, gave special weight to royalty in 
political life, underlining the ongoing position of Fijian chiefs – a kind of authority, 
leadership, and appeal to tradition not open to Indo-Fijians (see Kelly and Kaplan 
2001c: 121–142) . The ambivalences toward pluralism seen in the independence cer-
emonies of 1970 were to harden into polarized political parties . In the late 1980s, 
multi-ethnic political party democratic victories would fall victim to ethnic Fijian 
military coups .
In 1970, Fiji had two major political parties which gave voice to the aspirations 
of Fiji’s peoples for the nation-state . Because of constitutional requirements, each 
party had mixed ‘racial’ membership and fielded candidates of all three electoral cat-
egories (‘Fijian,’ ‘Indian,’ and ‘General Elector’) . Each at times espoused more or less 
pluralistic ideals . However, they swiftly became parties representing different ethnic 
groups . The largely Indo-Fijian National Federation Party was founded by leaders 
of cane growers’ unions and other unions in 1964, with a history of contestation 
against colonial policies . The largely ethnic Fijian Alliance Party, headed by ethnic 
Fijian chiefs, held power from 1970 to 1987 .
In 1984, a new Fiji Labour Party formed to combat the ‘racial’ parties, with 
key platforms such as the designation of all Fiji citizens as ‘Fijians .’ Labour won the 
1987 election, forming a Coalition government with the National Federation Party . 
Within a month, an ethnic Fijian army Colonel, Sitiveni Rabuka, led a military 
coup, claiming to represent ethnic Fijian interests . Rabuka became Fiji’s Prime Min-
ister in elections held under the new constitution he sponsored, which was ‘ratified’ 
by Fijian high chiefs . This new constitution of 1990 simultaneously simplified and 
reinforced principles already at work in Fiji’s Constitution at independence in 1970 . 
Not only were the ‘races’ out of both balance and demographic proportion, but ma-
jor offices were reserved for Fijians .9
8 For further history of this late colonial period, and other examples of colonial and anticolonial dis-
course from the same period, see Lal (1992 and 2011), and Kelly and Kaplan (2001c) .
9 See Rutz and Balkan (1992) and Rutz (1995) for delineation of plural ethnic Fijian national and 
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However, following the establishment of this constitution, a period of debate ensued . 
Public discourse about the fate of the nation was largely about the ethnic Fijian pol-
ity within the polity . But simultaneously the debates and fragmentation of ethnic 
Fijian solidarity created opportunities for multi-ethnic, non-exclusively ethnic Fi-
jian parties as partners . Even more importantly, concerns driven by a need to have 
a constitution that met recognized international standards led to the formation of 
the Fiji Constitution Review Commission of 1996, and then to a new constitution 
in 1997 . While it continued some of the 1990 constitution’s many concessions to 
ethnic Fijian custom and chiefly power (the Great Council of Chiefs were to appoint 
the President and Vice President, the largely ceremonial Heads of State), the new 
constitution altered the ‘racial’ composition of representation in important ways .
In a crucial expression of the voice of Fiji’s citizenry, the first election under this 
new constitution in May of 1999 did not lead to the electoral return of coup leader 
Rabuka . Nor did the National Federation Party win any seats, not even its leader Jai 
Ram Reddy, who had become famous for his efforts to work together with coups’ 
leader Rabuka . Rather, the multi-ethnic Labour Party, led by Mahendra Chaudhry, 
won an absolute majority and formed a new government in coalition with several 
ethnic Fijian parties . The voice of the people supported the multi-ethnic democracy 
envisioned in 1987 in the first Labour victory .
But one year following the election, a complicated aggregation of agents led and 
solidified a coup against Chaudhry’s Labour Coalition government . First, George 
Speight, a failed businessman, led a group of military personnel and took Prime 
Minister Chaudhry and Coalition parliamentarians hostage . Speight claimed to act 
on behalf of indigenous Fijian rights . Outside analysts have noted that Speight, past 
head of the Fiji Hardwood and Fiji Pine commissions in the Rabuka government, 
had seen his carefully laid plans to sell Fiji’s mahogany reserves (planted by colonial 
planners in the 1950s) to a US buyer overturned by the newly elected Labour coali-
tion government . Speight’s coup was overtaken and solidified by a second simultane-
ous coup, more from the top down, led by ethnic Fijian stalwarts . Ethnic Fijian bu-
reaucrat Laisenia Qarase was installed as interim Prime Minister, with the support of 
Fiji’s military forces under commander Frank Bainimarama . As head of the interim 
government, Qarase announced and implemented a range of programs to solidify 
ethnic Fijian paramountcy in the nation .
In the wake of the takeover of the nation in May and following months, there 
were many local takeovers of roads, power stations, tourist resorts, factories, and even 
police stations by ethnic Fijians asserting (as in the national takeovers) their rights as 
landowners and indigenes to define the nation as a whole . The interim government, 
headed by ethnic Fijian bureaucrat Qarase, presented its role as returning Fiji to 
peace, order, and ‘normality .’ Their interim budget and blueprint for Fiji sought to 
reconcile diverse ethnic Fijian claims and projects, their vision making ethnic Fijian 
interests the main national interests for Fiji and once again diminishing the rights 
nationalist rhetorical strategies in political discourse of this coup period . 
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and contributions of Indo-Fijians to the nation . Anthropologist Susanna Trnka, in 
her 2008 ethnography State of Suffering, has described in detail the silencing impact 
of the coups on many Indo-Fijians .
A New Kind of Coup?
In 2006, the military ousted Qarase and seized power . One cause may have been the 
Qarase government’s support of a reconciliation bill that would have pardoned 2000 
coup participants, including soldiers who mutinied against their superior officers . 
Frank Bainimarama, naval commander and head of all of Fiji’s military, has also set 
out a series of reforms, including a common roll electoral system . When the Fiji Ap-
peals Court found his abrogation of the constitution illegal in 2009, he dismissed 
and replaced the judges .
A new constitution was promulgated on 6 September 2013 . It includes a bill 
of rights and provides for a single-chamber legislature, Parliament, with 50 
members directly elected by universal adult suffrage for a term of no more 
than four years from its first session . All Fijian citizens from the age of 18 are 
entitled to vote in a single national constituency and under a system of pro-
portional representation . Parliament elects a non-executive President from a 
field of two candidates, one nominated by the Prime Minister and one by the 
Leader of the Opposition . The presidential term is three years and a President 
can serve no more than two terms . After an election, the leader of the party 
with the most seats in Parliament becomes Prime Minister . The Prime Minis-
ter is head of government . (The Commonwealth n .d .)10
This was the first coup that did not explicitly proclaim ethnic Fijian political para-
mountcy . Indeed Bainimarama has espoused a common roll for the future . Some 
observers have been tempted to call this the first coup to serve Indo-Fijian interests .
But the historical tactics of Indo-Fijian activism have been nonviolent: strikes, 
boycotts, electoral politics, and use of media to build communal solidarity and make 
moral arguments, in other words insistence on the truth .11 It is thus difficult to 
read the 2006 coup as a vehicle for Indo-Fijian hopes and aspirations in Fiji . Some 
Indo-Fijians and some Labour Party supporters may have hoped that the military 
would return the democratically elected Chaudhry government to power . But al-
though Chaudhry was for a time in the cabinet as Finance minister, he was forced by 
Bainimarama to resign when he alienated foreign business investors in Fiji through 
10 See also Australian Broadcasting Corporation (2013), Fiji Government (2009a, 2009b, 2013), and 
Fraenkl, Firth and Lal (2009) .
11 See Kelly for an analysis of the Indo-Fijian value of shanti in relation to the ethnic Fijian value on 
mana Kelly (1998, 2001, 2005, 2011 and also this volume) . 
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proposing new taxes . While disavowing ethnic nationalism, Fiji’s military is almost 
completely ethnic Fijian . The sense of political possibilities of the personnel of the 
coup government was surely shaped in the ethnically defined parameters of the in-
dependence political era . And the coup is a military coup . The historical tactics of 
Indo-Fijian activism have always been nonviolent .
The rise of political armies is surely a phenomenon connected with the nation-
state, as John Kelly’s chapter (this volume) discusses . But Fiji’s military also evokes 
parallels with colonial governments . Most apparent in Fiji recently has been the im-
pact of the military censorship of newspapers, radio, television, and internet . Claim-
ing to seek order and normality, the military suppresses truthful accounts of Fiji and 
of popular will throughout the world . Early on, the newspapers were full of trivial 
articles from wire services or local human interest stories about dogs who took bus 
rides and then returned home, seemingly passive aggressive choices to fill space by 
deeply frustrated editors and journalists . It is hard to speculate on the motives for this 
particular regime’s focus on media . But it seems quite similar to the colonial British 
insistence on rewarding loyalty and fearing what they imagine to be ‘disorder and 
disaffection .’ Yet this particular tactic seems unlikely to succeed . On the one hand, 
there is a deep history of anti-colonial ‘vernacular’ Indo-Fijian media in Fiji . And on 
the other hand, young people fill the internet cafes . Today’s global media sources and 
the protean capacities of the internet reach far beyond local censoring capacities .
Are Indo-Fijians seeking self-determination by ‘pessimal’ belonging?12 A with-
drawal strategy’s limit is that it refuses – non-cooperating – to join evil . Such a 
tactic may not actually shape structures except by moral suasion . So, the dilemma of 
Indo-Fijian belonging in Fiji has continued to be the problem of self-determination, 
not by building the political house in which one lives, but finding oneself dwell-
ing in a place and role constituted by others, moving into a house built by others, 
and for other purposes . In colonial days, Indo-Fijians refused the role of ‘guest’ (as 
some ethnic Fijians termed them) and ‘working population and nothing more’ (as 
colonial discourse would have had it) and, across their history, demanded recogni-
tion as citizens . As a tactic against violence, and a successful one (not a weapon of 
the weak), they embraced ‘striving for minority,’ and indeed were the most power-
ful continuants of Gandhian reliance on non-violent resistance (Kelly 1995a, 1998, 
2001, 2005, 2011; Kelly and Kaplan 2001b) . They did not collectively protest or 
regret their return to minority status in the islands but, paradoxically in a democracy, 
hoped for better political terms as a result of minority status (Kelly 1998) . In recent 
elections, no party commands a major political role as an explicitly Indian nationalist 
voice, neither as a Hindutva party (despite the rise of Modi in India) nor as a specifi-
12 By pessimal, I mean an interaction strategy of minimal engagement . The term was developed by 
anthropologist McKim Marriott (1976) in a discussion of the social potential of different exchange and 
engagement strategies . Asymmetric exchanges can be what he terms “optimal” in which the exchanger 
emphasizes giving over receiving . Exchanges can be symmetric, some valuing many transactions in bal-
ance, others (pessimal) seeking to avoid engagement .
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cally Indian national congress . Might such a party arise? Perhaps not . Even when 
blamed for benefiting from an anti-democratic decade and consequential reforms 
that they did not cause, Indo-Fijians choosing to stay in Fiji strikingly sustain the 
path of shanti (peace), to the point of quietism . And despite emerging global hostil-
ity to migration, many still chose to leave, often citing their children’s future . Most 
likely of all, therefore, is a continuation of the now decades-long expression of Indo-
Fijian sentiment: self-determination by diaspora, away from Fiji .
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Dilemmas of Belonging in Fiji, Part II:  6 
Shanti, Swaraj, and the Problem of  
Political Armies
John Kelly
“Societies hide the pain of belonging .”
McGranahan (2010: 3), citing Das (1995)
Belonging to What?
Dilemmas of belonging: our volume’s theme poignantly captures the situation of 
all too many peoples in the diasporas of the postcolonial world . As Martha Kaplan’s 
chapter has made clear, the dilemmas of belonging to post-colonial nation-states 
reveal the real limits to the utopian prospect of liberal self-determination . Especially 
for some people, like those in India beyond India, the diasporic South Asians? Clear-
ly . But can their experience illuminate issues larger than that experience? Are there 
dilemmas of belonging only for some people, or for all? And what shall we investi-
gate further, to better understand dilemmas of belonging? Writing for peace during 
what we now know as World War One, Thorstein Veblen ([1917] 1998) observed 
that advocates for peace were always persuasive, yet the world plunged into ever 
more devastating wars . “What Shall We Say?” he then asked (typically garishly, with 
the quotation marks and the capital letters) . His answer will help us with our own, 
as we seek insights into politics responsive to changing situations, but also deeply 
rooted in cultural valuations, precisely the stuff of politics beyond primordialism 
and instrumentalism . And Fiji as experienced by Indo-Fijians can help us as we seek 
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to track the emotions of belonging in their historical connections to reasons of state, 
nation, religion, and all other precedent relevant realities .1
Let us start where Kaplan (this volume) left us, among Fiji’s realities, and thus 
among things on earth not dreamed of in Versailles’s philosophies . Kaplan’s account 
tracks a legal and social history for all people in Fiji, somewhere well beyond and far 
more complicated than any story of a single group’s “self-determination .” Yes, by the 
time of Fiji’s decolonization there was a clear template for nation-state law and order . 
Independent Fiji began with a constitution . And that constitution began with a pre-
amble in the voice of “we the people .” But Fiji’s constitution was actually delayed by 
six months in London’s colonial office because the constitution drafters there were 
working through contradictions in Jamaica’s document . And, the exiting British did 
not meet local requests for drafts translated into Hindi and even Fijian language for 
perusal before its adoption in London and Fiji (Kelly and Kaplan 2008) . Further, 
Fiji’s document was unusual among postcolonial constitutions: it found sovereign-
ty to begin not with the decolonization struggle but rather in a chain of custody 
marked from the Deed of Cession, wherein Fijian chiefs recognized the British Crown 
as sovereign, construed as “giving” the British a sovereignty now coming back to the 
islands (Saunders 1997) . Fiji’s independence constitution thus ambiguously always 
locates sovereignty, finally, with the Fijian chiefs . Acts of election then enter demo-
cratic representatives of the people – any and all people, whether in ethnically delin-
eated districts or national districts – merely into power-sharing with others always 
already there (a status that also includes the police and military, of course, in every 
actual nation-state) . Kaplan shows the difference real hierarchy makes for citizen-
ship, the pessimal2 disposition necessary for Indo-Fijians to belong comfortably to 
Fiji as their place, and the grim alternative of renewed diaspora against increasing 
hostility to migration . We can carry her discussion further both by exploring a spe-
cifically Indian dilemma of virtue and reconsidering those valuations within more 
global dialectical tensions . The dilemma of virtue is that between shanti and swaraj, 
shanti meaning peace, swaraj self-rule (and ‘a dilemma of virtue’ meaning, whether 
to define the situation, to valorize or even transvalue possible courses of action, in 
one light or the other) .3 The global backdrop, then, is dialectical tensions not only 
1 Stanley Tambiah (1996) is my primary source for insistence on the wisdom of taking political anthro-
pology beyond both primordialism (as, for example, in cultural template arguments, people respond as 
culture wires them to) and instrumentalism (as, for example, in rational choice arguments, which na-
ively extend the chronotope of choice while they extend reckoning to cover all thinking) . From William 
Mazzarella (2013) comes inspiration for insisting on the wisdom of connecting reason and emotion in 
all actual depictions of human action . All of this commits to Marshall Sahlins’ (1976) view of culture 
encompassing and informing not-so practical reason, and above all extends the problem of the history 
of culture into the realm insisted upon by Veblen ([1917] 1998), situations with violent (in game theory 
terms, coercive and compelling as well as would-be persuasive) states already constituting irreducible 
parts of social situations, limits and opportunities .
2   I will discuss pessimalism in the next section .
3 People actively engage with the core values of their culture, and cultures set and change their priori-
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about equality and justice in theory and reality, but also about organized violence, 
peace and right . Fiji, with its frontstage chiefs and (usually, but not recently) back-
stage military, and changing relations between the two, Fiji with its complex engage-
ments of both with Indo-Fijians, Fiji can show us the sometimes implications of two 
less frequently reckoned dimensions of nation and citizenship . The first, that Veblen 
emphasized, is the situating precedence of states and their organized violence over 
nations and their claims of right . The second, the more frontstage problem after all 
for belonging in Fiji, is the sometimes appearance, within nation-states, of political 
armies . Political armies claim themselves to be the conduit between nation and state 
– the nation in the state, legitimate and sovereign – by uniquely embodying national 
will at time of need . In Fiji’s case, the army after the first three (or four; cf . Kelly and 
Kaplan 2001b, ch .6) coups legitimated itself as the expression of the needs and will 
of an ethnically exclusive inner and sovereign nation . By its roots and acts, the army 
embodied the taukei, owners of the land, and was the servant of chiefs, sovereigns . 
In the latest, 2006 coup, the powers of state before nation became most clearly and 
strangely visible, as the army proved able to disassemble all other institutions before 
it could delimit itself, and even the Great Council of Chiefs found itself outside of 
the new realms of law and order .
Shanti and Swaraj
The extraordinary public responses to coup violence in Fiji have been led by insis-
tence on peace, centered in the Indic, Islamic, and especially devotional Hindu value 
of shanti. Shanti is a broadly, soteriologically valorizing concept of peace as sign and 
destiny of the truly good in a world of suffering . The extension of the ethnic Fijian 
conception of mana to valorizing the usurpations of the coups has not launched 
spiraling violence, ethnic or otherwise, because the counterweight of shanti has kept 
the peace in the face of aggressive assertion and testing . Elsewhere, Kaplan and I 
(Kelly and Kaplan 2001a, Kelly 2005, 2011) examine in more detail the “intimate 
enemy” dynamics that have opened a cultural dialectic between mana and shanti in 
Fiji . Here, let us hone in on the emergence of a transvaluing shanti amidst the di-
lemmas of belonging faced, across many decades, by the South Asian migrants who 
became the Indo-Fijians . Dilemmas of belonging will seem, and feel, different if one 
is in quest of peace, than if one is in quest of justice, or in quest of mana, or of self-
determination . While Americans have veered, across the long ‘American Century,’ 
between Wilsonian views of self-determination as good policy, toward views of the 
quest for self-determination as inevitable expression of free human nature, and back 
to the concept of best policy, variously placed Indo-Fijians have relied on strikes and 
ties, when people are faced with dilemmas in which virtues lie on both possible courses of action, and 
with narratives variously situated that recommend solutions . Ruth Benedict pioneered the concept in 
the tenth chapter of The Chrysanthemum and the Sword (1946) . See also Kaplan’s chapter this volume .
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withdrawal to seek justice and peace even before the electric news of Gandhi’s suc-
cesses . They have since debated the core values of social and political life from various 
places and positions, with a strong sense both of global trends and local distinction, 
usually understood as local limitation, especially if the goal is self-rule .
The Hindu value of shanti, emotional peace in the face of hardship and suffering, 
has come to be of great importance to many Indo-Fijians, whether or not they come 
to feel that they belong in, or even to, the islands of their birth . Shanti, a cardinal 
emotion of bhakti or devotional Hinduism, is the virtue of pessimal transacting with 
God – peacefully accepting whatever God gives with all attendant confidence and 
hope in eventual good and love . The bhakti marg of sanatan dharm, which is to say, 
the devotional path within the eternal dharma, enables grace within alienated labor, 
and acceptance of one’s own good and right even when a lifetime will not see its just 
deserts realized . This confidence in divine love and in more ultimate hope is different 
from a Christian call for redemption from sin . In Fiji’s emerging moral economy, In-
do-Fijian shanti and grace in alienated labor has both complemented and contested 
ethnic Fijian fears of alienation and pursuit of mana and loloma, power and Christian 
love . Shanti has been a circuit breaker when ‘coup culture’ overturns democracy in 
the name of Fijian chiefly mana, even when the results have led Fiji Hindus and Fiji 
Muslims to doubt the wisdom of belonging to the islands, and especially to the locat-
ing of children and grandchildren there .
Yet all these considerations, these profound interactions of culture and law within 
postcolonial political dialogue, have still only examined part of what the Indo-Fijian 
dilemmas of belonging to Fiji can teach us about the postcolonial nation-state . Ka-
plan has detailed how legally-ensconced hierarchy in land laws, electoral laws, and 
public culture can place real limits onto the utopian deep, horizontal comradeship 
of the nation-state . Shanti, with its pessimalism4, fits the situations of many of the 
postcolonial labor diaspora colonies much better than either the knowledge-focused, 
self-help purification movement of the Arya Samaj, or the confidence of self-deter-
mination liberalism, explaining why a bhakti-centric Sanatan Dharm movement was 
more successful than the reformist Arya Samaj in so many labor diaspora colonies 
across the twentieth century .5 Prospects for shanti were obviously relevant, but also 
4 Pessimalism is a transaction strategy in which you take what you can get, rather than minimizing, 
maximizing, or seeking to optimize by negotiating one’s terms of transaction, in the model originally 
pioneered for South Asian culture of exchange by McKim Marriott (1976) . Shanti devotional world 
view tends to treat Hindus in this the kali yug, or fourth- and final age in a devolving, corrupting uni-
verse, as moral kin to Sudras, the low, service castes when society was better organized . Sudras by their 
own actions become too polluted in substance to succeed on the path of knowledge or jnana marg. 
All are equal in dependence on God’s grace, love and generosity to succeed, and the wise among them 
embrace this situation . Thus, the ethic to pessimal transacting, taking whatever comes one’s way, relying 
on God and not self for outcomes .
5 The most famous diaspora discourse emanating from one-time labor colonies, ironically, occludes this 
key point; in fact it is precisely what V .S . Naipaul ’s (1999) modernism seeks to overcome . Naipaul, 
in his alienation from his Indo-Caribbean roots (and citizenship) in both his life and works shows 
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prospects for swaraj, peace and also self-control, each sometimes seen as means to the 
other . In Fiji, land of shanti and mana, what about that latest, largest coup, whose 
transfigured mana, if it can even be considered such, led to the disbanding of the 
Great Council of Chiefs itself? What is to be done, if you quest not only for shanti 
but also swaraj, not only peace but also self-rule, in confrontation with political 
armies claiming sovereignty over you?
Pessimalism can only be a tactic, and probably a doomed tactic, if one’s ultimate 
goal is not merely shanti but swaraj, not only peace but self-rule . And vice versa, 
insistence on swaraj can be considered a useful tactic sometimes, but it is ultimately 
doomed and unpeaceful, in the real world, if one abandons Gandhian self-rule and / 
or American self-determination as the ultimate end . Ahimsa, non-violence, becomes 
more than a tactic if shanti, peace, is the end, as well as means . This chapter seeks to 
situate Indian diasporic dilemmas of belonging, whether to belong in, even to, Fiji . 
Ultimately, the chapter will be about war, peace, and political belonging generally . 
But proximately, and first of all, it is about how, for many Indo-Fijians, the dilemma 
of virtue between shanti and swaraj vitally sets the question – to stay, or to go – and 
on what terms .
Swaraj encompasses, roughly, the prizing of rights, duties, justice and uplift, 
above all via self-control, ‘self-rule .’ Two ethnographic vignettes will illustrate how 
shanti and swaraj can come to be in tension, before we return to the most general 
questions of theory . First, in 1985, in other words, before any coups in Fiji (yet 
shadowed with inchoate awareness of what was coming; see also Bharati 1972 on 
Uganda), an old man arrived late to a Ramayan mandali in Ra Province on Viti Levu 
(Fiji’s ‘big island’) . Ra district is predominantly ethnic Fijian, with population thin 
on the ground, the edge of decent cane-growing territory . Ra’s Indo-Fijians are farm-
ers – hardy but mostly not prosperous . A very good motive for persisting there in the 
suffering cane economy was after all desire for shanti – a peaceful, rural life . Ramayan 
mandalis (mandali is related to mandala, but really just means circles) are evenings 
devoted to collective singing of bhajans, devotional hymns set to themes from the 
Tulsi Das, Hindi-language Ramcaritmanas, a bhakti devotional rendition of the Ra-
mayana story put at the center of Sanatan Dharm (“eternal tradition”) style Hindu-
the successive alienation, an Arya Samajist father rejecting a Sanatani, much more folksy grandfather, 
leading to a grandson whose path of knowledge walked away from belief altogether, to firmly reorient 
toward modernist, individual self-emergence . Here we will not pre-emptively model all of diaspora as 
self-determination according to scale and location of place, as if one is merely to choose whether to 
be Indian writ global, or member of some more lately joined nation, or a free sojourner in this world 
somehow otherwise construed – and in the end, imagine people oriented solely to a secular future, an 
immanent temporal redemption . Modernism does have a strong constituency among Indo-Fijians, 
often combined with other valorizations of place and time . Both because those other valorizations have, 
I think, the outsized impact on what makes Fiji’s history different, and to resist modeling that contrasts 
Fijians’ cultural vibrancy with Indian instrumental calculating, here we explore the Fiji situation with 
South Asian, with the population especially South Asian Hindu, cultural commitments also in mind .
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ism .6 The old farmer joined the bhajans, and afterward in quiet conversation was 
apologetically agitated . Why was he upset? Youth from a Fijian village (koro) threw 
stones at his car as he drove quickly past in the dusk . Yes, he was in a hurry, but why 
did they break his truck’s back window? What was their motive? Varieties of bored, 
resentful, and deluded hatred were suggested, but the old gentlemen (in all senses 
deserving the term) cut off assessment, firmly apologizing, again, for this existential 
disruption of their quest for devotion-oriented peace . Even when another member of 
the circle raised the question whether Fiji was making it impossible to seek shanti, he 
firmly resisted . He was not going anywhere, and windows could be fixed . Resenting 
his own, unsettling, resentment, his irritation was above all not about the injustice 
of this assault on his property but on the interruption of his own flawed pursuit of 
shanti, and he was all too aware that restoring calm was in crucial part up to him . His 
own self-control was to serve the pursuit of peace, not only vice-versa .
This gentleman’s depth of commitment to seek shanti was marked; thus I re-
member it; others would no doubt have responded differently . Indo-Fijian memory 
is much about assessing varieties of response to different types of violence . Its exis-
tential tinge clearly goes back to girmitiya, indentured laborer days, and the fateful 
decisions whether to stay in Fiji, as 60 % of surviving indentured laborers chose to 
do, or return to India, as 40 % did, often at great expense and real hardship . We will 
next look briefly at Totaram Sanadhya’s Story of the Haunted Line ([1922] 1991), 
perhaps the most famous iteration of indenture-line dilemmas . The hero of Sanad-
hya’s story was forced to live in an abandoned, reopened “line” or plantation housing 
shed, a line thought haunted by former suicides . He was starving, one night, after 
acts of generosity had depleted his food supply . He came very close to suicide him-
self, standing on a stool with a noose around his neck, before a heterogenous set of 
simultaneous intercessions saved him . The causality was ambiguous . After a prayer to 
the Goddess for rescue from his longing and suffering, when memory of his mother 
was triggered by recognition of his duty to her, there was a knock on his door . Step-
ping down from his stool, opening his door, the hero met ethnic Fijians, not ghosts . 
They had returned, in the cool of the night, with large gifts of root crop food, in 
generous return on a perforce scanty meal of rice he had provided them earlier in 
the week, with the last of his week’s food ration . At Fiji’s independence, in the most 
optimistic of moods, efforts were made via stage play and even film to make this 
Story of the Haunted Line a paradigm for future recognition and exchange between 
6 I have written elsewhere (Kelly 2001) in detail about the Arya Samaj reform movement and its ratio-
nalist, reformist knowledge-path (jnana-marg) Hinduism, its early success in Fiji building schools and 
leadership structures, later overcome by bhakti-marg, i .e . devotionally oriented Sanatan Dharm mis-
sionaries, who persuaded the majority of Fiji Hindus to adopt the Ramcaritmanas as the perfect shelter 
for Hindus suffering the exile of labor diaspora . Thus shanti in the shelter (sharan) of devotion to Ram 
via this text is a particular soteriological goal of many Fiji devotional Hindus, as well as a widespread 
worldly value orienting (sometimes, often, or even always) the deontology of many more people there . 
Ramayan mandali meetings, depending upon (often revolving) leadership (as circles) sometimes involve 
reading and interpretation of Tulsi Das passages, but always the singing of bhajans.
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ethnic groups . In its chastity and generosity this story wrote over many dilemmas on 
the ground in actual girmitiya history, concerning Brahmins, caste, gender, sexuality, 
and kinship . But the point, for us here, is the way the story focalized (in Tambiah’s 
sense, see Tambiah 1996, discussed below) the dilemmas themselves: this “Story of 
the Haunted Line” has justly become a paradigm of how to move forward in exile, 
addressing violence and fear of violence, hunger and shame, memory and duty, de-
votion in despair, humility and its rewards, and even life and death itself . This core 
dilemma is not so much to be or not to be, since the story presumed his soul would 
continue some way, but how to respond to extreme suffering .
And how does this dilemma, the quest for shanti or swaraj, look outside of Hindu 
parable? The moralization of pessimalism (this strategy of accepting all that is offered) 
can be reconsidered if we remove sanguine hope for divine reward, as something 
much like what a Californian philosopher (James 2017) has recently called “adaptive 
attunement .” This adaptive attunement, argues James, is free will reconsidered (and 
Jean-Paul Sartre’s ([1957] 1968) existentialism reconsidered) to be compatible with 
a deterministic universe, imposing will not by controlling things but by efficient and 
purposeful alignment to them . A politics and ethics of extreme acceptance can be 
theologically optimistic . But under what conditions is it practically, let alone ethi-
cally, sufficient in the human political world? There is a problem of possibility here 
that needs to be further explored, crucial to the dilemmas of belonging . Dialectical 
tension between shanti and mana has emerged in Fiji, a new, fraught, trans-ethnic 
political culture in which chief-like self-justifying domination is delimited by with-
drawal, non-participation and avoidance, a dialectic that has been as productive as it 
has been frustrating for all who stay there . But can it sustain peace, let alone anything 
comparable to the ideal of liberal democratic self-rule? It is unwise to underestimate 
successful assertions of mana in Fiji’s ‘coup culture .’ But perhaps, as we shall see, it is 
even more unwise to neglect the more global history of postcolonial state violence .
A New Kind of Militarism in Fiji, amidst Global Problems  
for Self-Determination
Fiji’s current military-backed government is different from Fiji’s previous coup gov-
ernments . It is stranger, less positioned in the ethnic landscape and unstuck in ideol-
ogy, professing respect for global standards of equality and democracy, ratified by 
a closely controlled election in 2014, but more generally, for more than a decade 
now, forbidding most kinds of political discourse and action . Fiji’s current regime is 
extremely strange . However, the failure of Fiji to thrive as a self-determining nation-
state is all too typical . The mid-twentieth century promise of decolonization has 
led not to the realization of a globe of peaceful, free, prosperous democracies but 
to increasing asymmetries and smoldering, increasing violence . Neoliberal pressures 
from capitalist centers in Europe and the United States, the so-called Washington 
Consensus, overwhelmed efforts to organize a counter-ideology . Yet it seems also to 
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have generated even in Europe, and certainly globally, the uneven field of diffuse 
resentments and restlessness that Appadurai (2006) has aptly named “the geography 
of anger .” This development has global roots . A key nexus for both the positive and 
the negative, for both political constitution, and this shadowing anger, is the 1955 
Bandung Conference . What African-American novelist and social critic Richard 
Wright said of the delegates to the Bandung conference could aptly be said, now, of 
the vast congeries of global skeptics of the neoliberal institutions of the new world 
order: “They were much clearer about what they did not want than about what they 
wanted” ([1956] 1995: 212) . At Bandung, what they did not want was continuing 
interference from ex-colonizers . The call for the conference began with the question 
posed by Ali Sastroamidjojo, Prime Minister of Indonesia, at the 1954 Colombo 
conference, when five Asian prime ministers there pondered why the fate of Indo-
China was being settled, instead, at a simultaneous conference in Geneva: “Where 
do we stand now, we the people of Asia, in this world of ours today?” (Weeraratna 
2014) . Our contemporary geography of anger might well, still, concern the failures 
of mobilizations of “we, the people,” many places, to realize peace, prosperity, and 
justice . And while Fiji’s current rulers might be said to be clear about what they want, 
if we take them at their word that they wish to join the neoliberal world and to end 
many of Fiji’s experiments with communal exceptionalism in voting and governing, 
we still have to observe two things . First, they are late to a party that is not shaping 
up as its organizers planned . Second, their means bear little relationship to their 
ends . If Fiji’s current rulers do know what they want, they certainly do not know 
how to get it .
We seek to understand Fiji’s political extremes, both because we want insight 
into Fiji itself, even possibly grounds and lines for hope for politics there, and also 
because Fiji, in its extremes, might clarify some of the structures of the new global 
order of nation-states, emergent in decolonization after World War II . Fiji might 
help explain our global failure to meet the high expectations that decolonization into 
nation-states once entailed . Its study might make us wiser in the engineering of new 
hopes and expectations more globally, especially about belonging and its dilemmas 
in a world increasingly built by diasporic connections and movements . The Indian 
National Congress, with real wisdom, spent much of the twentieth century urging 
Indian labor diasporic communities not to return to India: exactly what, where, will 
constitute wisdom for India beyond India in the twenty-first century?
Fiji’s politics are surprising by many measures, especially when considered in 
combination . Fiji was extreme among new nations in the symmetry presented by its 
major ethnic populations, ethnic Fijian and Indo-Fijian, shortly after independence, 
close to a 50/50 population split . Fiji has also been extreme in the intolerance of 
one of the two groups to government by the other, with ethnic Fijian-backed coups 
following just one month (in 1987) and one year (in 2000) of government by Indo-
Fijian backed parties, within a long century of democratic or partially democratic 
government, with never a military move in the other direction across unbroken de-
cades of ethnic Fijian overrepresentation and dominance . But Fiji is also extreme, 
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and this is perhaps the key extreme, in the non-violence of its coup culture, with 
only one solitary death by military violence across five coups . Extreme in symmetry 
of ethnic divide, in one-sided political domination, and in non-violence . But in 
other ways, the problems of the nation-state in reality in Fiji are not extreme at all . 
Fiji is squarely among the majority of new nations engineered in the decolonization 
era that have, as Ranajit Guha put it speaking of India, ‘failed to come to their own’ 
(Guha 1982: 7) (or as an American would say, ‘failed to come into their own’) . The 
failure of most of these new nations to find freedom, peace and prosperity by way of 
their exercise of self-determination has frustrated utterly the planners, and even more 
the denizens, of the new world order after World War II . In fact, in its peacefulness, 
in its prosperity, and until recently in its civil freedoms Fiji has done much better 
than most, though it suffers now on all three measures .
The ethnic symmetry in Fiji is more complicated, historically dynamic and po-
litically hedged than is convenient for consociational democracy planners . Conso-
ciational modeling would be simpler if ethnicity was some kind of natural histori-
cal phenomenon independent of specific historical engagements and movements . 
Structuring institutions for communal sharing is vastly harder when we recognize 
labile social, cultural and legal histories . As Kaplan’s chapter explains, at Fiji’s inde-
pendence in 1970, the Indo-Fijians were actually 51 % of Fiji’s population . But the 
British designed constitution gave them only 40 % of the communally designated 
parliamentary seats, not an insignificant shift in a democracy . The departing British, 
in negotiation especially with their Alliance Party successors, built into Fiji’s first 
independent constitution further asymmetries against the ordinary liberal design 
expected in republican government . These included appointed Senate seats for the 
quasi-aristocratic ethnic Fijian Great Council of Chiefs, and also control by those 
Great Council appointees over a wide swath of law governing land ownership and 
regulation of ethnic Fijian social life . A third asymmetry was overrepresentation in 
parliament of people neither Indo-Fijian nor ethnic Fijian, the ‘general electors,’ who 
were originally, prominently, the Chinese- and European-descended citizens of the 
new nation, but who over recent decades have come to be mostly people of mixed, 
part-European ethnic descent, and other Islanders resident in Fiji, as most of the 
Chinese and European citizens have migrated out . Over time, every decade since 
independence, all of Fiji’s demographics have shifted significantly . Consonant with 
the rise of ‘other Islanders’ among the so-called ‘general electors’ has been an increase 
in the proportion of the overall population that is ethnic Fijian, an accelerating trend 
caused both by higher ethnic Fijian birthrates and a large outmigration of Indo-
Fijians, an outmigration especially of the educated and skilled that in its numbers, 
if not in its proportions, has paralleled and overmatched the rejection of Fiji by its 
initial Chinese and white citizens . The population has, in a history very brief for such 
significant demographic shifting, gone from an absolute Indo-Fijian majority to par-
ity to an absolute ethnic Fijian majority at present . Overall, Indo-Fijians have been 
surprisingly sanguine about this trend, particularly puzzling in light of the history of 
transgression of Indo-Fijian social and political right . In my experience, Indo-Fijians 
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often hope that an ethnic Fijian majority will work as a tactic against violence, to 
lessen fears and calm roiled political and social waters (Kelly 1998) . Readers of Su-
sanna Trnka’s vivid ethnography (2008) of post-coups Indo-Fijian life will know that 
Indo-Fijians have long lived in fear of ethnic Fijian violence . While deaths have been 
rare to non-existent, crimes against property have been all too common, and the 
justice system is often lenient when the vector of the crime is ethnic Fijian and poor 
against anyone wealthy . Strong physical barriers to protect private property became 
the middle class and upper class norm in Fiji, especially as the decades of coups have 
unfolded .
Fiji’s surprises and extremes can show more when compared to other complex 
realities than when measured against an ideal type of normal governance . To put this 
differently, Fiji is not simply a successful, a normal, or a failed state . Fiji’s troubles 
are part of the failure of a global nation-state system . Multiple, partial, all too com-
mon, and increasingly general failures of the theory of self-determination in reality, I 
think, are the cardinal problem for the political anthropology of our times . Many of 
these problems are well known . One of the best sources for contemplation of them 
is the magisterial review of UN declarations, protocols and treaties compiled by Brij 
Lal and others in the 1996 Fiji constitutional review document, Towards a United 
Future (Reeves, Vakatora and Lal 1996). Other problems are more obvious in reality 
than theory, notably the prevalence of political armies, military governments as an 
alternative grammar to the relationship of nation and state, and / or states in perdur-
ing military occupation of part or even all of their citizenry, with or without such a 
legitimating ‘political army’ (sometimes legitimacy depends on who you ask) . Here, 
some new comparisons may be rewarding . Many modes of comparative study of Fiji’s 
politics have already been fruitful: much has been gained by comparing Fiji to other 
Pacific Island histories, as Stewart Firth (2000), for example, has brilliantly shown, 
along with many others including Doug Munro (1990), Epeli Hauʻofa (1993), and 
Nicholas Thomas (1991) . The comparison of the indentured labor colonies of the 
British Empire has its own political and social stories to tell, with insights in particu-
lar from Brackette Williams (1991), and much to be learned from the ethnographies 
of Thomas Blom Hansen (2012), Viranjini Munasinghe (2001), Aisha Khan (2004) 
and others . The questions of racism and communalism in Empire have drawn many 
to compare the political duality in Fiji with that of South Asia’s Hindu / Muslim poli-
tics and the traumas of partition (see also Kaplan and Kelly 2017) .
A different comparison will highlight different local and global patterns . Espe-
cially because of the increasing role, and increasing strangeness, of Fiji’s military in 
government, let us compare Fiji’s political trajectory to that of the part of our planet 
that has been most persistently dominated by military government in the era of de-
colonization . That is the Asian Highlands .
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Highland Asia’s Endless Warfare: India’s Other Decolonization 
Trauma, and What Nehru Found “Absurd”
Compared to military incursions in many locations in Asia’s Highlands, Fiji’s coups 
are small affairs . Afghanistan is now deep into its second decade of US counter-
insurgency occupation, and that after a decade of US-backed war against Soviet 
occupation engineered by Pakistan’s Directorate of Inter-services Intelligence (ISI), 
and then the rise of the Taliban . Death tolls from militarized conflict in Afghanistan 
since World War II are in the millions, and military conflict has disrupted everyone’s 
lives . Pakistan, too, has lived a heavily militarized and violent half century, its own 
highlands held in amber in striking continuation of British colonial indirect rule 
policy, and simultaneously managed as a conduit for the episodically continuing 
warfare in Afghanistan and Kashmir . Before supposing that the military conflicts of 
the Highlands are somehow determined by Islam and jihad, notice the episodically 
raging and simmering conflicts, also, in Tibet, and the struggles in Nepal (the only 
major independent nation-state in the Highlands) and the fifty years of Indian army 
occupation in Northeast India, where twice as many people have died in counter-
insurgency occupation violence as have died in Kashmir . I am unaware that anyone 
has the full story on violence, conquest, and social reorganization in Yunnan . From 
the days of the Long March through its sudden prominence for Chiang Kai-shek and 
the Burma Road in World War II, Yunnan transformed from a sleepy outback into 
a strategic conduit . And meanwhile the extraordinary unraveling of Burma’s demo-
cratic order, its civil wars and long military dictatorship changed utterly what the 
Burma Road offered China, though China clearly has never forgotten or given up on 
its plan for Burma and commercial development . If everything from Tibet to Burma 
is evidence against blaming Islam for highland political strife, highland Burma’s story 
among many should caution us, also, against ascribing highland struggles mainly to 
the Cold War or other larger geopolitics . Let us track the rise of military government 
in the era of nation-states by considering the region with so many, from Afghanistan 
and Pakistan and Kashmir to Tibet, Nepal, and Yunnan, to Northeast India and 
Burma . While religious conflicts and Cold War proxy-fighting will be important, 
we have another story to unearth in this long and sad history: to put it simply, and 
oversimply, the fate of tribes in the era of nation-states . Without a quasi-evolutionary 
view of the tribal as primitive (in contrast, e .g ., to Ahmed 2013), Fiji’s fate hinges 
on the category itself, and a unique extreme sympathy . Fiji was shaped and is still 
path-dependent on a unique British sympathy for the people they saw as tribal, a 
sympathy sufficient to justify precedence for Fijian chiefly claims of sovereign right . 
Why did colonial Fiji insist on what Nehru found “absurd”? Let us seek to under-
stand this strangeness in Fiji amidst the devastating ubiquity of military occupations 
more generally .
Consociational democratic theorists often point at India’s partition and Hindu /
Muslim minority issues in both India and Pakistan as fertile ground for testing con-
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ceptions of community, minority, and democracy, with South Asia’s partition seen as 
the failure of its potential for consociation . But it may not solve the only, or most im-
portant, problems with postcolonial states if the cosmopolitan world simply teaches 
reliance on power-sharing to ameliorate the unresolvable among citizens’ differences 
in cultural and religious value-orientations . Here we learn about sustained, perduring 
structures of violence from the other trauma of South Asia’s decolonization . In the 
interests of time and to insure that we move from whole to part, our story starts long 
after it actually began, and we barely touch on its roots, above all looking over the 
shoulders of the famous progressive anticolonialist, Jawaharlal Nehru . Thus we will 
start with the real impact of the famous 1955 African-Asian Conference at Bandung 
on Highland Asia to clarify why, in a range of styles, the substance of politics in 
Highland Asia from Afghanistan to Burma has been endless military rule, usually 
with explicit impunity for military violence against civilians (from China’s endless 
imprisonments and the American drones and their ‘collateral damage,’ among the 
most imperious, to India’s staged ‘encounter killings’ of Northeast dissidents, among 
the most hypocritical) .
This account of the Bandung Conference, examining Bandung from the points 
of view of the one hundred million people who live in Highland Asia, will not follow 
the typical modes for writing the Bandung Conference story .7 Yes, at Bandung, Asian 
leaders took control of Asia’s political destiny . But in the same moment, one hundred 
million people lost their last best chance at a right to self-determine via independent 
nation and state . There were no representatives of Tibet invited to the table at Band-
ung . And Tibet is merely the most charismatic of many highland groups whose dip-
lomatic and military claims on nationhood and statehood were neglected . Consider 
for example the Karen on the Thai Burma border, seven million, in the 1940s armed, 
trained and organized by the British Special Forces to fight the Japanese, then aban-
doned when the keys to the one-time kingdom were handed by the British, in 1948, 
to leaders of the Burman lowlanders, most of whom had allied with the Japanese . 
The Naga, the Wa, and myriad other highlander groups would have similar stories 
to tell: what some Pathan thought, and more important, did about the partition of 
India and Pakistan started the troubles that have never ended for semi-partitioned 
Kashmir, without any recognition of a Kashmiri nation, let alone a Pathan one .8 
Jean Michaud (2006), Willem van Schendel (2005) and James Scott (2009) have 
led scholarly reconsideration of these highlands (uplands, massif ) as a geographical, 
7 On the model of Henry Louis Gates’s (1991) critique of “Critical Fanonism,” let us resist “Critical 
Bandungism .” Gates argued that a generation of postcolonial theorists were over-reading Frantz Fanon 
and misrecognizing his French roots, because they wanted a social theorist to proclaim authentic voice 
of the colonized, the third world, the global south, the wretched of the earth . Similarly, not only in the 
non-aligned movement itself but in global nostalgia for its quest for a third way outside of the soviet 
communism and western capitalism, there was vast hope to see only some things, and not others, 
planned and produced out of the diplomatic discussions at the Africa-Asia Conference in Bandung .
8 On the Wa, see Fiskesjö (2010) . On Kashmir and on Northeast India, a good place to start is Ram-
chandra Guha (2007); for Northeast India see also Baruah (2005) .
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historical, and political entity – here termed not ‘Zomia’ but the more user-friendly 
Highland Asia, or Asian Highlands . Leaving aside geographic determinism, leaving 
aside any romantic notion of the region as culturally anarchist, and above all, leaving 
aside the British allochronic cultural fantasy that the region was tribal in the sense 
of primitive, we reconsider the fate of the Highlands at Bandung, in effect at the 
moment where James Scott’s more romantic and geographic story leaves off, after 
World War II and ensuing events have engaged what Scott (2009) calls “distance 
demolishing technologies” to make Highland Asia a part of the rest of the world . 
What happened to the Highlands at the Bandung Conference?
In short, Jawaharlal Nehru and Zhou En Lai made a very large deal, a deal all 
about borders, metaphorical and literal . The deal was already made in outline the 
year before, in conversations between them in Delhi in 1954 . Each made major con-
cessions . Zhou, against Mao’s advice, sought a diplomatic foundation for ‘peaceful 
coexistence’ with his neighboring states . Arriving at Bandung with the experience 
of tens of millions of war deaths behind him, from China’s World War II through 
Revolution and warfare in Korea and Vietnam, Zhou led an exhausted and depleted 
warfare state . He was willing to sign on to the United Nations rules and definitions 
for legitimate and illegitimate warfare, and even rules against political intervention 
into other countries .9 Nehru, contrapositively, was willing to act outside of the UN’s 
mantle, despite his achievements there, and challenged the West’s Cold War by plan-
ning Asian history in Asia, for Asia .10 Reflecting careful compromises and strong po-
litical will, the final Bandung communiqué was about other things too . It famously 
condemned colonialism in all its manifestations .11 In its ten points, built from seven 
drafted by Zhou, Nehru, and the Burmans, it added as point one an endorsement 
of the UN charter on human rights, and in its last two points called for economic 
and social cooperation among its signatories . From this the story of birth of a non-
9 Mao, like Che Guevarra a decade later and elsewhere, was highly skeptical that the political lackeys 
of global capital (a category in which Mao included Nehru) could be trusted to stay peaceful and abide 
while a socialist revolution consolidated . Four years later, when the Dalai Lama fled from China to In-
dia, Mao was privately critical of Zhou and publicly of Nehru, and his unforgiving diplomatic criticism 
played a major role in the increasingly hostile exchanges between India and China that led three years 
later to the Sino-Indian border war . This war, a classically Maoist exercise in demonstrating that power 
flowed from the barrel of a gun, enabled China to declare exactly where the borders would be and left 
Nehru more bitter than any political event in his life (Ramachandra Guha 1999, 2007) .
10 See also Mazower (2009) on Nehru’s 1946 UN triumph versus Smuts and global racism, and Ram-
chandra Guha (2007) on the UN’s deliberate reconfiguration of Kashmir politics in a mode that sty-
mied Nehru’s effort to mobilize the UN against Pakistan . In 1955 the UN still refused to recognize 
the legitimacy of Mao and Zhou’s China, but Zhou was willing even to abandon the phrase “peaceful 
coexistence,” and redeploy rhetoric from the UN charter (Wright 1956), to enable in substance Nehru 
and Zhou’s deal to settle borders and sovereignties and end legitimate war in Asia – which was to say, 
between states in Asia, not between each state and those resisting among its claimed citizenry .
11 Zhou ignored the anti-Soviet debate leading to this phrasing and insisted it referred only to Europe-
an empires . “There cannot possibly be any other interpretation,” he told the National People’s Congress 
in May 1955 (Kahin 1956: 62) . 
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aligned movement has real roots . But the remaining seven points are an expansion 
and consolidation of the five-point deal between Nehru and Zhou, which was also 
accepted by Burma’s rulers before the Bandung conference began: a deal for recogni-
tion, non-intervention, and respect for settled borders of three new nation-states, 
India, China, and Burma . The observers of Bandung from the Nanyang (overseas 
Chinese) world trusted Nehru little and Zhou less, and argued that the non-inter-
vention promise was never seriously embraced by the mainland Chinese state .12 But 
at Bandung this sovereignty question was basic: would Revolutionary China, with 
its updated doctrines founded on Lenin’s united front strategy and permanent revo-
lution, would this China seek to claim via sovereign authority over Southeast Asia’s 
tens of millions of Chinese-heritage residents a right to rework government across 
Southeast Asia? Zhou, cognizantly, was trading away any sovereign claim of right to 
sponsor Southeast Asian revolution . And what he was getting in return was not small: 
it was Tibet . Nehru agreed, first of all in Delhi in 1954, to withdraw the remnants of 
an originally British claim to suzerainty in Tibet, a small chain of sleepy post-offices 
with armed guards styled as government outposts . He also agreed, generally, not to 
interfere in future events there, construed as ‘internal’ matters for China . In return 
he got a promise of peace and room for national industrial development policies, all 
the rage in the mid-twentieth century on all sides of the Cold War . Nehru was trad-
ing for peace and prosperity, and he traded away other people’s freedom . This did not 
happen by accident . In 1956 he met the Dalai Lama for the first time, and the Dalai 
Lama managed to find, in a private garden walk, the occasion to brief Nehru about 
efforts to organize resistance against the Chinese occupation of Tibet . He implored 
Nehru for help, much preferred to that of the American CIA . It would not be fair 
to say, of this meeting, that Nehru did nothing . In fact, he returned with the Dalai 
Lama, who was there as part of Zhou En Lai’s entourage for this diplomatic visit, and 
continued to negotiate with Zhou .
Any attribution of a particular motive to a Nehruvian action, for example his 
military occupation of Kashmir, has to reckon with the many levels and types of 
intellectual tensions that organize his thinking .13 Let us outline not his motives but 
12 Here see also Tan and Acharya (2008) . The Singaporean and other Southeast Asian skepticism that 
Mao’s state accepted Zhou’s commitment to peaceful coexistence had evidence and consequences . In an 
era informed by Lenin’s advice that revolutionary parties form ‘united fronts’ with bourgeois parties to 
decolonize, and then betray them, the 1960s were scene of tense suspicion and violently exploded alli-
ances: after the 1962 Sino-Indian border war, while China’s left led a succession of cultural revolutions 
against Zhou’s state, Singapore’s PAP acceded to the ‘Cold Store’ of its leftists, arrested before elections, 
and 1964 became Indonesia’s year of living dangerously, in which erstwhile allies turned murderously 
onto Indonesia’s Marxist left, killing a half-million people . And even the good fences of partition could 
not bring peaceful coexistence to North and South Vietnam .
13 At present I have a book underway that addresses many dimensions of Nehru’s complex decision-
making here . Nehru is a free agent and is no one’s Subaltern . To grasp many of his actions we need to 
consider at least seven dialectical tension points in his thinking . For example, there is his waning, origi-
nally intense commitment, to international socialist revolution (in his 1934 history lesson for Indira, 
he explains who Gandhi is, in Indian history, by calling him “the Lenin of India”) . Second, there is his 
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his actions, to understand how clear and sustained the line of events was that consoli-
dated the Indian nation-state and undermined sovereignty claims and other political 
claims at many locations in the highlands .
In Kashmir, on 22 October 1947, diplomat extraordinaire V .P . Menon (Source) 
tried to complete his exhausting diplomatic brief and arrange the political “acces-
sion,” as they called it, of one of the last of over 500 so-called “princely states” into 
union with the nation-state of India . Most had acceded on the promise of favorable 
terms before India’s own independence on 15 August 1947 . But Kashmir resisted, 
the Maharaja long a rival of the Muslim-led Congress Party in his own electoral as-
sembly, until the October “invasion” of Kashmir from its north-west by a large and 
unprecedentedly well-armed Pathan raiding party . Beyond doubt the new weaponry 
was courtesy of the new state of Pakistan; whether it was intended for border patrol-
ling rather than the traditional raiding on the lowlands, let alone whether a war of 
conquest was chartered by the new Muslim state, are matters still murky and doubt-
ful . But once Menon was in the capital on 26 October, the fearful Maharaja was 
immediately woken to sign a standard treaty of princely accession . While the Pathan 
raiders surprised the cities by turning back to their homelands, in no small part 
because their carts were already overladen from the abandoned towns in their path, 
it was the Indian Army that occupied the famous southern Kashmir valleys . Stanley 
Tambiah, in his modern classic study of violence, Leveling Crowds (1996), calls it “fo-
calization” and “transvaluation,” paired processes, when events are stripped of their 
contingencies, here for example Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah’s leadership of the 
Gandhian commitment to satyagraha, swaraj and ahimsa, i .e ., insistence on the truth, self-disciplining 
self-rule, and nonviolence . Third, his anticolonialism, manifest for example in his efforts to negotiate 
on behalf of the Indian National Congress working committee the meaning of World War II as grounds 
for Indian participation: where, in September 1939, he and the congress pledged to join any war effort 
that genuinely supported democracy and freedom against fascism and imperialism (Zaidi 1985: 26), 
the king pledged of war of right against might (21) and viceroy, a struggle of reason, right, justice and 
human freedom (and not, independence) against the rule of force (and not, imperialism or colonialism) 
(21–23) . Fourth, there is his statism, his commitment to one big union, which links to his faith in the 
United Nations as well as his many actions once in office that, for reasons of state, worked to consoli-
date central power at the expense of regional and foreign interests . Fifth, his anthropology, especially 
in his appointment of amateur anthropologist Verrier Elwin to a series of executive posts in control of 
various so-called tribal territories in newly independent India (see also his call for highlanders to sing, 
dance, and ignore the modern world, Nehru [1952] 2006) . Sixth, his complex responses to America . 
While in prison during World War II, his writing The Discovery of India (Nehru 1946) in the end meta-
morphosed into a discovery of America, especially after he read Nicholas Spykman’s The Geography of 
the Peace (1944) from which he confronted the theory that the future of the world would be shaped in 
response to the two waxing “super powers,” leading Nehru to the chapter “Realism and Geopolitics, 
World Conquest or World Association: the U .S .A . and the U .S .S .R .” Seventh, and I think in sum, the 
influence on his vision of H .G . Wells’s version of benevolent, scientific, democratic socialism (see, e .g ., 
Wells 1920) . In the end it might be his commitment to scientific solutions and his Elwinian, essentially 
ninteenth-century evolutionary anthropology, as well as big-state geopolitics, that led Nehru to see 
self-ruling Highlanders as not only dangerous but “absurd,” despite his long experience of the politics 
of condescension . 
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Kashmir National Conference, closely allied with India’s Congress Party . Focaliza-
tion reduces complexity to a simple script, as when the complex ethnic and religious 
lines of Kashmir’s many parts, only some of which are Muslim majority and one of 
which is mostly Tibetan Buddhist and Muslim, become a province with a Muslim 
majority and a Hindu raja . The politics of 1947 – when Mountbatten undertook 
personally to forestall Nehru and Jinnah, while Abdullah held out for an election 
to decide which country to join (which he clearly thought India would win easily), 
and while the Maharaja negotiated for a ‘standstill’ agreement in preference to an 
accession and merger in order to retain his title – all gets simplified to the story of a 
Hindu maharaja wanting the Hindu nation-state while the Muslim majority alleged-
ly wanted the Muslim nation-state . Simplified and also falsified: that is the extreme 
in transvaluation, which unlike focalization is the adding of meaning, theme, and 
even detail to a story to render it intelligible and significant in a larger, more global 
narrative – here the story of Hindu-Muslim communalism which, by August 1947, 
was already traumatically saturated by the blood of a million and more dead .
But the transvaluation, and the real tragedy for peace, prosperity and freedom in 
Kashmir was yet to be locked into place . That happened in early 1948, when Nehru 
was stunned at the United Nations . Here, again, we need a bit of background . Mi-
chael Mazower (2009) has shown, vividly, in his book No Enchanted Palace about the 
utopian and realist diplomacy surrounding the establishment of the UN, that Nehru 
shocked the UN establishment with a remarkable victory in 1946 . Nehru and the 
rest of the Indian delegation attacked South Africa for the racism of its emerging 
apartheid system, as another form of colonialism repugnant to global conscience . 
Jan Smuts, architect of the UN’s original, permissive colonial policy and author of 
much of its black letter law on non-interference in internal affairs of member states, 
was correctly confident that he was on the right side of UN policy and procedure . 
But Nehru won the vote in the General Assembly to find instituted racism a mat-
ter of global concern and South Africa beyond the bounds of civility . That’s where 
Mazower’s story ends – as he sees it, the first glimmer of decolonized dominance in 
the General Assembly votes – and our story begins, the payback . In 1948, in short, 
Nehru was shocked when the Security Council accepted Pakistan’s definition of the 
Kashmir issues, a malformed and incomplete border, rather than the case he himself 
had brought, the need to reverse an invasion . Nehru had hoped to use the UN pres-
tige and escort to push Indian troops through the Pathan north without violence . 
Instead, he got a ‘line of control’ across the center of Kashmir at the limits of his 
own military occupation of the Southern and Eastern districts . This transvaluation 
had Cold War thematics . Both the British and Americans wanted Pakistan as an ally 
against the Soviets . But the payback dimension should not be discounted, as the Se-
curity Council takes back the UN from Nehru’s nascent global south . And Kashmir 
became the irreconcilable territory, by UN deliberate choice . Pakistan, to increase 
pressure for a unification into Pakistan, built its ISI, Directorate of Inter-Services 
Intelligence, notorious engine of jihadist insurrectionists, to sponsor the sorts of 
movements in southern Kashmir that would pressure for accession into Pakistan . 
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Democratically inclined Sheik Abdullah was the odd man out . And even a genera-
tion later, in the wake of 9/11, ISI would still be plotting how to manipulate pres-
ences and absences of global jihad in order to gain the rest of Kashmir, oblivious to 
the impact of the jihadist politics they fomented elsewhere, notably Afghanistan .
Thus the prospects for a Pathanistan, in northern Kashmir and Pakistan, were 
never part of any serious global diplomatic discussion . While Menon signed up over 
500 princely states by getting rajas and nawabs to sign accession treaties, includ-
ing Manipur, an Ahom satellite state in a major rice valley in Northeast India, no 
one undertook similar diplomacy with the so-called ‘Hill Tribes,’ even though their 
populations were, in many cases, in the multiple millions . Neither Mountbatten, 
Jinnah, Nehru, nor anyone from the Congress or Muslim league ever campaigned for 
accession arrangements among the Pathans or, in Northeast India, with the Nagas, 
Kuki, or any other upland group . The English speaking, American Baptist mission-
ary-educated Naga elite was campaigning throughout the mid and late 1940s for 
a Nagalim, an independent Naga nation, more fiercely after Nehru’s government 
banned the American missionaries . The leading Naga newspaper called for it with an 
elegant dialogic reworking of Lincoln at Gettysburg: the Nagas, at least one faction 
claimed, wanted government “of the Nagas, for the Nagas, by the Nagas” (Guha 
2007: 268) . Congress responded by appointing ex-missionary, ex-Gandhian amateur 
anthropologist Verrier Elwin to manage the tribal territories . When Nehru finally 
visited – not the Naga hills but the adjacent, plantation-rich and six-times more 
populous Assam valley, on a campaign swing in 1951 – Naga leader Angami Zapu 
Phizo was able to present the case for Nagalim directly . Nehru avowed no knowledge 
of the famous story that Gandhi, meeting with Phizo shortly before his death, had 
advised the Naga to stay in India but affirmed their right to depart, promising to 
stand with them against the Indian Army if necessary . And Nehru did not say yes 
or no to the Naga demand . He said, “absurd .” Anthropologically inflected? Nehru 
suggested that the Naga should be protected from the modern world, that they were 
“Above all … a people who sing and dance and try to enjoy life; not people who sit in 
stock exchanges, shout at one another and think themselves civilized” (Nehru 1952: 
3) . He blamed foreign missionaries, whom he thought unsympathetic to the Indian 
National Congress, for independence movements against India, and hoped, implic-
itly, that the hill tribes would abandon their Christianity . Focalization and transvalu-
ation in the locality: since the 1950s, Christian conversion has galloped in Nagaland, 
and 71 % of Naga adults are now registered members of the Baptist Church, which 
compares to Mississippi, the highest similar percentage among American states, at 
51 % . But finally, in justifying his hold on the hills, Nehru the statesman cited, above 
all, a heterogeneity of “security concerns,” in one stew the problem of his Chinese 
and Burman borders, and also the prospect that if he acceded to independence for 
the Nagas, his troubles in Kashmir and even in Tamil Nadu and elsewhere would 
explode . Nehru was perfectly ready to override the political will of highlanders, es-
pecially when engagement with the central government would obviously be good for 
them – an astonishing social theory from the world leader of anticolonialism .
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Finally, the clearest case of this trend is Burma, and Nehru’s largely underestimat-
ed role in its history of civil war . Even the estimable historian Ramachandra Guha 
(2007) with his exemplary attention to Kashmir and Northeast India misses this key 
piece of the puzzle that is Nehru’s highland policies and practices . In February 1949, 
the Burma highlanders came the closest to claiming sovereignty over a large state of 
any highland army in the postwar period – and Nehru deliberately sabotaged them . 
In Burma, the violence of World War II had never really ended . The Karen, the 
Kachin, the Shan and many other highland groups had been courted by the British 
and provoked to campaign against Japan’s Coprosperity Sphere, which ruled lowland 
Burma for most of the war but never sought to penetrate the highlands except for 
its failed efforts to shut down the famous Burma Road . The British and even the 
Americans had good reason for a wartime highlands policy: the Japanese had cut 
off China’s armies from all seaports, and ‘flying the hump’ was not practical as the 
sole means of provisioning China’s army . The Allies not only managed to reopen the 
road connecting Mandalay to Kunming in Yunnan, but with remarkable engineering 
efforts they managed to build a new road from Assam through the mountains, the 
Ledo Road or Stillwell Road . This road connected the railhead in India with cities in 
reach of Chiang Kai-shek’s army .
Ordinarily, military victors would remember who were their friends, and who 
their enemies, but other currents ran deeper in decolonizing Asia . Under pressure 
from both the Indian National Congress and their own wrecked finances to de-
colonize as quickly as possible, in 1948 the British gave the keys to Burma to the 
Burman government centered in Rangoon . The hills erupted in rebellion, and were 
vastly better prepared for actual fighting, especially Smith Dun’s Karen National 
Union army with a long memory of continuous bloody skirmishing with Japanese 
and Burmans . By February, 1949, ten thousand Karen National Union soldiers sur-
rounded Rangoon, and the nascent Burman state came to be called the ‘Seven Mile 
Government .’ The Burman Prime Minister U Nu appealed to Nehru for support and 
aid, and got it . U Nu’s career is long and interesting . Foreign Minister in the Japa-
nese sponsored occupation government, ally of Aung San and his successor when 
Aung San was assassinated in 1947, U Nu is the same Burman leader who helped 
Nehru and Zhou sponsor the Bandung Conference and was the third signatory to 
the deal between Nehru and Zhou securing the borders before that conference be-
gan . In 1962 he would lose power to Ne Win’s military coup and in 1988 would fail 
to regain it for himself and Aung San’s elected daughter Aung San Suu Kyi . But in 
February 1948 U Nu was desperate . And Nehru saved him . The means were subtle . 
Nehru brokered the ceasefire and offered to sponsor the negotiations between the 
sides . He then called in the British Commonwealth to mediate, for the first and 
only time in his career, with predictable results: gathering in Delhi, Commonwealth 
diplomats devised a power-sharing peace plan and declared publicly their willingness 
to lead the peace talks and orchestrate a plan for new government in Burma . U Nu 
and his leading general the future dictator Ne Win fiercely declined . By then they 
could afford to . Nehru had quietly but decisively rearmed and equipped the Burman 
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national army, requiring that the Burmans keep the military support entirely secret 
(Bayly and Harper 2007: 464–67) . The Karen National Army was pushed back into 
its hills, where it still holds territory today, though few states recognize its claim to be 
the independent nation-state Kawthulee .
We need not conclude that highland nation-states are the Shangri-La lost to 
history by failures to recognize true nations . The history of Nepal is sufficient to 
suggest problems with that interpretation . (And Veblen, as we shall see, would point 
us in the opposite direction, toward a terrain of state military investments and their 
interests that precede, bound, inform, enable and delimit every venture in citizenly 
sentiment .) The highlands social history and political geography – even its historic 
economics of highland meat traded for lowland rice, its political economy of trad-
ing and raiding, hiding and seeking – create complexes that ill fit the nation-state 
model . These highlands gained their social contours while functioning for a millen-
nium on the periphery of empires (and including two perduring highland empires: 
the Ahom galactic polity emanating from Assam until the 1820s, and the Lamaist 
Tibetan Buddhist theocracy, finally destroyed, not coincidentally, in 1956, the year 
after the Bandung Conference; see also McGranahan 2010: 67ff) . More important 
to us is the reconfiguration of social relations, and social regard, in the highlands 
worked by the British Empire, and its consequences . In short, and to speak broadly, 
in British eyes the lowlanders became Orientals . The vast populations of lowlanders 
were seen, depicted and dealt with by way of all of the attendant stereotypic charac-
teristics: as Orientals, imagined morally suspect, deceitful, and of uncertain mascu-
linity but vast intelligence and resourcefulness . And the highlanders were generally 
seen as tribal: hill tribes, imagined to be primitive, emotional more than rational, 
fearful of the outside world, in need of moral guidance and protection, childlike, 
and hyper masculine . It never surprised the British when highlanders were adept at 
skirmishing warfare, from the Pathans to the Karen, though they ascribed it to race 
rather than history .14
The general point, here, is not about military intervention as a distortion of nor-
mal development of nation-states, but rather the opposite: that state power has, for a 
very long time, constituted and distributed the opportunities for states, and nations, 
to develop – with violence where necessary . Review of this reiterated history of co-
ercive, military rejection of claims to sovereignty deemed ‘tribal’ makes the question 
of joining or resisting a national formation – the question, belonging to what? – less 
naïve . Ali Sastroamidjojo’s Conference-orienting question, “Where do we stand now, 
we the people of Asia, in this world of ours today?” better situates the matter, as one 
recognizes the opportunity for nation-building, and nation-joining, as a function of 
larger forces . And if, indeed, military conditions of possibility are the rule, and not 
14 The fascinating story of the British Army’s own commitment to their fantasy, and turn to reliance 
on Gurkhas, and the attendant scramble in Nepal for increasing numbers of families, clans and villages 
to stake claims to Gurkha identity, has been well documented elsewhere (Des Chene 1991) . A similar 
history makes ethnic Fijians valuable in the postcolonial British army (see May 2014) . 
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the exception, for national prospects, we should neither neglect the colonial roots 
of most postcolonial situations, nor neglect the postcolonial appropriation – pre-
cisely, for Asia, at the Bandung Conference – of this precedent power . The British, 
fearful and respectful of highland warfare, but not highland politics, and no more 
respectful and equally fearful of lowland political aspirations, carved boundaries and 
built political and civil institutions according to their own anticipations and expe-
diencies . Their empire set baseline contours and political preconditions that, at the 
Bandung Conference, new Asian powers deliberately locked into an order of allowed 
nation-states for Asia . Whether Nehru too was a racist is not the first question . He 
inherited an Assam already constituted, in British colonial capitalism, with an in-
ner line sharply separating the populous lowland plantation zone from the so-called 
tribal highlands . While British courts carefully managed the investments and labor 
contracts for tens of millions of workers on myriad lowland Assam plantations, only 
Christian missionaries regularly entered the highlands, which knew little law of any 
kind, even Ahom . Thus, when Nehru called Phizo “absurd,” and couldn’t imagine 
a Pathanistan, nor allow a Burma ruled by highland groups, we need to track his 
own deliberate critique of colonial and postcolonial theories and realities . Nehru was 
highly influenced by Verrier Elwin’s romantic ethnography . Nehru enabled Elwin to 
impose a protectionist allochronic regime that led inexorably to fifty years of bloody 
counterinsurgency conflict in Northeast India . But this ‘anthropology,’ and Nehru’s 
own vision of progress and primitivism, owed more to nineteenth century anthro-
pology than to the twentieth century Boasian cultural relativism, with its nostalgia 
for savage, natural men . Nehru’s source for this imagery was, I think, the same as his 
source for unalloyed, ultimate confidence in science, industry, and state-led benevo-
lent planning as the foundation for all human progress: the British social democratic 
intellectual leader, H .G . Wells .
Most pertinent for us, why was Fiji so different? Let’s reconsider Fiji’s place with-
in a British Empire becoming Commonwealth, to grasp the distinctive politics of its 
tribes in a world of nation-building .
Tribals and Orientals in British Imperial Fiji: From Gordon’s 
Vision to a Political Army State, and beyond It
One reason why the Japanese military swept through Malaysia, Singapore and the 
rest of British Southeast Asia was because, when it came to military affairs and tech-
niques, the Japanese were unhesitant and state of the art . A British imperial army 
of 80,000 fell almost immediately to a Japanese invasion force of 20,000, because 
most of that British defense force was sepoys from India, whom the British refused 
to arm with modern weaponry or train in advanced tactics . The British rarely liked 
the idea of armed ‘Orientals,’ in Fiji no more than in Asia . The very last thing the 
British wanted, in Fiji, was Indo-Fijians seeking to express a military potential . Ironi-
cally, the recruits for Fiji’s plantations, especially the north Indian recruits, came 
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from precisely the towns and cities that were the cachement, for centuries before, of 
the military labor market (Kolff 1990) . Far from the image of eternal peasants up-
rooted from soil and oriental tradition by the lies of recruitment, Fiji’s South Asian 
plantation laborers came from towns and villages that for centuries had seen foreign 
service in caravan armies make boys into men, i .e ., men with financial stakes and 
personal alliances capable of supporting independent households and thus ready for 
marriage . The British Raj disarmed the caravans, and put the military labor market 
out of business, creating the massive dislocation and underemployment that made 
this recruiting belt ripe for the lies of plantation recruitment, lies especially about 
hardship, distance, and types of work required . And in Fiji the state deliberately 
sustained its hostile distance from the lives of the girmitiyas, “a working population 
and nothing more” in the words of the colony’s second Governor (Kelly and Kaplan 
2001b: 149) .
But this notwithstanding, Fiji’s history is in other ways decisively different, specifi-
cally in its Pacific Romance that Martha Kaplan (1995), Brij Lal (2010, 2011, 2012) 
and others have delineated in their scholarship on colonial Fiji and its contours . The 
very history of resistance to recognition of the sovereignty of armed, multi-million 
strong highland societies should signal the extraordinariness of Gordon’s legal and 
social policies for Fiji, above all his configuration of forms of aristocracy and even 
sovereignty for the ethnic Fijian chiefs . Fiji, too, has in its land policies an echo of 
the inner line, but almost in reverse: it is tribal lands that are protected, bounded, 
catalogued and reserved . Gordon’s land settlement plans included a very important 
nuance: the ethnic Fijian land reserve policy did not stop him from cutting out and 
assigning to the Colonial Sugar Refining (CSR) company a vast amount of Fiji’s best 
agricultural land, and in fact his promise to leave the rest in the Fijian reserves was 
crucial to his ability to entice CSR, Australia’s leading sugar refiner, to invest in Fiji . 
The plan all along was simultaneously to secure Fijian chiefly right and CSR monop-
sony, a plan for which Gordon credited J .W .B . Money’s critique of the causes of the 
Mutiny in India, and the need to keep races in their places (see also Kelly 2004) .
Fiji too has its official deployments of ethnological theory: rather than Verrier 
Elwin’s love of primitivism, it had the more sober and professional Rusiate Naya-
cakalou, student of Raymond Firth . Nayacakalou channeled by way of Firth the 
evolutionary vision of Henry Maine as he advised the Great Council of Chiefs about 
Native Administration and managed the Native Lands Trust Board through Fiji’s 
decolonization to the end of his life in 1972 . Nayacakalou explained Fiji’s politi-
cal dilemmas as ethnic Fijian problems with the culture of capitalist individualism 
and political democracy . Drawing on Maine’s famous status-to-contract vision of 
social evolution, he influentially declared the ethnic Fijians people of “status” and 
not “contract .”
Critics of British policy toward ethnic Fijians in Fiji deployed as many easy evo-
lutionary assumptions as did the champions of the policy: ethnic Fijians were either 
kept backward, frozen away from progress, or else protected and shepherded more 
slowly . Leaving aside evolutionary tropes and allochronic judgments, something very 
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different took shape in the circuits of affection animating many British institutions 
in Fiji, notably the army and the Great Council of Chiefs . As the army in Fiji meta-
morphosed from white (‘European’) officers and enlisted men, to white leaders over 
ethnic Fijian men, to ethnic Fijian officers and men, to ethnic Fijians joining the 
British as well as Fijian armies, and favoring the former (see also May 2014), the 
army in Fiji increasingly became a nexus of ethnic Fijian sovereign expression . When 
its special forces led coups, its mana thus expressed made it the classic political army, 
vehicle of national self-determining by taking over the state . With no democratic 
give and take, Fiji then was neither a nation nor a state legitimated by contractual 
transaction among citizens . Nor was it a pre-emptive state, like Nehru’s destroying 
Naga claims to sovereignty in order to protect them, a state pre-emptively protect-
ing . Eventually, yes, the political army renewing Fijian sovereignty and ownership 
of Fiji would give way, in the latest, strangest coup, as the military destroyed even 
the Great Council of Chiefs, and ended the districting that privileged Fijian votes, 
in what its leader told the UN, in 2007, was the “coup to end all coups” (Fraenkel 
and Firth 2009: 455, 458n13) . But until 2006, Fijian sovereignty, ownership, and 
political will asserted itself with extraordinary lack of limit, without balance of any 
alienation, without recognition of other right . Whereas the Wilsonian liberal nation-
state paradigm relied on vast contractual rules, abjuration of all right of violence, 
and remade the nation from blood into law via the new being expressed by state, this 
Fijian nation was not alienated from kinship (especially, in Sahlins’ sense of shared 
substance), not made in public, not even dependent on any larger justice than its 
own . The Indo-Fijians were not then invited to join it, could not become the taukei 
or owners of the land, nation, or state . And remarkably, despite the limited actions 
expected from them, they found powerful means of their own to resist, withdraw, 
object, and peacefully not cooperate .
“Belonging to what?” then, metamorphoses into “belonging or what?” After so 
many have asked what Fiji’s ethnic landscape meant for prospects of postcolonial 
citizenship, let us ask instead about the implications, and options, for diasporic ex-
Indians in the wake of Fiji’s unique deployments of colonial and postcolonial state 
power, about the effects of Fiji’s unique relations between ‘tribe’ and ‘state,’ and 
about the metamorphosing consequences of the vectors of sympathy ensconced in 
institutions of violence . We find in Fiji, from the first Governor to the last, from the 
already elegiac Sir Arthur Gordon of the 1870s to the unpleasantly sardonic Tim 
Hardy, “The Reluctant Imperialist” of the 1960s (see also Kaplan’s comments), we 
find ensconced in the 1970 independence Constitution, a colonial and then post-
colonial state remarkably different in the orientation of its implements of violence 
toward the relationship of state and tribe . Publishing in 2009, thus with the conde-
scension, also, of hindsight, Hardy remembers shuttering most of the Special Branch 
offices uselessly probing for revolutionaries among the Indians and labor unions, 
and predicting that “the only serious threat facing Fiji for as long as it was possible 
to foresee was that, if provoked by the formation of a government perceived by Fi-
jians to be dominated by non-indigenes, the Fiji military might stage a coup d’etat” 
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(2009: 338) . But Hardy’s British Empire was more concerned with whether the 
ethnic Fijians would accept independence, than with the limits of their commitment 
to democracy . In fact, he recalls a “blimpish junta” of British colonials, reveling in 
Fiji’s imperial backwater .
That blimpish junta continually warned Fiji’s Great Council of Chiefs that 
without the crown’s protection the weak, ‘backward’ Fijians would fall under 
the domination of Indian ‘immigrants,’ resulting in the liquidation of the 
system of chieftainships and the end of Fijian culture . By nature conservative 
in the first place, the chiefs weren’t hard to convince . Indeed, the blimps’ pro-
paganda terrified them . (ibid .: 353)
Almost no one in decolonizing Fiji protested the impropriety of an army built up 
entirely of ethnic Fijians – not because the asymmetry was ignored, but because it 
was a comfort for the chiefs .
Hardy served in British and then Malaysian Sarawak before Fiji, through much 
of the 1960s, through the tail-end of counter-insurgency against Chinese commu-
nists, integration of Sarawak into decolonized Malaysia, the failure of Indonesian 
pan-Malaysian political plans, even Indonesia’s year of living dangerously . He assidu-
ously tracked actual, and increasingly pathetic, Maoist rebels in Sarawak, especially 
after the slaughter in Indonesia, and in 1965 gathered evidence of mainland China’s 
refusal to send arms or funds to them .
All were happy to hear of ‘O’s plight and of China’s refusal to help but some 
of the heavies in KL, London, Labuan, Washington and Kuching were none 
too pleased to be shown proof that one of their articles of faith – that Mao 
handed guns to every third-world troublemaker who asked for them – was, 
simply, untrue . They had exploited the line that Mao was behind every gun 
pointed at Western interests in Asia to support their continuous – and suc-
cessful – clamour for more weaponry for themselves . They didn’t change their 
tune . (ibid .:300)
Hardy knew how far colonial state antipathy for both Chinese and Malay political 
agents could go, especially antipathy for Chinese communists . Serving in postco-
lonial Malaysia, “a foreigner in the service of a sovereign Asian nation … I had to 
keep my opinions to myself ” when a wrongheaded colonial identification of a Chi-
nese village as communist led to a perimeter fence and curfew, a policy “vindictive, 
unjust, small-minded, politically daft and materially wasteful” (ibid .: 313) . He was 
disgusted, more than surprised, he says, when “the Indonesian army turned its back 
on Malaysia and turned its weapons on its own people” (ibid .: 314) .
Fiji, then, appalled Hardy differently, not especially for its state violence, since it 
was clearly more peaceful, but for the more complete absence of justification for it . 
“They spoke darkly of ‘subversives’ like the local Indian political leader, A .D . Patel” 
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(ibid .: 321), but there were no actual subversives . Like New York Times political 
reporter Henry Kamm (1988) in Fiji a generation later, observing after Fiji’s second 
1987 coup the many military checkpoints, and realizing that the military were de-
ploying a technique learned in Middle Eastern peacekeeping, against a population 
bereft of insurgents to catch, Hardy quickly realized in decolonizing Fiji that the 
state’s affections and contempt were generating both ritual pomp and widespread 
fear . Hardy did what he could to dismantle Special Branch, he says, and left, this 
time, at independence .
The distribution of power is remarkably different, clearly, in the vast India shaped 
by the Indian National Congress, and the comparatively tiny islands of Fiji ruled 
through several elections after 1970 by the increasingly chiefly Alliance Party . Con-
sideration of sovereignty frustrations among Asian highland groups more than ten 
times more populous than ethnic Fijians can remind us of the unique benefits, not 
least in recognition of the political rights of ethnic Fijians, that Gordon’s original 
legal system provided the islands . But, this comparison suggests, Fiji’s problems stem 
from more than the failure of its colonial and then postcolonial governments to 
grant, in similar full measure, recognition of citizen rights and full participation 
in sovereign activities for the rest of the population of its new republics . Even the 
idea of coup culture does not fully fathom or locate the problematic principle in 
its roots, which is the willingness to deploy military force on missions of culturalist 
counterinsurgency . Sanjib Baruah, in his brilliant monograph on Northeast India’s 
politics, Durable Disorder, quotes Mrinal Miri’s “admonition that the idea of a na-
tion having a ‘policy’ towards part of itself is odd” (Baruah 2005: xvii) . Independent 
Fiji inherited not just a split population, but a long colonial history of very different 
kinds of policies towards parts of itself, ensconced deeply in its extant social insti-
tutions . While the unbalanced social roots and sympathies of the almost entirely 
ethnic Fijian army made the first four coups and their ethnic vectors clearly legible 
as interest group politics, we should not be distracted thereby from the fundamental 
strangeness of the deployment of military force on a mission of cultural protection 
and provision . In its latest coup, the military clearly seeks to use its tools politically 
against all claimants of right: it now has policy for, and after all against, everyone’s 
political aspirations .
Shanti and Mana, Grace in Exile and Redemption from 
Alienation: Belonging to What? Belonging or What?
“Man needs a master,” Immanuel Kant famously concluded in thesis six of his cri-
tique of all philosophies of history (Kant [1784] 1991) . The end of enlightenment 
required public control to establish the peace necessary for advance of private reason . 
Kant here accepted Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s ([1762] 1968) commitment to the com-
mon will as condition of possibility for private reason, but not John Locke’s ([1689] 
1988) more sanguine location of natural laws and interests behind the necessary 
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violence of the state . Kant’s student and trenchant critic Johann Gottfried Herder 
placed Kant’s certitude, correctly, in the “Averroan” tradition, influenced not merely 
by Hobbes ([1651] 1982) but by the whole discussion of human nature renewed 
from Aristotelean roots by Ibn Rushd ([1178] 2017), Ibn Khaldun ([1379] 1989), 
and others on the southern shore of the Mediterranean . It was Herder, constituting a 
strong argument for constitution of society by human culture, not by political states, 
who declared that “man needs a master” was a pernicious and erroneous doctrine .15 
A strong cultural approach (from Herder to Durkheim to Sahlins) locates the fun-
damental dynamics of society in cultural wholes precedent to and inclusive of the 
realms and reasons of state .
A very different critique of Hobbes begins with Montesquieu . Herder’s simple 
reversal, that “man needs no master,” rendered states, especially strong states like 
Rome and all future conquest empires simply evil . But Montesquieu worked a sea 
change, much like that wrought onto Sigmund Freud by Marcel Mauss (1973) . It 
is thanks to society that an unconscious is possible, Mauss and his heir Michel Fou-
cault ([1976] 1978) have shown, not thanks to unconscious needs that society was 
constituted . Similarly, Montesquieu ([1748] 1989) showed, war begins with states 
and their specific means and ends . States necessitate war, Montesquieu argued, far 
from the Hobbesian vision of a natural war of all against all as the thing necessitat-
ing states . Humans, then, do not so much need a master as inhabit a different world 
when they have one . Perhaps the most trenchant, and certainly the fiercest, critic of 
Kant in this light is Thorstein Veblen ([1917] 1998), present at the creation of the 
American century, and mordantly observing its roll-out . Precisely as Woodrow Wil-
son at Versailles began to articulate what has eventually become known as the ‘end of 
history’ doctrine – national sovereignty as the only legitimate form of sovereignty – 
Veblen observed realities at odds with the mandates of theory: states coming before 
nations . Where Wilson depicted self-determining nations expressing their political 
will via states of their own, Veblen observed states ascribing duties before award-
ing rights . States grant citizenship and other forms of representation sometimes for 
some, but tax any and all in blood and treasure, Veblen argued, according to the 
needs not of nation but of state . Anticipating the new American problematic of 
‘nation-building’ not as global challenge but as global fraud, Veblen saw the deep-
est problem in all doctrines of political necessity, dialectical and otherwise, lumping 
Marx and Wilson into the Kantian basket as grand teleologists . Veblen saw a simpler 
world, not one composed of irreducible wholes with internal dialectics, but merely 
one of situations that evolve; Veblen resituated the state from a Kantian to a Dar-
winian universe . Thereby, Veblen also resituated citizenship, rights, and duties into 
problems inevitably to be negotiated with extant leviathans . Veblen’s point of view 
moves dilemmas of belonging from special case to general question: how do any and 
all citizens seek peace effectively?
15 “The proposition ought to be reversed: ‘The man who needs a master is a mere animal; as soon as he 
becomes a man, a master is no longer necessary for him .’” Herder ([1800] 1966: 447) .
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Observing trends globally, let us list many unintended outcomes of the UN era’s 
global distribution of self-determination in reality . New forms of elite diasporic mi-
gration, a kind of self-determination by other means, join with many other un-
expected global developments, from the rise of NGOs to many new kinds of low 
intensity and asymmetric warfare, peacekeeping interventions, and political armies 
of several kinds – all this despite the American premise that it would be democracy, 
and not the army, that in the first instance connected the nation to the state, and, as 
in Fiji, vice versa . To understand the contemporary geography of anger, it is useful to 
grasp the problems, even the bad faith, in the Wilsonian vision of self-determination 
as a global economic solution: everyone to set by their actions the terms of their own 
fate . Self-determination comes originally from John Locke’s ([1689] 1988) Protes-
tantism of free will, versus Calvinist predestination in which God decides who finds 
heaven or hell in their future . Only in the hands of Woodrow Wilson at Versailles 
did this Christian otherworldly moral doctrine become a vision of how to arrange, 
or at least imagine, this-worldly fates, and in fact, this-worldly fates not of individu-
als but of collectives, nations with their own states . The idea made decolonization 
imaginable, with limited liability to ex-colonizers . It reconfigured as aid and gift all 
assistance to those whose economic interdependence and even simple economic de-
pendence could henceforth be occluded . Separate but equal, as the Americans once 
would say approvingly .
But while the American civil rights movement reconsidered the logic of separate 
but equal at home in the United States, and ‘super power’ Cold War transvaluations 
disrupted efforts at peaceful coexistence between nations and states more globally, 
new kinds of diaspora, after decolonization, have become the exceptions that dis-
proved the rule . Their dilemmas of belonging are not moments of failure in the order 
of nations and states . They are the actual reality at the limits of all citizenship, in a 
world where states precede and delimit the structures of opportunity . Precisely where 
neither self-control nor peace can be taken for granted, such dilemmas are resolvable 
only by the profoundest value commitments .
As in Fiji: late colonial Fiji’s chiefly leadership was famously ambivalent about in-
dependence, not surprising given the grounding of their power in the valorization of 
cultural difference and the protections and supports of Empire . Ironically, the more 
Fiji’s coups restored privilege, and the more the mana of chiefs usurped civil order, 
the more the resulting instability again suggested threats to settled order and the 
need for more secure protections . Most recently, for Fiji’s latest and strangest coup, 
New Caledonia’s Noumea Accords have unfortunately provided an all too attractive 
military model . In New Caledonia (to finish, here, with a military governmental-
ity closer in many ways to contemporary Fiji’s) the perduring French colonial state 
enforces a policy against open politics in its civil space . The Noumea Accords create 
highly temporary peace between indigenes and settlers by banning elections, in order 
to break cycles of election tension and conflict . The states in both New Caledonia 
and Fiji hope that demography and new economies will transform political interests . 
But in fact, as in the closely kindred counterinsurgency occupations in Highland 
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Asia and elsewhere, such military suppression of democratic political activity almost 
inevitably generates, instead, a new and growing geography of anger . Thus Fiji has 
moved from the problem of Indian belonging, to the problem of anyone bearing 
actual rights . In quest for road maps, the military has traded the cartoons of the 
colonial blimpish junta for blank pieces of paper .
Compared to Burma, Tibet, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kashmir, most of Northeast 
India, and most of the rest of the Asian Highlands, Fiji today looks peaceful, prosper-
ous, and even in some ways free . In Fiji, the demographics might well bring a happy 
ending if and when ethnic Fijians can accept democracy after all, and there is noth-
ing like absence to make the heart grow fonder . Indo-Fijians have sustained their 
commitment to shanti – morally-uplifting peacefulness – and are already among the 
world’s leaders in recognizing the emergent reality of global citizenship . Ethnic Fiji-
ans operate socially and politically by way of a volatile mixture of evangelism, nostal-
gia, rent-seeking, and cultural pride, interrupting the market models of self-interest 
more congruent with legitimacy for neo-liberal democracy, such as it is . That is why, 
for a long time now, the biggest conflicts in Fiji have not been between Indo-Fijians 
and ethnic Fijians but among ethnic Fijians, a trend that will continue .
This conclusion does not proffer for Fiji a general political solution, but instead 
observes the positive content that this postcolonial political history has rendered for 
Fiji’s citizens and cultures, on many sides . Many ethnic Fijians, especially those not 
privileged in the capitalist economy, still treasure their heritage of self-definition with 
a tribal counter-concept, in a quest for life without alienation . This self-determina-
tion is of and for a culturally collective self, and it is as often committed to loloma, 
kindly love, as it is to the aggressions of mana . Indo-Fijians, meanwhile, still face the 
cardinal Maussian problematic of how to give without subordinating self to other, 
and feel existential risk regardless of whether they are staying or going . Continuing 
peace in Fiji depends still on whether those two goals can be reconciled, mana and 
shanti, regardless of how long the military keep all sides frozen via antipolitical strate-
gies . Fiji’s best hope is that anger against its antipolitical state will simultaneously be 
firm enough and yet moderate enough to provide the common ground on which not 
so much one nation as an acceptable interdependence can be realized . In fact, Fiji 
is ironically well positioned to pierce in practice the illusions of independence and 
purely self-determination, and in a shared cultural field of recognized and reconciled 
differences, to move toward a common future without the need, in the end, to build 
one nation or even to want one .
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The Indian Diaspora(s) in Mauritius
Burkhard Schnepel
Introduction
The ethnohistory and situation of the Indian diaspora in Mauritius today is not 
only well-documented in archives (see Carter 1996; Deerpalsingh and Carter 1996a, 
1996b), it has also been thoroughly studied by a number of scholars .1 Therefore, the 
aim of this chapter is to systematize and analyze the body of knowledge that already 
exists and situate it within the broader framework of the Indian diaspora . More con-
cretely, I wish to identify seven characteristics particular to ‘Persons of Indian Origin’ 
(PIO) in Mauritius, especially in comparison with Indian diasporas elsewhere . These 
‘particularities’ are closely linked with one another and /or build on one another . This 
is not to claim that one or the other cannot also be found in other Indian diasporas, 
but both individually and in combination they make the Mauritian case specific . 
Due to rather than despite this specificity, they may eventually also tell us something 
about the contestations and strategic maneuvers that individuals and groups in In-
dian diasporas engage in to make their lives possible, bearable, and even successful 
elsewhere in the world as well .
1 See, among others, Beejadhur (1995), Benedict (1961), Bissoondoyal and Servansing (1986), Bood-
hoo (1999), Carter (1995, 1996, 2000), Hazareesingh (1966, 1977), Hollup (2000), Link (2002), 
Meisig (1999), and Nirsimloo-Anenden (1990) .
132 Burkhard Schnepel
First Particularity: The Indian Diaspora(s) in Mauritius Has 
(Have) Many Different Roots and Routes
The Indian diaspora in Mauritius is manifold and even heterogeneous in its social, 
caste, class, religious and linguistic respects, and, perhaps most importantly, in places 
of origin on the Indian subcontinent . Most of the ancestors of today’s Indo-Mauri-
tians came to the island as sugar plantation workers (‘coolies’) under the ‘indentured 
labor’ scheme . The scheme was introduced after 1834, when British abolished slav-
ery .2 The majority of the Indians shipped to Mauritius (mainly from Calcutta and 
Madras, but also from Bombay later in the nineteenth century) came from rural 
areas and belonged to the lowest and poorest castes and classes on the Indian subcon-
tinent .3 Later in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the ‘coolies’ were joined by 
clerks, priests, and merchants from the higher castes and better-off strata of Indian 
society .
As for their geographical roots, almost two thirds of immigrant laborers (today 
roughly 700,000 Indo-Mauritians of a total 1 .2 million Mauritians) came from the 
north of India, mainly Bihar and Uttar Pradesh . These people were and are known 
in Mauritius as Biharis, and they spoke and sometimes speak Bhojpuri, a local north 
Indian variant of Hindi . Approximately the remaining third came from the south 
of India, being further divided into Tamil- and Telugu-speaking groups of roughly 
equal size . The merchants mainly came from western India, so that today three to 
four percent of the Indo-Mauritians are Marathis and Gujaratis who retain their own 
group consciousness and language affiliation .4 Looking at religion, around 65 % of 
Mauritius’s PIOs are Hindu, 25 % Muslim, and 10 % Christian, with many Tamils 
especially having converted to Christianity . Within these categories there are also 
various, sometimes quite important further sub-distinctions, such as between ortho-
dox Hindus and Arya Samaj Hindus,5 Sunni and Shiite Muslims,6 and Catholics, 
Protestants and Pentecostals . However, Hollup (1994: 300) prefers a categorization 
based on what he calls “ethnic populations .” According to his estimates (based on the 
1972 and 1983 censuses), Hindus make up 40 .2 % of the total Mauritian popula-
tion (58 % of PIO), Tamils 7 .3 % (10 .5 %), Telugus 3 .0 % (4 .3 %), Marathis 2 .1 % 
(3 .1 %), and Muslims 16 .6 % (24 %) . These various regional backgrounds, mother 
tongues and ethnic and religious identifications combine dynamically with other 
2 On indentured labor, see especially Tinker (1974) . Carter (1996), who seeks to offer a balanced pic-
ture of indentured migration by discussing both the cruelties and the opportunities it offered, pointedly 
calls it “a rescue package for sugar plantations” (1996: 19) . 
3 On the situation in India, see Carter (1992) and Prakash (1992) .
4 On Gujarati merchants in Mauritius, see Kalla (1987) . 
5 On the Arya-Samaj in Mauritius, see Hollup (1995) and Ramsurrun (2001) .
6 On Muslims in Mauritius, see Donath (2009), Hollup (1996), and Jahangeer-Chojo (1997, 2002) .
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identity-making and identity-unmaking criteria, such as education, a rural-urban 
divide, and differences in economic success and professional standing .7
One should therefore be cautious in speaking of the Indian diaspora in Mauritius 
as a homogenous group . Rather, we should think of a plurality when it comes to 
describing and analyzing the internal socio-cultural, politico-economic, and religious 
aspects of the Indo-Mauritian diaspora(s) . However, more important than these sta-
tistics is that Indo-Mauritians themselves often strategically emphasize and adopt 
different identities in different situations . Thus, in some situations – and in structural 
opposition to the other, non-Indian, inhabitants of Mauritius, as well as the island’s 
Indo-Muslims – some PIOs may stress that their ‘ancestral language’ is Sanskrit and 
their religion Hindu, while in other situations Hindus and Muslims may point to 
their common Indian origin as opposed to fellow Mauritian nationals with African, 
Chinese, or French roots . In yet other situations, when it comes to defending their 
social, educational and economic privileges, well-off or well-educated Indians may 
ally with Gens-de-Couleurs and /or Franco-Mauritians of similar standing, at the ex-
pense of solidarity with rural and poor Indo-Mauritians . In other situations, internal 
differences may fall away, not only within the community of Indo-Mauritians, but 
between all ethnic groups and other communities living on Mauritius, as when Mau-
ritius has an important soccer match against Réunion, or when relations between 
Mauritians and tourists are at stake .8
In a nutshell, PIOs in Mauritius adopt multiple, overlapping, and situational-
ly shifting ‘fusion-and-fission’ forms of identification, both within the category of 
Indo-Mauritian and when transcending this category, for example, when they see 
themselves as belonging to larger entities such as the Mauritian nation, or as Asians, 
or even as Creoles (e .g . when the southwest Indian Ocean is compared and aligned 
with the history and the state of affairs in the Caribbean) . Some of these identifica-
tions, namely those derived from the region of origin on the Indian subcontinent, 
or those referring to the three main religions or language markers on Mauritius, are 
more important from the actors’ points of view than others, and therefore tend to be 
‘essentialized’ more strongly .9
Second Particularity: Indo-Mauritians Have Established  
a New Life Relatively Close to ‘Home’
In the nineteenth century, ‘coolies’ were better off than African slaves, who were 
forcibly deported in chains, in terrible hygienic conditions, and under severe penal 
7 In addition, an estimated 5 % of Indian emigrants to Mauritius were adivasis or tribals . See Hollup 
(2000: 222) .
8 On the socio-cultural and economic impact of tourism on Mauritius, see Schnepel and Schnepel 
(2008, 2009a) and Schnepel (2009) .
9 Plantation owners did not hesitate to make use of inner-Indian ethnic cleavages to ‘divide and rule .’
134 Burkhard Schnepel
regimes . The average death toll on vessels transporting Indian laborers was around 
three to five percent, while the death toll for slaves had been roughly ten percent . 
Certainly three to five percent is bad enough, and is therefore an advantage clearly 
to be understood in relative terms . Indian ‘coolies’ were also crammed into inhu-
man and unhygienic spaces on often old and unsafe vessels at risk of shipwreck, 
and were prone to the spread of epidemic diseases (see Carter 1996: 45–47) . The 
disruptive journey through which family, neighborhood and friendship ties were 
severed for a long time, if not forever, as well the potentially bleak and insecure life 
in an unknown and often hostile world, placed a severe mental burden on those who 
journeyed across the ‘black waters’ (kala pani) to new shores .10 Once safely there, 
communication with and remittances to families back home in India were uncertain, 
and a return journey would only be possible, if at all, after the standard five-year 
contract had been completed .
A journey to Mauritius took around eight weeks from Calcutta and six weeks 
from Madras or Bombay (see Carter 1996: 32) . The passage to Mauritius was there-
fore long and hard compared to that to Sri Lanka and Burma . Moreover, from Sri 
Lanka and Burma it was easier to return to India frequently and to maintain some 
ties with home, and there it was also possible to be joined by members of one’s fam-
ily, caste, village, and sub-region on a larger scale . This made it possible to try and 
‘copy’ one’s socio-cultural life at home, with all its established networks of solidar-
ity and its traditional caste-based social organization . This socially more integrated 
system of migration was known as kangani.11 In contrast, trips to Mauritius were by 
and large made by individuals, rather than being family, sub-caste or village affairs . 
While on board, one might meet neighbors or friends, or make new friends . These 
new relationships became known as jehaji bhai or ‘ship brothers,’ and later on the 
island, they could assume the character of quasi-kinship bonds .12
Nevertheless, compared to other destinations in the world-wide indentured la-
bor scheme,13 Mauritius was still relatively close to home . South and East African 
destinations as well as Malaysia were just a week or two further away and may be 
10 Moreover, Carter (1996: 51) estimates that around thirteen percent of immigrants died during their 
first five years on the island .
11 On the kangani system of importing labor, see Jain (1993: 6–11) .
12 The issue of caste in Mauritius deserves a separate discussion that would go beyond the scope of this 
article . Here it suffices to state with Hollup: “Among the Hindus of Mauritius, there is no system of 
hierarchically ordered groups, but caste populations still exist as kinship groups, although the endoga-
mous groups have undergone considerable change” (1994: 298) . See also Hollup (2000) .
13 In all, approximately 1 .5 million Indians left India as contract laborers before 1914, according to 
Carter (1996: 20, 22) and Tinker (1974: 62, 114) . These numbers are roughly distributed as fol-
lows: Kenya 32,000; Seychelles 6,315; Reunion 26,000; South Africa 152,184; Fiji 60,965; Mauritius 
453,063; Jamaica 36,412; Guadeloupe 43,326; Martinique 25,509; Trinidad 143,939; British Guiana 
238,909; Dutch Guiana 34,304; Grenada 3,200; St . Vincent 2,472; St . Lucia 4,350 . In this scheme, 
Mauritius not only received the largest number of contract laborers, it was also the first such destina-
tion . In many ways, Mauritius was used as an experiment and model for other countries . See McPher-
son (2009) .
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comparable in this respect . Destinations in the Caribbean or Fiji were so much fur-
ther away (19 to 20 weeks on board) that these longer distances made a significant 
qualitative difference .
Indo-Mauritians who had completed their time as contract laborers could return 
to India, and about a third did so . However, many of these returnees did not stay in 
India, but re-emigrated to Mauritius, this time bringing their wives and families with 
them . The relative proximity of Mauritius to the Indian homeland, accompanied by 
the gradual improvement of postal communications and maritime transport, there-
fore enabled a sort of circular or chain migration to develop . The significant number 
of those who stayed in Mauritius, the ever-increasing number of new arrivals (among 
them many re-emigrants with their wives and families), and the increasing number 
of female coolies (which resulted in marriages and island-born offspring)14 all gradu-
ally resulted in the establishment of more traditional forms of social cohesion among 
Indo-Mauritians and, as we shall see in the next ‘particularity,’ in the important 
numerical strength of PIOs on Mauritius .
Third Particularity: The Indian Diaspora in Mauritius is 
Substantial in Absolute Numbers, but Even More So in Relative 
Numbers
It is estimated that more than twenty million Indians live abroad today, as reflected 
in the statistics shown in the table next page . Two major historical waves of Indian 
emigration are largely responsible for these numbers .15 The first wave consisted of 
migration in the nineteenth century to the plantation economies in southern, sub-
tropical parts of the world . The second wave, starting after 1945 and arguably still 
continuing, has brought Indians to the industrialized countries of North America 
and Europe, as well as to Australia and, for several decades now, to the oil-producing 
Arab world . By and large, the descendants of those who came with the first wave 
are today regarded as Persons of Indian origin or PIO, while substantial numbers 
of those who came with the second wave or their descendants are Non-Resident 
Indians or NRIs .
The Indian diaspora on Mauritius is substantial, and exceeded in absolute num-
bers only by those in Great Britain, Canada, Malaysia, Myanmar (Burma), Saudi 
Arabia, South Africa, the USA, and the United Arab Emirates . However, only Ma-
laysia and Myanmar – two countries with their very own special kangani histories – 
14 Towards the 1870s, it was made obligatory to have at least 40 % of women on coolie-ships . At the 
end of the century, Indians born locally on Mauritius started to outnumber new immigrants (Carter 
1996: 149) .
15 For overviews, see among others Jain (1993), Schnepel (2005), van der Veer (1995), and Vertovec 
(2000) .
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Table: Estimated Size of Overseas Indian Community
Land





Australia 160 000 30 000 190 000
Bahrain nil 130 000 130 000
Canada 700 000 150 000 850 000
Fiji 337 000 nil 337 000
France 55 000 10 000 65 000
Germany 10 000 25 000 35 000
Great Britain 1 200 000
Guadeloupe 40 000 nil 40 000
Guyana 392 000 nil 392 000
Italy 36 000 36 000 72 000
Jamaica 60 000 1 500 61 500
Kenya 85 000 15 000 100 000
Kuwait 1 000 294 000 295 000
Malaysia 1 600 000 15 000 1 615 000
Mauritius 705 000 11 000 716 000
Myanmar 2 500 000 2 000 2 502 000
Netherlands 200 000 15 000 215 000
Oman 1 000 311 000 312 000
Qatar 1 000 130 000 131 000
Réunion 220 000 nil 220 000
Saudi Arabia nil 1 500 000 1 500 000
Singapore 217 000 90 000 307 000
South Africa 1 000 000
Surinam 150 000 nil 150 000
Tanzania 85 000 5 000 90 000
Thailand 70 000 15 000 85 000
Trinidad & Tobago 500 000 nil 500 000
United Arabian Emirates 50 000 900 000 950 000
USA 1 700 000
Yemen 100 000 1 000 101 000
These figures have been selected from the more detailed information “Estimated Size of Over-
seas Indian Community: Countrywise” found in Ministry of External Affairs (2002: xlvii–xlx).
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had larger first wave immigration . Furthermore, in relation to the total population, 
the Indian diaspora in Mauritius holds the top position, with more than two-thirds 
of the population having an Indian background .
With the gradual democratization of Mauritian society from the first half of 
the twentieth century onwards, and the granting of full electoral and citizenship 
rights today,16 this demographic dominance has allowed Indians great political in-
fluence, and even assured their dominance within the Mauritian political system . 
Indeed, with the exception of Paul Berenger, a left-wing Franco-Mauritian who led 
the country for periods in the 1990s and 2000s, all Mauritian prime ministers have 
had an Indian background . This numerical and subsequent political superiority was 
accompanied, if not also decisively triggered and supported, by the gradual economic 
liberation and upward social mobility of PIOs in Mauritius . Today, substantial num-
bers of Indo-Mauritians are well-off and highly educated, and are thereby ‘upwardly 
mobile’ citizens . Therefore, the politico-economic and social standing of contem-
porary Indo-Mauritians has improved greatly when compared not only with their 
initial state of ‘coolitude,’ but also with the descendants of their former relatives and 
neighbors who chose to stay behind in India .17
Fourth Particularity: The Indian Diaspora in Mauritius Is Not the 
Only One There
According to the 1982 census (the last of its kind), the population of Mauritius 
totaled 1 .2 million people, and was categorized as follows: Hindus 52 %; Muslims 
16 %, Sino-Mauritians 3 %, and General Population 29 % . Even at first glance, 
therefore, it is obvious that Mauritius is a multi-ethnic and poly-religious society . 
This diversity is expressed by the 20 annual nationwide holidays which demonstrate 
that most religious and ethnic groups on the island are equally acknowledged and 
their interests and self-esteem are respected . Another symbol of plurality (and unity 
in diversity) is the national flag, which features an abstraction of the colors of the 
rainbow .18
If we look at the categorizations used in the census more carefully, some incon-
gruities appear . The distinction between Hindus and Muslims is obviously a religious 
16 On democratization processes and ethnic politics in Mauritius, see Bräutigam (1997), Carroll and 
Carroll (1999 and 2000), Mathur (1997), and Mukonoweshuro (1991) .
17 For the economic development of Indo-Mauritians, see Allen (1999: chapter 6), Carter (2002), 
Carter, Deerpalsingh and Govinden (2000), Metha (1995), and Srebrnik (1999) . 
18 For the demographic development of Mauritius, see Lutz (1994), Dinan (2003), and Royle (1995) . 
The difficulty of categorizing sections of the Mauritian population into clearly defined and ‘politically 
correct’ groups is expressed by the fact that, during more than a century of state-run census activities, a 
number of different criteria were tested and rejected until, in 1982, all such endeavors were discarded . 
See Christopher (1992) .
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one, and we have already noted that the ancestors of both Hindus and Muslims in 
Mauritius today originally came from India, especially North India . However, given 
that various Muslim groups on the island have recently started to claim that they 
originate from the Arabian peninsula and to call Arabic (not Hindu or Urdu) their 
‘ancestral language,’ these common local roots in India should again be emphasized . 
Hence, both Hindus and Muslims are Indo-Mauritians and were actually labelled as 
such in censuses until 1947, the year of India’s independence and the partition into 
India and Pakistan . However, the third largest census group, ‘Sino,’ was not a reli-
gious categorization but rather one based on region of origin, namely China or East 
Asia . This group could be subdivided into Hakka and Cantonese speaking Chinese . 
Subsumed under the ‘General Population’ label are such heterogeneous groups as 
white Franco-Mauritians (accounting for 2 % of the population), ‘Creoles’ (in the 
Mauritian context the descendants of African slaves) and ‘Coloureds’ or ‘Gens de 
coleur’ (a hybrid category denoting the offspring of mixed, usually ‘black’ (female) 
and ‘white’ (male) unions who were barred from inheriting their father’s estates but 
often received better education and other privileges, allowing them to climb the 
social ladder) .19 Strikingly, the descendants of former slaves and former masters now 
found themselves in the same demographic melting pot, one called ‘General .’ This 
indicates that, in post-colonial Mauritius, the descendants of indentured laborers 
had become such a majority that they could be split into two religious groups and 
also be distinguished from the East Asian ‘Sino-group .’ The unified category of ‘Gen-
eral Population,’ made up of the two distinct groups that first populated the island 
in the eighteenth century, can therefore be defined negatively, as all those who did 
not come from Asia .
Using other categorizations in the census would obviously have produced dif-
ferent figures . Taking regions of origin, for example, a census would have identified 
macro-groups as Indian, Chinese, French and African, or Europeans, who could be 
distinguished from Africans and Asians . If one took religion in all instances (and 
not only in the first two) as the criterion, the cards would have been substantial-
ly re-shuffled: not only are all sub-groups of the ‘General Population’ Christians, 
whether black, white or colored, but so are large numbers of Mauritians hailing 
from South India (probably subsumed under the label ‘Hindu’ in 1982), as well 
as most Sino-Mauritians .20 Taking yet another criterion, namely that of language, 
would have made things both easier and more complicated . Officially, fifteen lan-
guages are spoken in Mauritius, including English, French, Kreol, Bhojpuri, Hindi, 
Urdu, Tamil, Telugu, Marathi, Arabic, Hakka, and Cantonese . However, in almost 
all interactions, a French-based Kreol is spoken, and occasionally French . Indeed, 
many Mauritians speak excellent French, with most of the national media also com-
municating in French . The official national language, however, is neither French nor 
19 Numerous ‘Gens de Coleur’ today are lawyers, teachers, surgeons, journalists, managers, or in similar 
‘middle-class’ positions .
20 On religion as an ‘identity marker,’ see especially Eriksen (1998: 90–97) .
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Kreol, but English, though (or perhaps precisely because) only a minority of educat-
ed Mauritians master the language and enjoy using it . If one looks at language less as 
a means of communication than as a symbolic marker of identification and belong-
ing, another dimension is added . Asked about their ancestral language or mother 
tongue, Indo-Mauritians in particular tend to mention languages such as Sanskrit, 
Hindi, Urdu and even Arabic, which their ancestors could barely have spoken when 
they arrived . This seems strange because few Indo-Mauritians have these as their 
native languages today, nor would have many of their ancestors or ‘mothers .’ While 
speaking Kreol in everyday life, some other Indo-Mauritians today also speak Hindi, 
Marathi, Bhojpuri or Urdu at home and / or as a second language in community af-
fairs . However, for reasons of identity politics, Indo-Mauritians would not call Kreol, 
the language of the Creoles, their ‘mother tongue .’21
In Mauritius then, we find multiple, sometimes overlapping, sometimes structur-
ally opposed identities in action and motion . Hence, Mauritius represents a quite 
heterogeneous conglomeration of groups, which can be classified in a number of 
ways, according to country or continent of origin, phenotypical characteristics, 
(claimed) ancestral languages, religious denominations, and socio-cultural or eco-
nomic characteristics . Among these various groups on the island, PIOs constitute 
the majority: about two-thirds when all Indo-Mauritians are considered, and still 
more than 50 % when only Hindus are counted . As I pointed out in ‘Particularity 
Number One,’ these PIOs can be further differentiated or divided along various 
lines when different criteria are applied, not only analytically (from the point of 
view of an outside observer), but also by the actors themselves in their dynamic and 
strategic responses to various situations . This fluid and shifting situation applies not 
only to the PIOs, but also to other groups on the island . In Eriksen’s words: “The 
main theoretical point here is that ethnicity is, in practice, not an inert, categorical 
property of persons (although folk models tend to depict it as such), but a property 
of the relationship between agents acting in situations and contexts and as such, its 
meaning changes with the context” (1998: 98–99) .22
Fifth Particularity: All Mauritians Come from Elsewhere and Value 
Their Diasporic Links
The fifth particularity arises out of the fourth one, but it adds another particular 
dimension to the overall diasporic state of affairs in Mauritius discussed so far: each 
and every sector of the multi-ethnic Mauritian ‘rainbow’ population has come from 
elsewhere . This means that no single group living on Mauritius today can claim 
21 Several studies discuss the importance of language identification in politics in contemporary Mau-
ritius . See, among others, Eisenlohr (2001, 2002, 2004, 2009), Hookoomsing (1986), Eriksen (1990, 
1998: 75–90), and Hookoomsing, Ludwig and Schnepel (2009), Ludwig and Schnepel (2009) .
22 On the issues in this section, see especially Eriksen (1998: 14–21, 47–74, 97–101) .
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indigeneity and hence demand rights or privileges arising from such a claim . Some 
groups may have been there before others or even claim to have come first . However, 
today any such claim to have been ‘earlier comers’ or ‘first settlers’ is less important 
than sheer numbers, which eventually translate into political power . The absence of 
any aboriginal or officially acknowledged first-comer population makes present-day 
inter-ethnic negotiations and identity politics somewhat unique . On Mauritius, no 
group can make a native claim to possession or at least privileged access to land or a 
resource, as we may find in Australia, the United States, or (even more comparable 
to the Mauritian situation) in Fiji, where Fijian groups have sought to bar the de-
scendants of coolies from acquiring land property on the basis that only ethnic Fiji-
ans are the ‘sons of the soil,’ or in Trinidad, where Afro-Trinidadians claim political 
privileges on account of having arrived on the island first .23
Although, or maybe exactly because, everyone on the island originally came from 
elsewhere,24 the idea and ideology of an original home elsewhere remains pertinent 
in most contemporary Mauritians lives, whether socially, politically, economically 
or religiously . In other words, apart from being Mauritians and Mauritian nation-
als (which they are and consider themselves to be), all sections of Mauritian society 
also consider themselves, sometimes quite significantly, as having diasporic roots and 
continuous diasporic links to their real and /or assumed ‘homelands .’ Consequently, 
in both ideology and practice they exhibit and are guided by a diasporic conscious-
ness . This is complicated by the fact that, after several decades of secondary migra-
tions starting from Mauritius, there are now also Mauritian diasporas, some of them 
Indo-Mauritian diasporas, most prominently in countries like Australia, South Af-
rica, England, or France .
Sixth Particularity: The Mauritian Kind of Nationalism Can Be 
Called ‘Ethnonationalism’
The diasporic consciousness and politics are supported by the state in both inter-
nal and external policies . In Mauritius, the idea of nationhood and the state differs 
radically from the nineteenth-century West European prototype of ‘one culture /one 
language /one religion /one nation /one territory /one state .’ While this ‘ideal’ nation 
was seldom if ever achieved elsewhere, after independence in 1968 Mauritius had 
to confront its racial, socio-cultural, linguistic, and religious diversity . Attempts to 
build the nation and unify its elements into both a working unit and a sentimental 
entity had to be modelled on the well-known slogans ‘unity in diversity’ and the 
‘rainbow nation .’25
23 On this point, see Carroll (1994), Eriksen (1992) and Srebnik (2000: 10–11) .
24 This observation also applies to most of the species of flora and fauna to be found on the island 
today .
25 The issue of nation-building in Mauritius against the background of ethnic plurality and strong eth-
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In other words, the Mauritian nation-state had to harmonize two issues which often 
conflict in countries around the world . On the one hand, there was the great impor-
tance that Mauritians gave and still give to their ethnicity and roots . On the other 
hand, there has been an urgent need to build a unified nation in which divergent 
interests and identity markers are peacefully and effectively brought together under 
one umbrella, and with a number of ‘common denominators’ (Eriksen 1998) . So 
far the goal of accommodating two (for many apparently contradictory) ideologies 
and community-building principles has been achieved with great success . In eco-
nomic terms, Mauritius has had its up and downs and its inequalities, but by and 
large this neoliberal ‘tiger state’ can boast remarkable achievements, which are no 
longer based solely on sugar but on a cleverly diversified economy and a powerful 
‘hub strategy .’ Furthermore, Mauritius has managed to establish and practice a rather 
consensual multiparty democracy (see Nave 2000), making it “one of the few stable 
democracies in the postcolonial world” (Eriksen 1998: 6) . Socially, despite all the 
conflicts of interest and communal contestations around resources, there have been 
relatively few cases of violent unrest since 1968, with each of these ending within 
days . Furthermore, these upheavals were not necessarily based on and motivated by 
ethnic interests, and may be better understood as youth revolts,26 or economic or 
class struggles .
While the Western European ideal of nationhood remains globally dominant to-
day, Mauritius is certainly not alone in having to build the nation along other lines . 
In fact, the unity-in-diversity paradigm also guides other post-colonies like India 
and Indonesia . Indeed, after independence many other postcolonial nation-states 
have found either that their territorial borders had been drawn arbitrarily, cutting 
across ethnic and cultural groups, or that, within the framework of the new nations, 
a multitude of heterogeneous groups had found themselves mingled together in the 
new nation, or that their migrant populations had been ‘shipped together’ without 
any consideration of socio-cultural, linguistic, or religious characteristics .
The Mauritian state’s policy of (multi)ethno-nationalism instead of mono-na-
tionalism, therefore, only becomes unique if we add two other aspects to the mix . 
First, all ethnic identifications on the island are closely combined with and based 
on diasporic imaginations: ethnic discourses in Mauritius always emphasize links to 
other parts in the world, to other homelands . The second aspect, which makes this 
sixth particularity unique in a discussion of Indian diasporas, leads us directly to the 
last ‘particularity .’
nic consciousness is exemplarily discussed in Eriksen (1998, especially pp . 137–166) . See also Chazan-
Gillig (2000) .
26 This was most obvious in the 1999 riots, the last serious riot in Mauritius, when there were clashes 
between young people of all ethnic backgrounds and the police after the famous reggae /seggae musician 
Kaya had died under suspicious circumstances in police custody .
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Seventh Particularity: The Role Model for Ethnic-Cum-Diasporic 
Identity on Mauritius Is Provided by the Indian Diaspora, 
Especially Its Hindu Variant
To repeat, nation-building activities and national ideologies on Mauritius are based 
on the idea of the legitimate existence of a number of different ethnic groups, which 
are generally represented and ideally share power in proportion to their relative nu-
merical strength . The diversity of origins of these ethnic groups means that they all 
share a diasporic consciousness (to some degree) and logic in which the following 
(interconnected) elements are given esteem and value:
an established link to a homeland outside Mauritius•	
an ancestral language•	
an ancient and essentialized ‘ancestral culture’•	
a religion, which is conceived as ‘traditional’ and regularly performed and •	
expressed in major religious festivities
a known history of one’s own, accompanied by markers of ‘cultural heritage .’•	
As I stated, all ethnic groups share these diasporic evaluations more or less. I must now 
stress, however, that these elements are best achieved by the Hindu diaspora in Mau-
ritius, where a sacred dimension is attached to each element . To put it the other way 
round, perhaps more accurately, the Indo-Mauritian version of diaspora has become 
so dominant that it serves as the model and ideal for other ethnic groups as well . Let 
us look at these elements once again, this time with a focus on the Indian diaspora:
Indo-Mauritians can clearly identify India – ‘Mother India,’ that is – as their •	
original and sacred land of origin .
Hindi and Sanskrit are conceived of and propagated as mother tongues, repre-•	
senting purity and even sacredness .
Indian philosophy, literature, music, and dance are considered ancient and sa-•	
cred, and there are various institutions in Mauritius, some of them sponsored 
from India, which offer venues and platforms for their performance .
Hinduism, with its daily rituals and major religious festivals, plays an impor-•	
tant role in Mauritian public life . Some festivals, like Divali in November or 
the Maha Sivaratri in February, are nationwide holidays .
In this Indo-Mauritian logic of diaspora, the Muslim part of the Indo-Mauritian 
community finds itself somewhat included or encompassed . In this ideal type and 
Guests without a Host 143
model, the Indian diaspora – which I show in Particularity 2 to be manifold and even 
heterogeneous in itself – is a Hindu diaspora .
This Hindu model represents the ideal, but it is seldom achieved by all . This is 
evident, especially, in how Mauritians of African origin fare in these respects . As far 
as their country of origin is concerned, Africa is too large to qualify as a sentimental 
‘home country .’ The violent abduction of their ancestors from concrete territorial 
roots, and the subsequent roots- and identity-extinguishing condition of slavery have 
severed any factual links to specific countries,27 and have also dampened any emo-
tional and ideational attachments to them . Moreover, in the media contemporary 
Africa is typically represented as a place of poverty, misery, corrupt regimes and war, 
making it even more difficult for Afro-Mauritians to attach positive evaluations to 
their ‘ancestral homes .’ In terms of language identity, slavery has also cut the ties to 
any mother tongue . Certainly, Mauritian Creole or ‘Morisyen,’ contains significant 
Bantu elements, but even its practitioners conceive of it (wrongly or not28) as a de-
rivative form of French rather than an ancestral language . Therefore, Creole hardly 
qualifies as an ethnic marker for Afro-Mauritians, let alone a sacred one . In religious 
matters, most Creoles are Christians today . There are few ‘African’ elements in the 
praxis of the religion, which was introduced by the colonists and the former slave 
masters . Culturally, Mauritians clearly identify the Sega dance as Creole rather than 
African in origin, and see it as a cultural product that only emerged in Mauritius 
under the harsh conditions of slavery .29
From the point of view of Hindu nationalists and their dominant idea of diaspo-
ra, then, the Mauritian descendants of former African slaves serve as an example of 
how culture and cultural identity can be lost if one’s roots are severed and /or forgot-
ten . So, all in all, the second largest group in Mauritius (around 25 %), namely Mau-
ritian Creoles, is generally seen as a deficient and incomplete version of the (Hindu) 
ideal of diaspora . This is strikingly expressed by the categorization of Creoles in past 
censuses under ‘General Population’ (as I pointed out above), rather than being rec-
ognized as an independent and clearly identifiable entity in their own right .30
27 Certainly, Afro-Mauritians are sometimes called Malgas or Mozambik, referring to an assumed origin 
from Madagascar and Mozambique, but these designations are meant pejoratively . It is estimated that 
about 45 % of all slaves came from Madagascar, but many of these may have come first come to Mada-
gascar from elsewhere . See Eriksen (1998: 52) and Allen (1999: 42) .
28 Linguists have investigated and discussed this point in great detail .
29 On Mauritian Sega, see Schnepel and Schnepel (2009b, 2011) .
30 On this and other aspects of the so-called ‘Creole malaise,’ see especially Miles (1999) .
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Conclusion
Since the mid-1990s, India has shown an increasing interest in its diasporas spread 
across the world . This interest has been accompanied by a number of legal, fiscal, 
economic, political, and socio-cultural measures, which have substantially changed 
interactions and exchanges between ‘Mother India’ and her ‘children .’ Indo-Mau-
ritians have also been affected by this new policy . The introduction of a ‘Persons 
of Indian Origin Card’ in particular – which is valid for twenty years and offers 
many advantages for PIO (making their status comparable to that of NRIs) – has 
succeeded in strengthening relations between Indo-Mauritians and India (see Kan-
towski 2002) .
The numerical predominance of PIO in Mauritius, the opening of India to PIO 
and NRIs, and the ever-increasing economic power and attractiveness of India in a 
globalized world have led to ‘Indian-ness,’ especially in its dominant form ‘Hindu-
ness’, increasing in strength in Mauritius and in India . Consequently, Mauritius 
has strengthened its relationship with India on all levels, not just an economic one . 
The increasing interest of ‘Mother India’ in their NRI and PIO ‘children’ all over 
the world (and especially in their remittances) has been accompanied by Mauritian 
PIO’s increasing interest in India and their roots there . This search for roots takes on 
many forms and manifestations, such as numerous individuals of Indian background 
visiting the Mahatma Gandhi Institute to search for archival documents relating to 
their ancestors .
All these particularities, individually and in sum, create a special position for the 
Indian diaspora in Mauritius . The Indian diaspora(s) in Mauritius, as well as the 
other diasporas (African, Chinese, French, English) on the island, could be called 
‘guests without a host .’ However, if a diasporic group such as the Indian (especially 
the Hindu) one does manage to achieve numerical superiority, if no other group has 
traditional claims to land, resources or privileges, and if this diasporic group also 
achieves some kind of social and politico-economic standing and educational skills, 
then it can flourish . In a democratic environment it can even become so dominant 
that it turns from being a ‘guest without a host to becoming the ‘host .’ This pro-
cess can be facilitated by the original home country, if it discovers the potential its 
diaspora(s) has to offer . All this was the case for the Indian diasporas in Mauritius, 
especially for the Hindu one .
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The Indian Diaspora in East Africa
Roman Loimeier
Conceptual Framework
Issues of communitarian organization, identity, and belonging have long informed 
the history of the subcontinent (today India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri 
Lanka), and they continue to do so . Prominent examples include the muhājirūn in 
Karachi / Sindh, Hindu-Muslim strife in Gujarat, temple and mosque disputes in 
Uttar Pradesh and other regions, and ethnic conflict throughout the subcontinent .1 
Communitarian organization, identity and belonging are informed by variegated 
historical legacies, politics, religion, social and ethnic dynamics, questions of class, 
and respective modes of ‘othering .’ The question arises, however, if such dynam-
ics have also influenced the development of the Indian diaspora, or if questions of 
‘belonging’ have become paramount in the context of the rise of African national 
states . My contribution looks into this question by focusing on the development of 
the Indian diaspora in East Africa and Tanzania / Zanzibar in particular . Looking at 
a number of Indian diasporic communities in their historical context, I ask if these 
communities have reproduced metropolitan (i .e . Indian) communal disputes, or if 
they have rather sought to find a place for themselves in colonial and postcolonial 
East Africa .
1 For a discussion of the term ‘communalism’ see Peter van der Veer (1994) .
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History of the Indian Diaspora in East Africa
Indians first arrived in East Africa in pre-recorded times, possibly more than a thou-
sand years ago . Due to the monsoon wind system, traders who came to East Africa 
with the northeast monsoon (Swahili: kazkazi, from December to March), had to 
stay on the coast for several months until they could return to India or Arabia with 
the southwest monsoon (Swahili: kusi, from May to August) . The monsoon wind 
system thus encouraged the establishment of a temporal Indian presence on the East 
African coast . In the 16th century, this presence was recorded by Portuguese sources 
and seems to have become more permanent around this time . Indeed, the pilot 
‘Malemo Canaqua,’ who guided Vasco da Gama straight across the Indian Ocean to 
Calicut in 1498, was an Indian resident of Malindi (Sheriff 2010: 110) . However, 
it was not until the early 19th century that Indian settlements in East Africa grew 
significantly and became more prominent .
The development of a permanent Indian presence in East Africa was connected 
to the expansion of the Sultanate of Oman in the 19th century . Although Oman had 
started to intervene on the East African coast in the mid-17th century, its position 
there remained marginal until the early 19th century, when the Bū Saʿīdī dynasty in 
Masqat realized the coast’s economic value and shifted the seat of the government 
to Zanzibar in 1840 (see Sheriff 1987) . In 1804, the Sultan of Oman had started to 
‘farm out’ control of Zanzibar’s customs to, amongst others, Indians (‘Banians,’ i .e . 
Hindus), who paid the Sultan an annual fee for the license to collect customs fees .2 In 
1818/1819, the (Hindu) Indian trader Jairam Sewji took over the lucrative position . 
In 1837, the Jairam Sewji family also took control of customs on the Mrima coast 
opposite Zanzibar . Sewji’s company retained control over Zanzibar’s customs until 
1886, when Sultan Barghash established a government customs department (Sheriff 
1987: 84, 127) .3
In 1839, a British-Omani commercial treaty allowed British subjects (including 
Indians from those parts of India already under British legislation) to enter Zanzibar, 
and to reside and trade within the Sultan’s dominions along the East African Coast 
(Oonk 2006: 254ff) . Trade subsequently increased, as did the number of Indians 
on the coast, from 214 in 1819 to 2,500 in 1870, and to 6,000 in the early 1900s . 
The immigrants were mostly poor Muslims from Gujarat, especially from the Kutch 
peninsula, and were typically small shop owners, small scale traders, and craftsmen . 
Trading and entrepreneurial families such as the Topans, the Visrams and the Parroos 
even became financiers of Arab slavers . However, the major trade item was African 
2 As a result of this policy, the Indian community in Zanzibar had grown to 214 persons by 1819, “and 
they were already described as wealthy” (Sheriff 2016: 3) .
3 In 1876 however, another wealthy Indian trading family, that of Tharia Topan, managed to outbid 
the Sewji Company by offering an annual fee of 450,000 Maria Theresien Thaler (MTT) for the right 
to collect custom duties . In 1880, the Jairam Sewji family was able to regain control over Zanzibar’s 
customs by outbidding the Topan family with an annual payment of 500,000 MTT (Bennett 1978: 
106) .
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ivory, which was highly sought after in India, where it formed an important part of 
dowries . In addition, Indian traders bought spices, copal, cloves, goat skin, and dried 
fish . The major import from India was so-called ‘Surat cloth,’ various textiles which 
came primarily from Surat in Gujarat .
From the beginning, the Indian community in East Africa was characterized by 
social and religious fragmentation . Three criteria informed the formation of local 
communities: religion, regional origin, and occupation . Most Hindus, for instance, 
were Bhatias, Vanias and Lohanas,4 who came as merchants, traders, and brokers 
from Kutch, whereas Patels came from an agricultural background in central Gu-
jarat . Other Gujarati Hindus belonged mainly to artisan groups, whereas Punjabi 
immigrants were less informed by social origin, forming a single community in East 
Africa . Community development was particularly informed by the development of 
different religious orientations in East Africa . Despite Hindu’s pioneering the early 
trade, Muslims soon came to dominate the Indian diaspora in East Africa . A first 
Khōja-Ismāʿīlī Jamāʿat Khāna (community center) was established as early as 1838 
in the Forodhani ward in Zanzibar .5 The Khōja-Ismāʿīlī community included promi-
nent members such as Tharia Topan (1823–1891) and the trader Allidina Visram 
(1851–1916), who all became important to funding the community’s social activi-
ties . The Khōja-Ismāʿīlīs mostly came from Kutch / Gujarat (like most other Indians 
in East Africa), as well as from Punjab and Sindh (Daftary and Hirji 2008: 204–
206) . The development of the Khōja-Ismāʿīlī group parallels that of the Bohora com-
munity6 and other Indian families that were dominated by rich traders, like those 
of Sewa Haji (1851–1897) and Nasser Veerjee (1865–1942) . The most prominent 
Bohora family was the Karimji-Jivanji family, which came from the Kutchi seaport 
Mandvi to Zanzibar in 1818, and opened its first business in 1825 .7 From modest 
beginnings, the Karimji family became one of the richest Indian families in East Af-
rica, involved in all kinds of trade, as well as sisal and cashew production . Nearly 150 
years later, the Karimji-Jivanji family would become the East African representatives 
for Toyota (and also for Tata and Chrysler) . Like other wealthy Indian families, the 
Karimji family engaged in charitable activities .
From the 1890s, the number of Indian indentured workers or ‘coolies’ (who 
came primarily from Punjab) increased, while Goans started to be recruited as civil 
4 Lohanas are a Kshatriya group, often administrators, and are also traders today . Most Khojas are Lo-
hana by origin; Vanias and Bhatias are comparatively small high caste groups from Rajasthan .
5 The Khōja-Ismāʿīlīs represent the Nizārī-branch of the Ismāʿīliyya . The Ismāʿīliyya are the ‘sevener’ 
branch of the Shīʿa in contrast to the 12’er or Ithnāʿsharī branch . The present Aga Khan is the 49th 
religious leader of the Khōja-Ismāʿīlīs . For a history of the Khōja-Ismāʿīlī community see Daftary and 
Hirji (2008) .
6 The Bohoras represent the Mustaʿīlī-branch of the Ismāʿīlīs . The dāʿī al-muṭlaq (supreme guide) of 
the Bohoras has been Sayyid Muḥammad Burhānuddīn since 1965 . He is the 52nd dāʿī al-muṭlaq of the 
Bohoras . His father, Sayyid Ṭāhir Saifuddīn directed the Bohora community from 1915 until his death 
in 1965 . For a history of the Bohora community see Blank (2001) .
7 The history of Karimji-Jivanji family has been recorded in great detail by Gijsbert Oonk (2009) .
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servants . The indentured workers were employed mostly on the Mombasa – Uganda 
railway, which was built from 1895–1903 . Indeed, 35,000 coolies were brought to 
East Africa for this project alone . By 1914, the number of Indians had grown to 
38,000, and to 55,000 by 1921 . Although most indentured laborers left East Af-
rica when the Mombasa – Uganda railway was completed, around 7,000 remained 
(mostly in Kenya) and worked as railway personnel, drivers, stationmasters, fore-
men, linesmen, repairmen, upholsterers, carpenters, and other artisans, while others 
settled down as dukka wallas (small shop owners) (Oonk 2006: 255) .
The next phase of immigration started during and after WWI and was linked 
with the British war effort, when tens of thousands of Indian soldiers and porters 
brought to East Africa to fight the Germans . After WWI, a growing number of 
Indians found employment in the colonial administration and economy . As a conse-
quence of Indian mass emigration beginning in the late 19th century,8 the Brahmin 
idea that crossing the ocean (kala pani, ‘the black water’) would cause ritual impurity 
and even render Hindus ‘outcasts,’ became increasingly obsolete . A member of the 
Shree Shiv Shakti Mandir in Zanzibar and a Brahmin himself summarized this de-
velopment in a conversation in 2010, when he told me that “the diaspora killed the 
idea of the black water, even Brahmins travel around the world today” (Joshi sr ., 18 
August 2010) . By 1939, the number of Indians in East Africa had grown to 105,000 . 
After WWII, the Indian population increased further, and by 1962, 362,000 Indians 
were living in the four East African countries (see Table 1 for an overview) .
8 During this period of mass emigration, Indians not only immigrated to East Africa but also to the 
Caribbean, Mauritius and Fiji .
Table 1: Indian population growth in four East African countries
Year Kenya Uganda  Tanganyika / Zanzibar Total
1921 25,253  5,200  10,209 / 13,772  54,000
1931 43,623 14,150  25,144 / 15,247  98,000
1939 46,897 17,300  25,000 / 15,500 104,000
1962 175,000 77,500  92,000 / 20,000 362,000
1969 140,000 75,000 85,000 300,000
1972 105,000  1,000 52,000 158,000
1984 50,000  1,000 30,000  81,000
1995 / 2000 100,000 12,000 90,000 202,000
Source: Oonk (2006: 256)
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The Indian Communities in East Africa after Independence
After independence (Tanganyika in 1961, Uganda in 1962, Kenya and Zanzibar in 
1963),9 East African governments gave those Indians who were not automatically 
citizens by birth an option to register within two years . As many Indians hesitated 
to apply for citizenship, administrations took “their procrastination as an expression 
of a lack of faith in these states” (Oonk 2006: 258) and started to introduce periodic 
embargoes, which again increased suspicion among Indians . However, some Indian 
group leaders, especially those from the Khōja and Bohora Ismāʿīlīs, encouraged 
their members to apply for citizenship . In 1952, the Aga Khan (the religious leader 
of the Khōja Ismāʿīlīs) advised his followers to regard East Africa as their permanent 
home, to speak English rather than Gujarati, and encouraged women to wear West-
ern dress (Oonk 2006: 261) .10
Despite the willingness of the Aga Khan to cooperate with East African govern-
ments, national politics quickly led to conflict . One of the first victims of Tanganyika 
(from 1964 Tanzania) President Nyerere’s policies to marginalize and even eliminate 
old elites was the East Africa Muslim Welfare Society (EAMWS), a supranational 
Muslim welfare organization dominated by Indians as well as some conservative Af-
rican religious scholars such as Ḥasan b . ʿAmeir . The EAMWS had been founded in 
1937 by the Aga Khan . Since 1961, its headquarters had been in Dar es Salaam . In 
the context of emerging nationalisms in East Africa, the EAMWS that had propa-
gated Muslim unity became increasingly obsolete and was dissolved in 1968 (see 
Loimeier 2007) . The 1967 Arusha declaration started a period of anti-‘Asian’ (i .e . 
anti-Indian) policies in all three East African countries . These policies included the 
nationalization and expropriation of Indian businesses, properties and houses, and 
triggered waves of Indian emigration from all East African countries . The most bru-
tal policies were applied in Zanzibar, where many Indians were killed in the revolu-
tion of January 1964 or subsequently fled; and in Uganda in 1972, where 70,000 
Indians had to leave the country within 90 days (see Oonk 2006: 259) . In Tanzania, 
the Nationalization of Buildings Act of 22 April 1971 (Oonk 2009: 105) led to an 
Indian exodus, and to the effective expropriation of the Karimji and other wealthy 
‘Asian’ families’ property . Between 1964 and 1972, 40–50 % of all Indians in Kenya 
and Tanganyika emigrated to the USA, Canada, and Britain (Oonk 2006: 254ff), 
forming a diaspora of ‘twice displaced’ Indians . In the 1980s, governments across 
East Africa revised their anti-Indian policies . In Uganda, President Museveni even 
ordered the return of confiscated properties to their former Indian owners . Still, 
9 In 1964, Zanzibar and Tanganyika united and formed the Federal Republic of Tanzania .
10  This policy was rejected by the dāʿī al-muṭlaq of the Bohoras . The Bohoras opposition to integration 
backfired in 1968, when the Tanzanian government expelled the dāʿī al-muṭlaq Sayyid Muḥammad 
Burhānuddīn for allegedly violating foreign exchange regulations . The dāʿī al-muṭlaq had been visiting 
the Bohora communities in Tanzania to bring them into closer compliance with the policies of the 
Bohora dāʿwat (the ‘message’) (Blank 2001: 240) .
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anti-Indian sentiment remains vibrant, and anti-Indian riots and occasional protests 
occur in all East African countries, especially in Uganda and Kenya .
In Tanzania, governments from Ali Hassan Mwinyi (1985–1995) through Ben-
jamin Mkapa (1995–2005) to Jakaya Kikwete (2005–2015) have encouraged Indi-
ans to return and presented them as the ‘saviors’ of the Tanzanian economy (Oonk 
2006: 260) . With economic liberalization starting in Tanzania in 1985, many Indian 
families indeed began to rebuild business, albeit cautiously . Yet by 2010, the Indian 
community in Tanzania had grown to about 200,000 (Kaid Lookmanji, 7 August 
2010), and even small provincial towns such as Iringa again had their own Indian 
Muslim and Hindu communities . By 2010, Dar es Salaam alone had 15,000 Hindus 
and at least ten major Hindu temples, mostly situated in or near Kisutu Street (9 
temples), i .e . in the center of the Uhindini (‘Indian’) ward of central Dar es Salaam, 
and in Upanga (1 temple) . These temples catered for different religious orientations 
among the Hindus, as well as for Hindus from different regions of origin in India 
(Gujarat, Maharashtra, Konkan etc .) . There were also temples devoted to specific 
gods such as Rama, Shiva, or Krishna . In addition, the Hindu community in Dar es 
Salaam managed one ‘Hindu’ hospital, the ‘Shree Shiv Shakti Hospital,’ as well as a 
library and a gym .11
Indians in Pre-Colonial Zanzibar
In the 19th century, Zanzibar’s economy boomed under the Sultanate of Oman’s 
liberal trade policies . The boom led to considerable population growth . In 1819, 
Zanzibar Town had a population of about 5,000 inhabitants, but by 1835 it had 
doubled or even tripled . By 1846, it had grown to about 20–25,000, and by 1885 
had reached about 80,000 (Bennett 1978: 57; Sheriff 1987: 138) . Zanzibar’s popula-
tion not only grew but also became increasingly diverse . By the 1840s, 5,000 Omanis 
and between 400 and 700 Indians had settled . By the 1870s there were about 3,000 
Indians (mostly Gujaratis) living in Zanzibar, including 2,000 ‘Banians’ (Indians 
belonging to different Hindu orientations and occupational groups) .12 Most Indians 
settled in the Kiponda, Hamamni, and Kajificheni wards and built representative 
houses, whereas poor Indians settled in Ng’ambo, the ‘other side’ of the ‘creek’ that 
separated the old town from the rural areas (see Sheriff 1992 and 1995) . In addition, 
there were Hadrami and Yemeni communities, immigrants from Madagascar, the 
11 Since 2005, an ‘Indian’ building boom has led to the destruction of many old buildings in the Uhin-
dini quarter in Dar es Salaam . This building boom was linked with the fact that leases on plots of land 
in ‘Uhindi’ that had been granted by the British colonial administration in the mid-1930s expired in 
the mid-2000s . Indian lessees were thus able to buy ‘their’ plots and started to replace the old two- or 
three-storey buildings with new buildings that were much larger (my own observations, 11 August 
2010) .
12 There were also some Zoroastrians, mostly from Bombay . They were allowed to establish their own 
‘fire temple’ in Zanzibar in 1882 (Exhibition, House of Wonders) .
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Comoros and Somalia (particularly from the Brāwa region), indigenous Zanzibaris, 
Wapemba, Watumbatu, and the ‘Hadimu’ people from Zanzibar’s east coast, as well 
as Africans from the hinterland stretching back as far as Manyema (Eastern Congo), 
Baluchis from south-eastern Iran, and a growing community of Europeans (Sheriff 
1987: 147, 149) .
The 19th century was thus characterized by the development of a polyphonic 
society in Zanzibar Town that stressed social criteria as markers of distinctness: be-
ing an aristocrat or a slave was more important than being ‘white’ or ‘black .’ Even 
the Sultan’s family was divided into an ‘Abyssinian’ and a ‘Circassian’ line (see Ruete 
1998: 85ff) . Intermarriage and concubine (suria) relationships led to the emergence 
of a large group of ‘black’ Arabs (Africans who came to regard themselves as ‘Arab’ 
due to their affiliation with an Arab family) . The Indians in Zanzibar, by contrast, 
mostly refused to intermarry with Africans, yet many men maintained suria relation-
ships with African women . The refusal to intermarry thus became a major obstacle 
to Indian integration in East Africa . Indians not only refused to marry non-Indians, 
but maintained practices of exclusion and social avoidance among themselves . There 
were, however, a few exceptions: Ithnāʿsharī communities’ marriage practices were 
less exclusive; some early migrants from Surat mixed with the African population in 
Zanzibar in the early 19th century; and Hindu migrants, who were predominantly 
male until the late 19th century, seem to have had African concubines more fre-
quently (see Sheriff 1987 and Issa 1995) .
The emerging Indian community in Zanzibar was split into numerous different 
fractions . In 1870, the Indian Muslim community consisted of three major groups: 
the Khōja Ismāʿīlis, the Bohoras and the Memons, a small Sunni (Ḥanafī) group . 
In 1870, there were less than 250 Memons, mostly from Gujarat (Kathiawar and 
Kutch regions), usually Surat and Porbandar, or from Lohanpur in Sindh (Martin 
1978: 34–5) . The Khōja-Ismāʿīlī community was the largest group with 535 families 
in 1870, 422 of them originating from Kutch . About 2,100 people belonging to 
this group had their permanent residence in Zanzibar, while the other 450 members 
settled on the mainland . The Bohora community, another branch of Ismāʿīlī ori-
entation, was the second largest . Most of them originated from Rajkot and Kutch . 
In 1870 about 250 lived in Zanzibar, while about 600 lived on the coast . Most 
Bohoras made a living as craftsmen, artisans, locksmiths, petty traders and iron-
mongers, while Khōjas were usually traders, or entrepreneurs in import-export and 
long-distance trade businesses . Later on, many became artisans . Memons, Bohoras 
and Khōjas were also marked by different social and occupational affiliations: they 
were either Kokni (traders from Konkan, although not all Koknis were Memon), 
Lohana (traders from Lohanpur, although not all Lohanas were Memon), or Bania 
(often regarded as Hindu traders, although some were Memon, and thus, Muslim) .13 
In addition, there was a small Muslim Khumbar (‘Kumbaro’) population of often 
13 Zanzibar National Archive, ZNA AB 1/36: Reconstitution of the Committee of the Sir Euan Smith 
Madrasa .
158 Roman Loimeier
itinerant petty traders who are today pot-makers in Makunduchi, as well as a small 
group of Catholic Indians from Portuguese Goa, and a group of about 300 Hindus 
(Martin 1978: 36) .
This situation was further complicated by the fact that the terms ‘Bohora’ (as de-
rived from the Gujarati term vohorvun, trader) and ‘Khōja’ as well as ‘Kokni,’ ‘Kum-
baro,’ ‘Bania,’ or ‘Lohana’ did not necessarily denote religious affiliation, but could 
also mean an occupational and / or social group that might be Sunnī or Hindu rather 
than Shīʿī-Ismāʿīlī (Khōja or Bohora) . Religious and / or occupational groups were 
finally divided by non-religious splits, sometimes seeking to legitimize these splits 
as socio-ethnic arguments . The Memon community in Zanzibar thus split into two 
communities between 1945 and 1956,14 namely the ‘Hindu Sunni Kokni Jamāʿat’ 
(which became Shāfiʿī) and the ‘Cutch Memon Association’ (which remained 
Ḥanafī) . The Khōja group in Zanzibar equally split due to disputes over the politi-
cal reforms started by the Aga Khan in India: the dissident Shīʿa Khōja-Ithnāʿshara 
community emerged in fact from the larger Khōja-Ismāʿīlī-group in the course of the 
19th century, when the political and religious leader of this group (the ‘Aga Khan’) 
had to flee Iran and settled in Bombay in 1844 . When he began to impose his au-
thority over the Khōja-Ismāʿīlī community there, a number of Khōja-Ismāʿīlīs split 
and established the ‘Sunni-Khōja’ group (in India in 1869) and the Shīʿa Khōja-
Ithnāʿshara group (in India and East Africa in 1877) (Sheriff 2016: 8) .15 However, 
the new Ithnāʿshara Khōja group refused to mix with non-Khōja Ithnāʿshara Indian 
Muslims . Equally, the Bohora community (dāʿwat, lit . ‘cause’) has seen splits due to 
the fact that the community’s leadership tried to secure Bohora ‘orthodoxy’ with re-
spect to other Ismāʿīlī-groups in both colonial and post-colonial times by practicing 
baraat, the social ostracism / exclusion of dissident members . Baraat, in fact, excludes 
dissident Bohoras from religious rituals performed by Bohora scholars, including 
the dāʿī al-muṭlaq. It can amount to exclusion from the complete spiritual and social 
sphere, as well as the economic, educational and welfare services of the dāʿwat (Blank 
2001: 180f ) . In January 1979 and June 1981 Bohora orthodoxy was stressed in a 
number of pronouncements of the dāʿī al-muṭlaq regarding dress and personal com-
portment . Since then, Bohora women have switched to the ‘typical’ Bohora burqa 
and its rida, a bonnet which can be used as a facial veil, while men were compelled 
to wear a beard as a sign of Bohora identity and loyalty towards the dāʿī al-muṭlaq 
(Blank 2001: 184) . Communities such as the Bohoras and the Khōjas, in addition, 
refused to pray with other Muslims in their respective mosques and had their own 
Jamāʿat Khānas .
14 Zanzibar National Archive, ZNA AB 22/51: Kokni Jamat .
15 Even today members of both communities refuse to talk about the reasons for the split .
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British Economic Policies in Zanzibar
On 7 November 1890, Britain assumed full political control over the Sultanate of 
Zanzibar, making it a British Protectorate until 12 December 1963, when it became 
independent again (see Loimeier 2009) . While Zanzibar underwent thorough politi-
cal and administrative change in the colonial period, most Zanzibaris were preoc-
cupied with economic development after 1890 . Abolition in particular, which was 
implemented between 1890 and 1897, soon turned out to be a major problem for 
the British . They feared “that freed slaves would seek to be independent peasants, the 
clove industry would collapse, the already heavily indebted Arab landowners would 
become bankrupt, and the government would lose its main source of revenue” (Ba-
kari 2001: 49) . However, few slaves actually achieved emancipation . Most continued 
to work as contractors on the plantations of their former owners (Cooper 1980: 
84ff) . As tenants however, the former slaves were free to work part-time on their 
own plots of land, creating an increasing shortage of plantation labor . The contract 
system was soon abandoned in favor of a wage labor system that allowed former 
slaves to stay as squatters on the plantations while working . This system put increas-
ing financial pressure on the plantation owners . Consequently, they started to hire 
seasonal pickers from the early 1900s . These migrant workers, often Nyamwesi from 
central Tanganyika, soon settled permanently (Flint 1965: 650; Cooper 1980: 92ff) . 
The move from “slaves to squatters” (Cooper 1980), and later to wage laborers, was 
orchestrated by the British to prevent a shortage of labor threatening the plantation 
economy (Sheriff 1991: 117–123; Nisula 1999: 226) .
Zanzibar’s Arab plantation owners not only had to survive the abolition of slav-
ery, which led to increasing indebtedness since they had to pay now for labor, they 
also had to survive economic depression, with the clove price starting to drop in the 
late 1920s . As a result, mortgaging of trees and land increased (Cooper 1980: 139) . 
Many farmers lost all their trees, while others could no longer maintain their planta-
tions and their creditors, often Indians, began to take over their properties (Cooper 
1980: 142) . The British authorities tried to stop the demise of the Arab plantations 
and the rise of an Indian creditor and landowner class by establishing the Clove 
Growers’ Association (CGA) in 1927 . The CGA provided low-interest harvesting 
loans, storage space and minimum selling prices to plantation owners, and was re-
sponsible for marketing the clove harvest . Its goal was to save ‘Arab’ plantations, as 
‘Arabs’ and not Indians were seen as the major pillar of British rule (see Shao 1992 
and Gilbert 2004) . When the CGA loan-system was abolished in 1928, membership 
fell rapidly, and Indians continued to buy clove plantations . Consequently, Indian 
clove tree ownership grew from 5 % in 1922 to almost 50 % in 1933 (Turki 1987: 
45) . The abolition of slavery, the resulting shortage of labor, the world economic 
depression, and the fluctuation of the clove price, as well as the dispossession of Zan-
zibar’s mainland dominions were instrumental in the demise of the big plantation 
owners . Even colonial officials started to consider the big landlords a ‘spent force,’ 
with peasantization of the clove economy seen as an alternative (Bakari 2001: 50) . To 
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stop the demise of the big ‘Arab’ plantations and the rise of Indian plantation own-
ers, and ignoring the protests of the Indian National Association (INA), the British 
transformed the CGA into a government body in 1934, authorized to license clove 
dealers and to inspect produce . In 1937 the CGA became the sole buyer of cloves .
British Racial Policies in Zanzibar
From the late 19th century, race and skin color became increasingly paramount in 
Zanzibar . The British administration was particularly concerned with questions of 
how to identify and treat the different members of the Zanzibari population, and 
introduced the concept of a ‘natural hierarchy of races .’ Colonial history thus has to 
be seen as a history of framing: the framing of societies, regions, religions, and races . 
Such processes of framing informed ethnic classifications and led to the construc-
tion of races in Zanzibar in colonial times and a subsequent, distinct ‘racialization’ 
of Zanzibar’s public life (Purpura 1997: 163) .16 Even in one of the last Department 
of Education (DoE) annual reports, the Protectorate was described as having been 
“ruled by Arab Sultans since the end of the 17th century . The Arab and the indig-
enous African population is exclusively Muslim, and Islam is the official religion .”17 
The dynamics of racialization again touched both public and private lives, and had 
lasting effects on pro-independence politics, the 1964 revolution, and beyond . The 
British colonial view, namely that “Zanzibar was an Arab land,” for instance, was 
used by Zanzibar’s revolutionaries to legitimize the revolution in and beyond 1964 . 
In their concept of colonial society, the British occupied the highest rank . As British 
colonial rule was based on indirect rule and consequently sought to instrumentalize 
the Omani ruling elite to implement its policies, Zanzibar’s Arab population was sec-
ond in colonial racial hierarchies .18 In 1917, Zanzibar’s British Resident Pearce thus 
stated in his education report that the population of about 200,000 was divided into 
different ethnic groups . “For facility of reference,” these complex ethnic and religious 
structures were simplified by a division of the population into three ‘classes’:
16 British efforts to identify and frame Zanzibar’s populations also became apparent in the colonial-
era censuses (1910, 1921, 1924, 1931, 1948, and 1958) . From the 1930s on, census data become 
increasingly accurate, with the censuses of 1948 and 1958 the only two to present a detailed picture 
of Zanzibar’s population . Later census data was also increasingly detailed with respect to issues such as 
religious affiliation . The 1948 census (Zanzibar National Archive, ZNA AB 33/7) thus registered 21 dif-
ferent religions: ‘Roman-Catholic,’ ‘Christian,’ ‘protestant,’ ‘Hindu [so stated],’ ‘Brahimin,’ ‘Vaishya,’ 
‘Sanatan Dharamist,’ ‘Ārya Samāj,’ ‘Islam [so stated],’ ‘Suni [sic] Shafi,’ ‘Suni [sic] Hanafi,’ ‘Suni [sic] 
Maliki,’ ‘Shia Ismaili Khoja,’ ‘Shia Ithnasherikhoja [sic],’ ‘Shia Bohora,’ ‘Shia Ibadhi,’ ‘Jains,’ ‘Sikhs,’ 
‘Zoroastrians,’ ‘Buddhists,’ and ‘unspecified .’
17 Zanzibar National Archive, ZNA BA 5/34: Annual Report 1964 .
18 For a general discussion about questions of ‘race’ and ‘identity’ in colonial times, see Glassman (2000 
and 2004) .
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Zanzibar possesses a cosmopolitan population and rightly to deal with the 
problem of education, it is desirable to appreciate the varying interests of the 
races and communities involved . This diversity of population, concentrated as 
it is in a small area, tends to complicate the question . The Asiatic and African 
populations of Zanzibar may be divided into three distinct races, the members 
of which differ in mentality, in modes of life and in aspirations . With the 
exception of about 2,000 Hindus, all are Muslims, but with little religious 
coherence or regard for each other . The first class comprises the Arabs, who 
represent the aristocracy and the land owning community (c . 9,000); the sec-
ond class includes the British Indian communities (c . 10,000) . These people 
are almost exclusively commercial; they are town-dwellers, constitute the great 
shop keeping class, and represent powerful influences in Zanzibar; the third 
class comprises the ‘Swahili’ or the African ‘negroes’ settled in Zanzibar: He 
may or may not have a few drops of Arab blood in his veins . He represents 
90 % of the population, and both Arabs and Indians look down on him as an 
inferior person; but it should be understood that he is far superior to the pagan 
Negro of the mainland .19
Since the British regarded the Arabs as the ruling elite and were prepared to grant 
them a number of privileges, it became increasingly important for Zanzibaris to be 
counted and registered as Arab . This explains the rapid statistical growth of ‘Arabs’ 
in colonial times .20 Many of these ‘Arabs’ were not plantation owners or members 
of the ruling family, but petty traders and small rural shopkeepers as well as small 
farmers (Purpura 1997: 160) . Changes in perception or self-definition may have also 
contributed to the growth of the ‘Arab’ population, as did intermarriage between 
Arab landlords and former slaves, which became widespread . To rise socially, parents 
and offspring from these marriages tended to portray themselves as ‘Arab .’ Another 
major explanation for the growth of the Arab (and Indian) population was the food 
rationing system in WWII, which provided preferential treatment for Arabs and 
Indians (Asians) . These groups were entitled to rice rations, while Africans received 
only maize and beans, a regulation that gave birth to the slogan Njaa ndiyo ilizaa 
makabila haya hapa Zanzibar (famine created these tribes here in Zanzibar) (Mali-
yamkono 2000: 5) .
Ranking below the ‘Arab’ population, ‘Indians’ came second in colonial hierar-
chies . And like the Arab population, the Indian communities were represented by 
a number of associations . The largest, the Indian (National) Association, was estab-
lished in 1914 (according to Mapuri in 1910; Mapuri 1996: 12), having emerged 
from the Indian Merchants’ Association (est . 1905) (Turki 1987: 39) . Under the 
19 Zanzibar National Archive, ZNA AB 1/224: 1913 report on education; emphases in original .
20 In fact, Zanzibar’s Arab population grew rather out of proportion in the first decades of the 20th 
century . Between 1924 and 1931 the Arab share of the population rose by 38 %, from 8 .7 % to 14 .2 %, 
and had risen to 16 .9 % by 1948 (see Prunier 1998) .
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leadership of Seth Yusufali A . Karimji, Sir Tayabali Karimji, Tayyibali Ismailji Jivanji, 
Mohammed N . Jindani, Jaffer Hassin Manji, and Mulji Mathuradas, it fought for 
the economic interests of Indian traders and businessmen, as in the clove boycott 
movement of the 1930s . In politics, Indians did not feature prominently until post-
independence, with few exceptions, including members of the Karimji Jivanji and 
Hussaynali families, who were active in the Indian National Association (INA), and 
Rati Bulsara,21 the editor of The ʿAdal Inṣāf, the major Indian paper aside from The 
Samachar .22 There were also smaller Indian associations, based on religious, ethnic, 
and occupational affiliations, but they were not politically active .
The British tried to understand and reproduce the heterogeneity of the Indian 
population in their racial policies . To do so, they organized the Indian communi-
ties into subgroups according to religious, ethnic, regional, and social patterns . In 
religious terms, the British registered Hindus, Muslims, ‘Parsees’ (Zoroastrians), and 
Catholics (from Goa) . In regional terms, they identified immigrants from Gujarat, in 
particular Kutch and Kathiawar, as well as the town of Surat . There were also some 
Southern Indians, again divided into different groups . In political terms, there were 
the Hindoo Union, the Sikh community, the Goan community, the Zoroastrian 
(‘Parsee’) community, the Hindu Mandal (Hindu community), the Baharania As-
sociation, and the Cutch Memon Association, as well as the Kokni Jamat . This latter 
group was confusingly called ‘Hindu Sunni,’ yet, in reality was the Sunni-Shāfiʿī 
fraction of the Memon community from which it had split .23 In 1945, the Brit-
ish administration registered seven ‘Indian’ religious communities (totaling 13,025 
people): the ‘Hindu community’ (3452), the ‘Khōja-Ismāʿīlī community’ (2400), 
the ‘Sunnī community’ (i .e . Memon, the Kokni Jamat; 2313), the ‘Ithnāʿshara com-
munity’ (2000, mostly Khōja-Ithnāʿashara), the ‘Bohora community’ (1377), the 
‘Goan community’ (721, who were Portuguese subjects), and the ‘Parsee  community’ 
21 Rati Bulsara (also written Rutti Balsara) was one of the few politically active Indians, working as the 
Indian-Parsee editor of The ʿAdal Inṣāf, which ran from 1948 to 1964 . It was one of the leading ‘Indian’ 
papers in Zanzibar at the time, boasting Zanzibar’s most sophisticated printing press . In 1957, Rati 
Bulsara won the 1957 Stone Town constituency seat in the first Legislative Council (LegCo) elections 
for the Zanzibar National Party (ZNP) . He also was publicity secretary of the ZNP . In 1959, he was 
accused of anti-colonial propaganda and banned from publishing for 12 months (Mwongozi, 22 May 
1959) . In 1961, he stood again as the ZNP candidate for the Stone Town seat (see Barwani et al . 2003: 
163, interview with Amani Thani) . Rati Bulsara was related to Bomi and Jer Bulsara, both teachers and 
parents of Faruk Bulsara, who became famous as Freddie Mercury .
22 Most Indian newspapers published in East Africa since the early 20th century have been published in 
Gujarati . The Indian community in Zanzibar started publishing Akhbār (‘News’) in 1907, which later 
became the Sunday newspaper The Samachar, edited by Fazel J . Master . Like most papers, The Samachar 
stopped publishing after the 1968 revolution . In 1922, Biharlal N . Anantani founded another Sunday 
paper, the Zanzibar Voice, which also stopped publication in 1968 . The second major paper for the 
Indian community was another Sunday paper, The ʿAdal Inṣāf (‘The Just and Fair’), established by Rati 
Bulsara in 1948 .
23 Zanzibar National Archive, ZNA AB 22/46: Shia Khoja Ithnasheri Community .
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(212) .24 These communities tried to conserve their own identity and, for instance, 
insisted on their own schools for religious education (see Loimeier 2009) .25
The various Shīʿī groups undoubtedly presented the most difficult task for the 
British in their efforts to compartmentalize the population . There were at least 
three major affiliations: the Shīʿa Khōja-Ithnāʿshara community; the Shīʿa Imāmī 
Ismāʿīliyya Supreme Council, i .e . those Khōja who were affiliated with the Aga 
Khan-led Khōja-Ismāʿīlī-(Nizarī)-group; and the Bohora-Ismāʿīlī community, which 
followed their own dāʿī al-muṭlaq . Due to the unique character of some Indian com-
munities, like the Ārya Samāj (‘Community of Nobles’),26 the British were never 
certain how to deal with them . In a note of the Protectorate administration of 27 
March 1930, Ārya Samāj was described as such:
The Arye Samaj [sic] is not a Sect but an assembly of believers of the Vedas 
(Ancient Hindoo Scriptures) . It does not include any member of the tradi-
tional sects (Jains, Vaisnavas, Mahtais, Sikhs) for the reason that membership 
of the Arye Samaj implies renunciation in any belief of ‘caste .’ The Aryans 
stand to Hindooism as Protestantism stands to Roman Catholicism . It is a 
movement of reformation and return to simple ‘first doctrines .’ In her self-
presentation, the Arye Samaj claimed to be a ‘Vedic Church’ that believed in 
the omni-presence of God, that propagates science (vidya) and that would 
fight against ignorance (avidya) .27
24 Zanzibar National Archive, ZNA AD 7/20: Indian Education 1945 .
25 In 1963, Zanzibar’s ‘Stone Town’ had 48 mosques, four Hindu and one Buddhist temple, two 
churches, and a Zoroastrian place of worship (see Sheriff and Jafferji 1998) .
26 The Ārya Samāj movement was established by the Shivaite Swami Dayananda Saraswati (1824–
1883) in Gujarat in 1875 . It became an important reform movement in Northern and Western India 
(see van der Veer 1994: 65ff), proposing a return to the ‘pure’ religion of the Vedas and the rejection of 
all post-Vedic texts . In fact, Dayananda wanted to create “a religion of the book” (van der Veer 1994: 
65) like Christianity and Islam . He thus propagated the translation of the Vedic scriptures from Sanskrit 
into Hindi, and Ārya Samāj “discovered in Hinduism a monotheistic god, a book, and congregational 
worship .” This was “a substantial transformation of a set of polytheistic traditions (and led to the cre-
ation of modern Hinduism)” (van der Veer 2001: 27) . Ārya Samāj became a religious community in 
which all religious power gravitated towards the laity (despite its stress on Brahmanical scripture and 
ritual) . The Vedic religion was proclaimed as a rational religion of the Aryan people . Ārya Samāj also 
stressed the importance of modern education, fought against the Hindu pantheon and iconic worship, 
and even attacked the caste system: whatever caste one had, one could become a priest and officiate 
in the Vedic sacrifice of the Ārya Samāj (functions formerly restricted to the Brahmans) (van der Veer 
2001: 52) . The movement also defended the sacredness of the cow and initiated the ‘Cow Protection 
Movement,’ which had a distinct anti-Muslim undercurrent . In a structural parallel to Muslim reform 
movements, where reformers attacked established religious scholars’ hegemonic control of scriptural 
interpretation, Ārya Samāj attacked the Brahmans role as the central intermediaries between the texts 
and the pious population .
27 Zanzibar National Archive, ZNA AB 82/683: Public holidays .
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The Indians in Zanzibar after the Revolution of 1964
Peace in Zanzibar was disrupted in 1964 . A revolutionary rising on the morning 
of 12 January ousted the Sultan and Muhammad Shamte’s government, which had 
governed Zanzibar as an independent state for less than a month, having taken pow-
er on 10 December 1963 .28 Led by John Okello, the revolutionaries encountered 
little resistance and occupied all major strategic positions by 4 pm (see Clayton 1981; 
Petterson 2002; Mrina and Mattoke 1980; Wimmelbücker 2001; as well as Loimeier 
2006 and 2009) . Over the following days, the revolution assumed a more organized 
character, with the Afro Shirazi Party (ASP) Youth League and Umma cadres29 to-
gether forming the Revolutionary Council (RC) on January 16 . Nevertheless, anar-
chic killings in both urban and rural areas continued for some days, as did other acts 
of ‘revolutionary violence’ and abuse of power . Meanwhile, control over the revolu-
tion passed into Zanzibari hands . In Raha Leo, the new revolutionary center of Zan-
zibar, Karume, ‘Babu,’ and the other revolutionaries formed the leadership which 
proclaimed the first revolutionary government of Zanzibar on 24 January . By then 
it was clear that Okello and his group had lost their influence over the government 
and the Revolutionary Council . On 20 February 1964, Okello himself was deported 
to mainland Tanganyika (Clayton 1981: 93) . Zanzibar was renamed the ‘People’s 
Republic of Zanzibar and Pemba’ and a policy of nationalization was implemented . 
Nationalization would considerably change the social set-up of the country . The 
new regime soon changed established economic structures and, among other things, 
imposed a trade monopoly, a policy which hit Indian shop owners, who were forced 
to close as soon as their stock was exhausted . On 8 October 1964, the External Trade 
Corporation became the sole importer-exporter of all goods except cloves, which 
were marketed by the Zanzibar State Trading Company . On 1 November 1964, the 
first state shop was opened in Miembini (Martin 1978: 59, 61) . The nationaliza-
tion of trade and the economy, as symbolized by the creation of the Zanzibar State 
Trading Company, led to the collapse of the economy within a few years . From June 
1971, Zanzibar relied on a system of food rationing for rice, flour and sugar, based 
on food cards and the central distribution of food through 27 state shops .
As a result of the revolution and its aftermath, Zanzibar’s demographic structure 
changed decisively, not because thousands of Zanzibaris were killed in the first days 
of the revolution, but rather because many branded ‘non-Zanzibaris’ were either 
deported, forced to emigrate, or fled the islands as refugees over the coming years 
(Bakari 2001: 79) . The harassment and arbitrary imprisonment of Arabs, Comorians 
and Indians continued into the 1970s (Clayton 1981: 124) . In November 1964, 
28 For a history of the revolution and its aftermath see Loimeier (forthcoming) .
29 The Afro Shirazi Party (ASP, led by Abeid Amani Karume) and Umma (led by Abdurrahman ‘Babu’) 
parties formed in the late 1950s and early 1960s and represented a majority of the ‘African’ constitu-
ency in Zanzibar . Both ASP and Umma advocated radical reforms to Zanzibar’s social and economic 
system .
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350 civil servants of mostly Arab origin were detained, with similar waves of arrests 
following in May 1966, March 1968, and in the aftermath of an alleged coup at-
tempt against Karume in 1969, as well as in April 1972, after Karume’s assassination 
(see Kharusi 1967 and 1969; Lodhi, Rydström and Rydström 1979: 88) . Moreover, 
the houses of the leading Arabs and Indians, in particular the al-Barwānī, al-Lamkī 
and Karimji families, were taken over by the government in February and March 
1964 .30
The Indian population of Zanzibar, which had not supported the Afro Shirazi 
Party or the revolution, also suffered . Many Indians were killed or fled . Due to their 
hegemonic position in trade and business, Indians encountered widespread animos-
ity in Zanzibar . In the countryside, Indian shop-owners and money-lenders had 
ruled supreme until the revolution, which African Zanzibaris used to wipe out the 
money-lenders and the debts they owed to them . Anti-Indian feeling had been ram-
pant before the revolution, especially during the late 1950s zama za siasa (time of 
politics) . In an account of life in Zanzibar, Abdul Sheriff wrote that his family often 
went on holiday to Jambiani on the East Coast, where he played with local children . 
However, when the zama za siasa came, the village children were told by their par-
ents that they should stop playing with Indians (msicheze na hawa Wahindi) (Abdul 
Sheriff in Sauda Barwani et .al . 2003: 316) .
In addition to massacres and harassment of ‘non-Africans,’ most Arabs and Indi-
ans (around 13,000) were expelled from Zanzibar in 1964 . Around 8,000–10,000 
Arabs eventually settled in Oman (Clayton 1981: 99), while those who stayed in 
Zanzibar started to redefine themselves as ‘Africans .’ In 1967/68 another exodus of 
Indians took place, as the stocks that had so far enabled the (mostly Indian) shop-
keepers to sell goods on the black market were exhausted, and no change in the 
political or economic situation was in sight . The situation became even more precari-
ous when Karume, who wanted to eradicate all non-African influence in Zanzibar, 
announced a plan to forcefully marry ‘Asian’ girls to Africans (Martin 1978: 70) . On 
6 September 1970, four girls from Indian (allegedly Persian, i .e . ‘Parsee’) families 
were taken from their families and married that day by member of the Revolution-
ary Council Qāḍī Hamid Ameir Ali (Clayton 1981: 124) to other elderly council 
members . At a meeting Karume declared: “In colonial times, the Arabs took African 
concubines without bothering to marry them . Now that we are in power the shoe is 
on the other foot” (Clayton 1981: 124) . Those members of the girls’ families who 
protested were beaten and deported, and a number of Indian families were forced 
to leave the country . Many of these families tried to flee with their daughters, and 
30 The expropriation of the Karimji family’s property / wealth (not only in Zanzibar but also on the 
mainland) in the context of the Nyerere’s ‘nationalization’ policies in the late 1960s is documented in 
detail in Oonk (2009: 162–167) . In Zanzibar, the family villa of Sir Tayabali Karimji was taken over by 
the revolutionaries and became Zanzibar’s ‘State Guest House .’ The Karimji Hospital which had also 
been built by Sir Tayabali Karimji was nationalized and became the V . I . Lenin Hospital, only to be 
renamed Mnazi Mmoja Hospital in the 1980s (Sheriff 2016: 9) .
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there were some cases of suicide among Indian girls (Clayton 1981: 124) .31 Indeed, 
the forced marriages are still remembered by Indians as a traumatic time .32 The final 
blow for the Indian communities came on 16 March 1971, when Karume told all 
Asians that they had to leave Zanzibar within a year (Clayton 1981: 123) . At the 
time, 6,000 Arabs and Asians were still living in Zanzibar . From 30 June 1971, these 
groups were no longer given licenses for their shops . By 1972, only 3,500 Arabs 
and Asians remained in Zanzibar . In total, 35,000 people had left Zanzibar between 
1964 and 1972 (Martin 1978: 71) . In the end, the revolution obviously led to a sig-
nificant reduction of the different Indian communities . Today, Indian communities 
have not recovered from the revolution, the subsequent mass exodus and the restric-
tive economic policies of the revolutionary governments until the mid-1980s .
The Indian Communities in Zanzibar Today
Nevertheless, the Indian presence in Zanzibar continues in a number of places today . 
In religious terms, the two remaining temples of the Hindu community have to be 
mentioned, namely, the ‘Shree Shiv Shakti Mandir’ in Forodhani / Hurumzi (built 
in 1958 and opened in 1959 as a temple dedicated to Ram) and the Ārya Samāj 
Temple in Forodhani (completed 1906) . The Jamāʿat Khāna of the Khōja-Ismāʿīlīs in 
Forodhani (built in 1838, rebuilt and expanded in 1905) is still standing, as are three 
pre-1900 Jamāʿat Khānas of the Bohoras in Soko Mohogo, Kajificheni / Mkunazini 
(Ismailji Jivanji) and Kiponda (Mulla Abdulali Walliji) . There are also the Ithnāʿsharī 
mosques in Kajificheni / Hamamni (Hujjatul Islam, built 1894/1895), Kiponda (Ku-
watul Islam, 1878) and Malindi (Matemni, 1861 by Aḥmad b . Nuʿman), as well 
as the Sunni-Ḥanafī-Memon community mosque and school in Kajificheni / Mku-
nazini (1870s) . Catholic Goans also have a parish around St . Joseph’s church . Fi-
nally, there are the cemeteries of the different religious communities, as well as the 
Hindu Crematory in Kiungani .33 The Indian communities set up most cemeteries 
in Vuga and the adjacent areas of Ng’ambo: the Khōja-Ismāʿīlī cemetery on the 
seashore in Mnazi Moja, which has been largely swallowed up by the Mnazi Moja 
hospital grounds; the Khōja-Ithnāʿsharī cemetery in Vuga (including Sheriff Dewji’s 
family vault just behind the Taasisi building), which was established after the split 
31 See also Martin on forced marriages . He writes about four ‘Persian’ girls who were clandestinely 
taken away on 28 February 1973, a year after Karume’s assassination . Their flight took them by dhow 
to the mainland, then across the Kenyan border to Mombasa, and from there via Karachi to Teheran 
(Martin 1978: 70–71) .
32 Bohoras maintain they were particularly lucky, as they had expatriated their girls to the mainland in 
time . Bohoras also claim that Bohora women started to dress in a particularly unfashionable ‘Bohora’ 
style dress (burqa and rida) . This is a false memory, though, as the dāʿī al-muṭlaq first introduced the 
new Bohora dress for women in 1979 (Blank 2001: 184) .
33 Hindus believe their dead have to be cremated and the ashes scattered in a river or the sea . Thus, they 
established their ghat (crematory) in Kiungani, which is close to the ocean (see Issa 1995: 75) .
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of the group from the Khōja-Ismāʿīlīs in 1877; the Bohora cemetery situated in 
Kikwajuni, close to the former House of Representatives; the Sunni-Ḥanafī-Memon 
graveyard on the Kilimani Road, which is opposite the old Golf Course and near 
the ‘Parsee’ cemetery on Ziwani Road; the larger Khōja-Ithnāʿsharī graveyard in Mi-
chenzani / Raha Leo (Issa 1995: 68/69); and the (‘mainstream’) Ithnāʿsharī cemetery 
in Mwembeladu / Ng’ambo (Penrad 1995) .
Indians also retain a significant economic presence, with a number of retail, tex-
tile, stationary, book and copy shops; major hotels, in particular, those linked with 
the Aga Khan Foundation (Serena); the Silk Road, Radha Food House, and Maha-
raja restaurants; at least one barber shop and one dhobi (laundry); antiques shops in 
Gizenga and Kenyatta Road (Zanzibar Gallery, Memories of Zanzibar, Lookmanji); 
Goan shops (photo-studios in particular, the Capital Arts Studio; tourist equip-
ment, electronic); tour operators (such as Mitu), the Madrasa Resource Centre in 
Malindi;34 and the derelict Shree Vanikmahajan Union Hall in Kajificheni, which 
was built in 1957 . However, the communities remain relatively small . In 2010, there 
were around 1,400 Indians, including about 400 Bohoras, 300 Khōjas, 400 Hindus, 
200 Ithnāʿsharīs, 50 Goans, some Sikhs and Memons, as well as a few Zoroastrians . 
In 1964, Zanzibar’s Indian population had been 17,000 (Kaid Lookmanji . 7 August 
2010, Vishwas Joshi, 6 August 2010, Abdul Sheriff, 18 August 2010; Zahir Bhalloo 
and Iqbal Akhtar, 4 August 2010) .
The contemporary home of the Hindu community in Zanzibar is the Shree Shiv 
Shakti Mandir in Hurumzi, which was built for a community of 4,000 Hindus in 
Zanzibar in the late 1950s . Between 1964 and 1968, however, most Hindus fled to 
Dar es Salaam (Joshi sr ., 2 August 2010) . In Zanzibar, the Hindu community remains 
linked with the group of the ‘Shirdi’ Sai Baba in India,35 and can be called ‘Shivaist’ 
in orientation . Recently, the temple in Zanzibar was taken over by a new Brahmin 
priest from Mombasa, as the old priest had fled with the temple’s money . The new 
priest introduced stricter temple discipline and excluded women from entering the 
inner sanctuary of the Shiva shrine . He also led the daily rituals and prayers which 
were recited in Gujarati . Gujarati and English were also the accepted languages in the 
Ārya Samāj temple, although prayers there were recited in Sanskrit . The Ārya Samāj 
group in Zanzibar was established in 1904 by Gokaldas Sunderji Robanath, who had 
come to Zanzibar at the age of nine, establishing the Ārya Samāj temple and the Ārya 
Kanya Vidyalaya (Girls’ School) in 1906 . He left Zanzibar after the revolution and 
died in Britain in 1967 . In 2010, the Ārya Samāj community was rather small, with 
34 Like many other projects in Zanzibar, the Madrasa Resource Centre was also financed by the Aga 
Khan Foundation . The foundation can thus be seen as a transnational body seeking to exert influence 
on national policies by representing Khōja-Ismāʿīlī interests .
35 The Shirdi Sai Baba (the ‘holy father from Shirdi,’ c . 1838–1918) settled as a guru and yogi in Shirdi 
near Bombay in 1856 . His true name is unknown, he refused to answer questions about it . He tried to 
reconcile Hindus and Muslims . Today, a number of gurus such as the Sathya Sai Baba (b . 1926) claim 
to be re-incarnations of the Shirdi Sai Baba .
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ten to twenty members gathering for prayers on Saturday after 5 .30 pm (my own 
observations, 20 August 2010) .
Conclusion
The diaspora in East Africa illustrates that the four dominant issues of Indian com-
munalism, namely, regional and social descent (caste, jati),36 occupation and religion 
continue to define the development of the Indian communities . Gujaratis do not 
mingle with Punjabis, nor Goans with Sindhis; equally, Muslims keep their distance 
from Hindus and vice versa (as do Christians) . Even among Muslims, ‘sectarian’ 
orientations prevail, especially among the different Shīʿī groups . Finally, social origin 
and occupational background continue to inform everyday interaction and rein-
force religious and regional identities . The divide between Khōjas and Bohoras – a 
divide even within the Ismāʿīliyya – corresponds to a divide between higher-ranking 
Lohanas (Khōjas) and lower-ranking Bohoras, who were often craftsmen, artisans, 
locksmiths, petty traders, and ironmongers when they came to East Africa .37 The 
longevity of communal divisions amongst Indians in East Africa is remarkable as 
it runs against an argument implicit in the academic literature on migration and 
diaspora: namely, that outside pressure, crisis and oppression directed against a spe-
cific ethnic / religious and / or social group reduces or even prevents conflict among 
minorities who wish to defend themselves in an inimical environment . The history 
and development of the Indian communities in East Africa shows, however, that 
fragmented communities may remain fragmented even under conditions of duress . 
At the same time, in postcolonial times Indian communities have come under serious 
pressure to either ‘quit’ or ‘conform’ by integrating themselves into East Africa’s new 
nation states . However, the pressure on Indians to commit themselves completely to 
a new identity and to become exclusively ‘Kenyan’ or ‘Tanzanian’ was unacceptable 
to most, not only because it was linked with the forced nationalization of property, 
but also because it would have meant abandoning identification with two impor-
tant ‘cosmopolitan’ legacies, namely the British Commonwealth38 and the Indian 
diaspora worldwide and its roots in India (and, to a lesser degree, Pakistan) .
36 I define ‘caste’ here as a basic concept of social organization that is informed by occupational func-
tions and a ritual division of work . ‘Castes’ unite persons and groups that are linked by bounds of blood 
and consequently stress endogamous marriage . The true character of a specific ‘caste’ can be identified 
only in relationship and contrast to other ‘castes’ that are linked to each other in social, political, reli-
gious and economic terms (see Michaels 2006: 176/177, 184) .
37 As the poorest Indian community in Zanzibar, the Bohoras suffered significantly less in the revolu-
tion and its aftermath than Ithnāʿsharīs and Khōjas . Indeed, the Bohoras were even able to take over 
some of the business of the other Indian groups, especially the Khōjas, in the 1980s . As a result, many 
Bohoras have become traders and shop-owners and dominate these businesses today, even more than 
Khōjas did before 1964 . To a certain degree, this is also true for the Tanzanian mainland .
38 Most Indians in East Africa had a British passport and were rather unwilling to exchange these for 
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The fragmented character of the Indian diaspora in East Africa extends to Zanzibar, 
where duress has been even more severe than in other parts of East Africa (with the 
exception of Uganda in 1972) . Despite virtually collapsing after the revolution and 
not having recovered today, Indian groups in Zanzibar still maintain communal ex-
clusivities and refuse to intermarry with other Indian groups or non-Indians . Equal-
ly, political oppression has made integration into post-revolutionary Zanzibar virtu-
ally impossible for Indians, and has consequently prevented them from developing 
an idea of ‘belonging’ to the nation . The established patterns of non-intermarriage 
practiced in India thus remain current in both East Africa and Zanzibar . Clearly, 
communal issues prevail and are not about to be dissolved in the foreseeable future . 
Even in Zanzibar, which has a tiny Indian population today, there is nothing like a 
homogeneous Indian community . Indians are rather split into different fractions and 
distinct communities that reject intermarriage, even if there are no open conflicts .
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new Ugandan, Kenyan, or Tanzanian passports . When ethnic cleansing (as in Uganda and Zanzibar) 
or the nationalization of Indian properties (as in Kenya and Tanganyika) started, East Africa’s Indians 
found it relatively easy to migrate to Commonwealth countries such as Great Britain and Canada . 
Canada, especially the federal states of Alberta (Edmonton) and Ontario (Toronto), became a new 
centre of ‘twice displaced’ Indians .
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Part III:  
Politics of Belonging and Violence

Domestic Violence and the Implications of 9 
Belonging: Experiences of Indian Immigrant 
Women in North America
Swati Shirwadkar
This chapter explores the experiences of domestic abuse by female Indian immigrants 
in North America, who are caught between multiple layers of constraints emanating 
from the host community on the one hand, and from belonging to the homeland 
culture on the other . Deprived of access to a violence-free safe space in their private 
lives, these women attempt to pull off a delicate balancing act between life, family 
and culture in the western world .
Cultural diversities due to increased transnational migration have attracted the 
attention of researchers in recent years, bringing out the several dimensions of the 
process as well as the multiple challenges, including that of assimilation into the host 
society . The social cost of migration, particularly for women, is one area that still 
needs attention . Exclusion of immigrants from policies and programs, particularly in 
the case of women, remains an area of concern for both policy makers and activists . 
This is particularly true for domestic violence against women . Gender-based vio-
lence within the private area of the family household is a universally acknowledged 
problem in many societies the world over . However, developed nations, particularly 
North America and Europe, have taken substantial policy and programmatic steps 
to reduce violence against women, especially within the family . Given the recent 
trends of immigration to these countries, there is a growing concern whether these 
policies and programs are useful for accommodating the needs of immigrants, and 
indeed addressing the issue of cultural diversity . This perceived shortcoming espe-
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cially warrants attention in the case of North America, i .e . Canada and the United 
States . What, therefore, are the experiences of Indian immigrant women that render 
it problematic for them to access the benefits of existing policies and programs?
To explore this issue, I will first present a review of studies on domestic violence 
and the Indian cultural context . With this general background in place, I contex-
tualize domestic violence against immigrant Indian women living in Canada and 
the United States in terms of their belonging to the homeland culture . This will 
bring out the complexities of how Indian immigrant women experience domestic 
violence – first in the immediate family context, second in terms of general diasporic 
experience, and third in terms of belonging to a particular homeland culture . In a 
further step, I summarize this exploratory study of age-stratified immigrant Indian 
women, social service workers and the wider community, revealing the constraints 
preventing these women from accessing programs and policies that have been put in 
place to protect them . The conclusion suggests a need for further research into the 
problematic of what it means for an immigrant diaspora to belong to a homeland 
culture . The study highlights how immigrants struggle to become part of the host 
society, suggesting that full access to policies and programs designed to help has yet 
to be achieved .
The Issue of Domestic Abuse
Violence against women is indisputably a universal phenomenon, being firmly root-
ed in different societies and cultures all over the world . Most tragically, domestic 
abuse often goes unnoticed or occurs behind closed doors . The family perspective 
did not see domestic violence as a universal phenomenon perpetrated against wom-
en (Gelles 1993; Gelles and Straus 1988) . However, other research suggests that 
violence is asymmetrical and that women are persistently abused in developed and 
less-developed countries alike (Dobash and Dobash 2005; Heise et al . 1994) . The 
feminist perspective sees wife abuse as an extreme form of male domination as well 
as a socio-historical reality rooted in the structure of patriarchy, pointing to gender 
differences in patterns of domestic violence . Women are without power in social, 
economic or political spheres of life, rendering them dependent and vulnerable (Do-
bash and Dobash 2005) .
Although the feminist perspective has highlighted both the complexities of do-
mestic violence and the institutionalization of gender inequalities, it fails to adequate-
ly address other factors behind the subordination and entrapment of women (Fer-
nandez 1997) . Recent studies draw attention to factors transcending gender, which 
are of particular importance for the study of South Asian communities . M . Jacqui 
Alexander and Chandra Talapade Mohanty have emphasized the need to understand 
genealogies when analyzing women’s experiences (Alexander and Mohanty 1997) . 
The use of ethnicity and gender as significant analytical categories has been deemed 
necessary to contextualize domestic violence among immigrant communities (Abra-
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ham 1999) . Especially in the case of South Asian women, there is a need to be sensi-
tive to the place of origin of immigrant communities . Yet this sensitivity is frequently 
either missing or downplayed by state policy . Analysis of the complicated nature of 
domestic violence in immigrant families points to the involvement of multiple inter-
facing factors like cultural conditioning, racial prejudice, isolation, and immigrant 
status (Abraham 2000) . Thus it is imperative to move beyond a feminist perspective 
when exploring domestic abuse against South Asian immigrant women .
Method
This exploratory study was conducted to identify more specifically the experiences 
and needs of Indian immigrant women living in Canada (and to some extent in the 
United States as well) (Shirwadkar 2004) . The current programmatic approaches and 
policy provisions are contrasted with the actual experience and culture of the abused 
women . I conducted in-depth interviews with a snowball sample of Indian immi-
grant women, in order to identify the issues, barriers, and problems they encounter 
when dealing with domestic violence in the Toronto area and the Southern United 
States; likewise, I conducted telephone interviews with women from other parts of 
the United States . Additional interviews with battered women advocates, activists, 
and prominent community social workers were also used to substantiate and elabo-
rate on the interviews with the immigrant women . There were inevitable limitations, 
first of all due to the shortness of my in-country stay (however, after a gap of some 
ten years, I was able to add some more recent cases, interviewing respondents while 
on visit in India or else by phone), and secondly due to the small number of obser-
vations drawn on, which necessarily reflect only the perceptions and experiences of 
a small group of immigrants . Notwithstanding, the findings suffice to outline the 
main issues facing immigrant women .
One of the main challenges when researching immigrant communities is gain-
ing access to its members and obtaining disclosure on sensitive issues . As I belong to 
India, I was more readily accepted by the immigrant community and could attend 
a variety of formal and informal community activities . I was able to contact com-
munity residents and social workers in connection with celebrating Indian festivals 
and informal family get-togethers . Discussions and observations with these parties 
helped me understand the cultural milieu of the immigrant community and the 
perception of domestic abuse within the immigrant community . These gatherings 
also helped me understand the attitude of the immigrant community to domestic 
abuse . The meaning the community attaches to the issue of wife abuse is different 
from mainstream society . Certain forms of abuse are not only tolerated but may be 
considered legitimate (Rao 1998) . Though most immigrant women admitted that 
domestic violence was a problem, they tended to ascribe the problem to a regional 
Indian community other than their own, especially when we discussed the issue in 
a community setting or in a large group . Moreover, prominent community social 
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workers and activists privately elaborated actual cases of abuse among all the Indian 
communities . Some community members later privately approached me to narrate 
cases of abuse .
Information was sourced via a few domestic violence victims from immigrant 
communities in Toronto and the United States; respondents came from different 
parts of India and were chosen by snowball sampling . As already pointed out, I held 
an advantage in developing trust with these women by being from India myself . Also, 
the short period of my stay in Canada and the United States reduced their worry that 
I might leak their ‘family problem’ to the wider community . Thus, I benefited from 
being an ‘outsider,’ while gaining social access as an ‘insider .’ My interviews with 
the victims were unstructured and some were spread over time . Sometimes victims 
gave information about abuse on the telephone when their husband was not around, 
and sometimes they did it by email . In one case, the extended family of one victim 
found out that she was talking to someone about domestic abuse and put an end to 
her contacts .
In four cases, the abuse was physical, though combined with psychological, spa-
tial, and financial abuse . Two cases involved severe physical abuse . In other cases, 
the abuse was more psychological and financial . However, it has to be noted that in 
the course of discussion most victims concurred that just a slap from the husband 
during an argument could be tolerated . None of these women had ever sought help 
from service providers . One of the physically abused victims eventually confided her 
problem to a community support group, while another was rescued by her maternal 
family members . Even among the physically abused, one victim did not want to end 
the marital relationship . (However, two of the victims had obtained a divorce .) In 
one case, the husband of the abused woman crosschecked if the wife was meeting 
with “the researcher .”
Domestic Violence in India
Crime and violence against women in India has only recently attracted research 
 attention, prompted in part by the Indian women’s movement plus concern over is-
sues like an increasing number of dowry deaths (Kumar 1993) . In India, nearly two 
in five married women experience some form of violence from their husbands . The 
embedded (and structural) nature of violence against women has been captured by 
earlier studies of the status of women in India . These studies have also brought out 
the regional variations in women’s status, reflecting local differences in social struc-
ture and institutions (Karve 1965; Madan 1975; Srinivas 1978; Committee on the 
Status of Women in India 1974) . They have likewise exposed the impact of the patri-
archal, joint family in imposing marriage customs and shaping the role of women .
An Indian woman traditionally faces a range of expectations associated with 
the principle of sewa (selfless service): proficiency in cooking elaborate Indian food, 
looking after in-laws, maintaining respectful and amicable relationships, entertain-
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ing guests, and providing a flow of gifts (Dube 2001) . The construct of femininity 
emphasizes submissiveness, inferiority, docility and dependency, plus the importance 
of the patriarchal family (Shirwadkar 1998) . Deviation from these gender role expec-
tations are likely to meet with different forms of abuse, and lend some justification to 
domestic abuse as an inevitable part of marriage (Busby 1999; Rao 1998) . However, 
there also exists an age and role hierarchy within Indian families, affording some 
women space depending on their role status . With concern growing over this issue, 
recent research in India has highlighted several correlates of domestic violence, such 
as young age at marriage, family hierarchies, poverty, and economic independence 
(Ahuja 1987; Fernandez 1997; Karlekar 1998; Kelkar 1992; Kumari 1989; Mahajan 
1990; Rao 1998) . Gender studies have brought out the class-caste context and the 
rural-urban variations in domestic violence . The latter context helps to elucidate 
how and why such indicators as education or employment may or may not work to 
reduce violence or dowry demands in some regions, and also why strategies adopted 
by women to subvert domination in different communities are more or less effective 
(Deolalikar and Rao 1998; Liddle and Joshi 1986; Mukherjee, Rustagi and Krishnaji 
2001; Raheja and Gold 1996) .
Indian women, moreover, face another problem: the scarcity of policies and 
programs addressing domestic violence in India . Whereas counseling programs are 
court-mandated for men in North America, in India itself this is not the case – there 
the chief recourse for women is to seek help from family counseling cells, though 
they rarely in fact do so . There are also some government-sponsored housing facilities 
set aside for women fleeing violent relationships . A Supreme Court justice criticized 
that these facilities were being run like brothels (Sakal Daily 2001), supporting the 
impression that most state-sponsored programs are counterproductive . However, 
some policy improvement has materialized through recent legislative amendments 
and a proposed domestic violence bill . Women’s organizations have, however, raised 
several reservations against the prospective bill . Apart from problems in defining 
domestic violence, the bill did not clearly give the women the crucial right to remain 
in her matrimonial home (The Lawyers Collective 2001) . Finally, the Prevention of 
Domestic Violence against Women Act was passed in 2006 after many changes, yet 
on the level of implementation many hurdles remain .
This cultural context of domestic abuse in India may prove helpful for analyzing 
the abuse experienced by Indian immigrant women . Here violence within the family 
has to be situated within the larger context of womanhood in Indian culture general-
ly – a culture undergoing turmoil, transition, and reassertion in the era of globaliza-
tion . The experience of the Indian immigrant woman is complicated, however, not 
only by her homeland culture, but also by her immigrant community and the new 
nation where she resides (Bhattacharjee 1997) . This social complexity and cultural 
specificity has led South Asian activists and researchers to voice their dissatisfaction 
with the mainstream battered women’s movement, which tends to focus on only one 
dimension of these women’s lives – the violent relationship (Alexander and Mohanty 
1997; Bhattacharjee 1997) .
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Diaspora and Belonging: Immigrants and Culture
Immigrants who still see themselves as belonging to a homeland cultural context also 
see themselves as constituting a diaspora . The identity of diaspora ethnic groups is 
rendered more dynamic by increasing mobility in the present globalization context 
(Appadurai 1997) . Globalization and increasing migration have brought into focus 
complexities in the notion of boundaries and loyalties, especially in terms of belong-
ing and identity (Koh 2011) . The new diaspora, now being lived out in western 
countries, reproduces its existence through the perceived fact of still belonging to 
the home culture on the plane of life practices, albeit in different circumstances . The 
impact of community is strong among these immigrants, even if it is an imagined 
community (Anderson [1983] 2006) .
It is acknowledged that multiple identities coexist in the case of immigrant 
diasporas (Anthias 2006) . In their working lives Indian Americans strive to be per-
fect professionals, instilling in their children the American values of competitiveness 
and hard work; but at the same time they are at pains to socialize their children in the 
traditional Indian culture to which they belong, through visits to temples, missions, 
voluntary community language schools, and – importantly for our present concern – 
they expect their daughters and wives to comply with traditional roles, as for example 
when entertaining guests with Indian food or taking part in festival rituals . Research 
studies show that there are shifts in beliefs and identity in the new context (Joshi 
2006; Segady and Shirwadkar 2012); hence identity can be flexible . To belong to 
any collectivity, it is important to conform to the prevalent gender norms (Anthias 
2006) . The culture of the ethnic population is not a reified but a dynamic construct . 
In the Indian context for example, while the core beliefs and values may not be easily 
erased (Singh 2000), provision is made for new adaptations . Increasing entry of In-
dian immigrants into the western world does not necessarily mean that the cultural 
roots expressed in core institutions like family, kinship, marriage, and motherhood 
are forgotten . On the contrary, they are reconstituted and used from time to time, 
albeit for different purposes . The institutional impact remains strong, especially in 
the cases of the extended family, kin network, and marriage customs (Karve 1965; 
Madan 1975; Srinivas 1978) . Sociocultural and family obligations, the norms and 
values of a particular culture, are significantly implicated in people’s life cycles, and 
this applies no less to the immigrant context, with the difference that they now need 
to be reconstituted in a rather different situation to their place of origin .
In the altered circumstances of immigration, women may not necessarily be 
aware of the nuances of western legalities, especially those relating to the private 
sphere, which in most South Asian countries is usually treated as a sacrosanct area; 
as a result, legal measures are only considered as the last option; moreover, media-
tion through the larger family-kin network is preferred over social welfare services . 
Though welfare services are common in western countries, certainly compared to the 
South Asian scene, social service workers may be handicapped by a paucity of un-
derstanding or information about the situation of immigrant Indian women (Status 
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of Women Canada 2002) . In the Indian context, issues relating to marital discord 
are considered personal and emotional, a stricture that also applies to the cultural 
socialization of women, which traditionally includes complex layers of family-kin 
networks along with ethnic community ties . Explicating the concept of belonging, 
Nira Yuval-Davis brings out its different levels, which include social locations, emo-
tional attachments to collectivities, and also to a value system that helps judge others 
from the perspective of the collectivity (Yuval-Davis 2006) . The complex interplay 
of these layers needs to be unraveled, if we are to understand the issue of abuse and 
the effort to overcome it .
Indian Immigrant Women in Canada and the United States
The presence of the Indian immigrant community is strongly felt in some parts of 
Canada and the United States . Especially Ontario or British Columbia and Califor-
nia or Texas are known to have skilled Indian IT professionals . Toronto, which is in 
Ontario province, possesses the largest population of Indian immigrants (554,900, 
or 4 .9 %, of Ontario’s total population) . An Indian woman usually comes to Canada 
in circumstances where she is totally dependent on her spouse; and in most cases, she 
is unaware of the immigration laws . Her usual close-knit kin and extended family 
network, along with her neighborhood support and community resources, are sud-
denly lost or substantially reduced (Bannerji 2000; METRAC 2001) . Consequently, 
she becomes very isolated . In some cases, this isolation results in a compensating 
control exercised by her husband that has psychological, physical, financial and even 
spatial aspects . Studies indicate that enforced dependency can be predictive of in-
timate partner violence (Raj and Silverman 2007) . Owing to cultural barriers, she 
cannot speak about her abuse in public or seek assistance elsewhere . Indian women, 
particularly those from middle-class backgrounds, are ashamed to admit to domestic 
abuse because of the social stigma attached to it and the fear of ‘gossip,’ especially 
within the community (Johnson and Johnson 2001; Raheja and Gold 1996) . They 
do not seek help from shelter homes for abused women, because of the Indian wom-
an’s traditional preference for turning to her natal family for support rather than 
some outside agency (Desai & Krishnaraj 1987; Preisser 1999) . Patriarchal family 
norms are predominant even in urban nuclear families in India, while in the im-
migrant context the community takes the place of the neighboring kin group (Pillai 
2001; Segal 1999; Uberoi 2000) .
An Indian middle-class woman is seldom educated about her legal rights as a 
‘wife .’ Innumerable cultural symbols, such as the pan-Indian epic character of ‘Sita’ 
or ‘Sati-Savitri’ (idealizing the quiet suffering of women), ingrain the belief that the 
marital family home is a woman’s only alternative (Epstein 1996; Kakar 1978; Segal 
1999) . Indian immigrant women often also stay in abusive relationships because of 
scant economic resources and language barriers; conversely, social service workers 
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generally do not have enough information or understanding of Indian immigrant 
women to effectively reach out to them (Status of Women Canada 2002) .
Policy Provisions and Experiences of Immigrant Women  
in Canada and the United States
Canada and the United States have put in place several policies and programs to pre-
vent domestic violence against women . In the case of immigrants, however, the legal 
situation for domestic abuse victims is rather more complex (Abraham 2005; Das-
gupta and Warrier 1996) . The data on transition houses in Ontario showed that the 
majority (80 %) of beneficiaries of subsidized housing are Canadian-born . It was ob-
served that a shelter home in the Houston area did not have any South Asian victims . 
Moreover, the data showed that there was no separate category for South Asians . This 
reflects a need by Indian women to remain in a secure community network .
One Indian immigrant woman gave her impressions after visiting a shelter home . 
All her fears of ‘loose’ western morals, lesbianism, and racist discrimination surfaced, 
and she did not dare to even think of leaving her home again, even if her husband 
was an abuser . The immigrant culture was seen as too different and the western cul-
ture as too ‘modern,’ combined with a fear of race relations along the grid of power . 
Obviously, the subjectivities attached to the issue have been used to build a defense 
wall, where ‘our’ culture is constructed as superior, at least in terms of moral con-
duct, than ‘theirs .’ The identity of the ‘other’ may be an imagined one . In this case 
the generational difference also mattered, as the victim was an elderly person . She 
also commented that at her advanced age, interacting with the young social worker 
at the shelter seemed very odd and put her in the awkward situation of asking for 
help; besides, the social worker seemed ‘so formal,’ which might mean she was not 
genuinely interested in her problem .
Clearly, it is not easy for South Asian women to interact with members of the 
host community in these matters . Moreover, a Canadian social worker of South 
Asian origin admitted that racism existed even within the social service organizations 
dedicated to helping women . Subsidized housing in Canada was deemed inadequate, 
given the great demand and a 10-year waiting list .
The Tug of the Home Culture and Belonging to Family in India
It was observed among the immigrant Indian women interviewed for this study that 
there was a predominant feeling of belonging to the home culture and tradition . A 
woman’s identity in India is constructed from several complex and dynamic factors . 
It is influenced by primordial loyalties such as religion, caste, language, and history, 
combined with such cultural specifics as particularized beliefs, customs, traditions, 
and values . All of which are ingrained in a process of socialization via local languages 
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and literature, Hindi movies, and the invasion of satellite TV (Chanana 1996; Derné 
1999; Kishwar 1999; Segal 1999) . On the one hand, there is the mystification of 
sexuality due to rigid segregation of the sexes in public life; on the other hand, there 
is the ensemble of marriage ceremony, dowry and gifts – all of which reinforce the 
subjugation of women within the Indian patriarchal social structure .
Browsing through the matrimonial columns of the major national daily ‘The 
Times of India’ elucidates the importance of marrying into a ‘status’ family, prefer-
ably ‘NRI’ (non-resident Indian) . These practices pressure women into keeping their 
marriages intact . For example, two abused women interviewed in this study told of 
‘telephone marriages’ with second-generation South Asian Canadians of a particular 
religious community, where the actual presence of the bridegroom at the wedding 
was not necessary . The young women said that they were happy with their family’s 
decision to have them marry a person whom they had not even seen at the time of 
the wedding . “If something unfortunate happens then that is my fate,” one of them 
said .
Some practices in India, such as the dowry, cross the boundaries of religion or 
caste . As an impact of consumerism, some castes and tribes are even adopting the 
dowry, although it was never a part of their tradition . The spread of education and 
women’s employment has not changed their dowry situation appreciably, although 
in some cases educated young men now carry a higher price tag . If a young man is 
already an immigrant, this will almost certainly cause an increase in his dowry price . 
Dowry has become a continuous source of cash extraction, with different forms of 
gifts answering to the need to acquire consumer goods, nor does this need for capital 
cease after marriage (Deolalikar & Rao 1998; Jejeebhoy 1998) .
Ending such a marriage means returning to one’s family, not only with the shame 
and stigma of divorce, but with the added disgrace of having wasted all the money 
spent on the marriage . Usually Indian women do not want to leave a marital rela-
tionship because marriage is seen as a lifelong relationship, or as a sanskar or sacra-
ment (Agnes 2000) . Even in India, there is a tendency to encourage and almost force 
young women to suffer abuse in the marital family – anything but ceasing to live 
with their in-laws and husband . Divorce is usually discouraged as it amounts to a loss 
of family honor (Kallivayalil 2010) . Canadian television telecast a Canadian Indian 
arranged marriage that was opulently celebrated, but ended sadly in the wife killing 
the husband in a scuffle . The woman’s in-laws’ attempted to control the son, provok-
ing him to physically assault the wife, who then defended herself . Ending a marriage 
by divorce is not an easy option for Indian women, even when they are abroad . The 
common perception in developed countries concerning arranged marriages is that 
they are, in effect, a trap attached to a culture that is barbaric . That the menace of 
domestic violence is all pervasive is easily forgotten . Extreme cases such as of honor 
killings are also reported in the media of the United Kingdom and the United States . 
Such reports, where the talk is of killing the wife to preserve the family honor, serve 
to revive earlier images associated with Indian culture – such as satee – resulting in 
a media frenzy of ‘burning brides,’ ‘burning widows,’ or the like . Media coverage 
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and discourse problematizes incidents such as honor killing, so much so that even 
arranged marriages are portrayed as barbaric and ending in violence . However, if 
something similar happens in the host community (e .g ., stalking and the killing of 
a partner on suspicion), it is not treated the same way . The binaries created by the 
discourse on ethnicized culture (seen as emotional and backward) and the culture of 
the host society (seen as rational and advanced) exclude immigrants and further ac-
celerate the ‘othering’ process .
Shelter workers reported that while South Asian women do seek counseling, they 
are also reluctant to leave even a highly abusive situation and avail themselves of shel-
ters . Acceptance of a failed marriage is hard enough, but far worse is speaking about 
it in public . This can degrade one’s self-image of being a ‘good wife’ and daughter-
in-law . Moreover, a ‘failed marriage’ is often accompanied by a loss of status and ties 
within the immigrant community, which, as has been pointed out already, serves as 
a support network for Indian immigrant women in an alien society . The fear of the 
losing one’s immigrant status imposes an additional burden in the form of having to 
face one’s community back home in India . An immigrant woman related how when 
she called one of her male colleagues, his wife had picked up the phone, since he 
was not at home at the time . In the course of the conversation the wife broke down 
and told the caller about the physical abuse she was enduring . But when given the 
contact details of a social worker as well as a shelter address, the victim blurted out 
the words: “hamare me aisa nahi karte na … log kya kahenge!” (“but we don’t do that, 
what will people say!”) . The invisible idea of log (people) and the pressure of the 
invisible community clearly works, even in the new geographic locale . After this she 
never called back and avoided all contact . The sense of being a community mem-
ber – adhering to its norms and not crossing red lines – seems strong among many 
immigrants . Besides, there is always community pressure coming from being part of 
a ‘model minority’ (Abraham 2005) . Migration is often coupled with aspirations of 
upward mobility, hence immigrants need to balance awareness of how their actions 
will impact on the immigrant community with a wider awareness of how these same 
actions will be seen back in India, where immigrants enjoy the high status of ‘NRI’ 
(NRI, or ‘non-resident Indians,’ is the homeland term used in this connection) . In 
such cases, identity must be constructed in relation to the imagined ‘other’ and by 
self-insulation, since one is also aware that getting help in the new social context is 
not easy . There may also be a role for the host community in constructing them as 
the ‘other .’ It was found that interaction with the host community in Canada and 
United States is mostly limited to the workplace . Family visits and community par-
ticipation were almost absent . On the other hand, the Indian immigrant community 
is closely knit and interdependent, with a preference for engaging in collective leisure 
activities and community gatherings . There is also a lot of sharing of social capital via 
networks – e .g . accommodation for newcomers, monetary help, transport for visi-
tors and children, or help with cooking . It is difficult for an Indian woman to cope 
without a community network of her own, especially when she knows that the kind 
of help she needs cannot be provided by the host community .
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For an immigrant woman, employment does not necessarily ease her lot . Having 
a job does not mean that housework is shared by the husband, nor is there any 
reduction in her duties to relatives . One middle-aged interviewee related that she 
still observes the Indian dress code, because of her mother-in-law’s dictates and her 
husband’s disapproval of western culture . Another lady jokingly said something in a 
group that amounted to an interesting observation . She pointed out that when she 
visited India after a long gap, she found that her husband’s younger sister was wear-
ing sleeveless shirts and shorts in her mother-in-law’s presence, but “their rules were 
different from when I was of that age!” In-laws can maintain control even if they are 
living in India . The husband, in such cases, becomes the agent carrying out their 
wishes . One divorced woman told of her mother-in-law writing to her husband not 
to let her “evade his control,” acting on the incitement of her husband’s sister, who 
was staying with the couple at the time . As a result, the husband isolated his wife and 
beat her . Moreover, the kind of act, the context and setting in which it occurs, also 
carries legitimacy at times . If the respectful relationship with any of the in-laws is 
felt to have been violated, even in terms of showing independence by wearing ‘west-
ern’ dress, this may invite a negative reaction . Depending on the seriousness of the 
violation, acts of physical violence may win approval, with the degree of legitimacy 
and social support varying with the social, historical, and interpersonal parameters 
(Dobash and Dobash 1979) .
In another case, however – that of a highly skilled working couple – it was actu-
ally the mother-in-law who helped the abused wife . This respondent was a profes-
sional working woman and the couple was earning very well . No one knew that she 
had been physically abused by the husband for quite some time . He used to get angry 
over minor things, even over a minor argument, and would beat her up . He used to 
wake her up in the night and throw her against the wall; she couldn’t sleep properly 
for fear he might start again . Even though her maternal family relatives were in the 
United States, she did not tell them about the abuse so as not to be a burden . On one 
occasion, when her in-laws arrived from India and were staying with the couple, the 
husband started beating the wife in the presence of her mother-in-law . The mother-
in-law objected, but in spite of her efforts to stop him, the husband dragged the 
wife into another room and closed the door so he could continue beating her with-
out interference . The mother-in-law wanted to call the police, but the father-in-law 
stopped her; instead, he called the wife’s family to take her away for her own safety . 
With the support of her maternal family, this abused woman could finally obtain a 
divorce . She also changed her location and job, but it took quite a while to overcome 
depression .
Indian working women seldom kept separate bank accounts, though this is 
changing now among young professional immigrants . Earlier, women were not in-
formed of financial matters, such as taxes, and as a result were more dependent on 
the husband . This can be observed particularly among women of the elder genera-
tion . The impact of role responsibilities from the home culture was strongest among 
them – with much time and attention devoted to performing the duties of a tradi-
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tional Indian wife and maintaining the family image in the eyes of the community . 
Interestingly, the ‘others’ also contribute to the construction of this image by con-
trasting the ethnic community practices with their own . In one case of financial and 
emotional abuse, the husband was swindling the wife’s money and pressing her to 
take out loans . In spite of her being highly educated and holding down a job, she 
remained ignorant about her financial status for a long time and was unable to resist . 
When she realized that she had lost everything, she was in a fix . The respondent 
stated that though divorce was an option, it was hard to go down that road . Any hint 
of marital discord could easily become ‘talk of the town’ in the Indian immigrant 
community . Moreover, for middle-class working wives in the United States, filing 
for divorce is very expensive; lawyers, according to her, charge exorbitant fees, which 
would have the effect of further eroding her financial situation and depriving her of 
the money she would need after the divorce .
In most cases, the immigrant woman earns less than her husband . The husband 
has control over her pay and spending . The funds for her in-laws’ air travel are typi-
cally taken from the woman’s resources . Women tend to accept such practices for fear 
of causing conflict with family-kin . Incurring the displeasure of in-laws may result in 
gossip and criticism within the immigrant communities . One agitated interviewee 
commented, “We are filling their [meaning her in-laws in India] boriyans [meaning 
food grain containers or coffers] with dollars, and I cannot even buy underwear 
for myself . It’s not only that you invite the husband’s hostility if you don’t comply, 
but because of being a badi-bahu [meaning the eldest daughter-in-law], the whole 
family-kin network expects you to make all kinds of sacrifices .” Sometimes it is a 
thankless sacrifice .
Isolation of Abused Migrant Women
One elderly and physically handicapped woman pointed to another major factor 
related to domestic violence, namely isolation and dependency . Even though her 
abuse continued for years, she could not speak out for several reasons . Her husband, 
who held a prestigious government post, threatened her with political reprisals if she 
did so . She believed that her husband, because of his high position, would be able to 
make good on this threat . So she put up with physical and financial abuse as well as 
the trauma of having to witness an illicit relationship by her abusive husband in her 
own house . When she found out about her husband’s infidelity, he grew even more 
violent . She described her humiliation when her husband not only thrashed her in 
front of the other woman, but seized her with both hands and told the other woman 
to slap her . With tears in her eyes she continued: “…but being a woman, bai-pan 
[implying a sense of the common sufferings of women] was awakened in the other 
woman and, luckily for me, she could not go through with it, so that at least I was 
spared further humiliation, though both made a point of treating me as a mental 
case, so I still had to endure their taunts and derisive laughter .” And yet she was not 
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ready to consider leaving her husband . “I can’t drive a car … so who can I depend on 
for even simple things like fetching groceries in this icy foreign land?” Here again it is 
apparent, despite the fact of her having lived in Canada for so many years, that there 
existed a construction of the ‘other’ in her mind . Dreamily, she expressed a wish that 
perhaps someday somebody would narrate her story in a film or a novel, and that af-
ter watching or reading it her husband would have a change of heart and come back 
to her! When this woman revealed her abuse to a small group of Indian immigrants 
involved in community social work, the husband became concerned about his own 
reputation in the community and at least stopped the physical part of the abuse . This 
brings out the potential for community pressure in stopping or reducing abuse . The 
Indian immigrant community in Canada has been observed to be more closely knit 
than in the United States, but this situation is slowly changing now due to the recent 
influx of well-off Indians from the Gulf states .
Another elderly woman, this time from an orthodox religious community, spoke 
out about her own abuse, and that of her daughters, at the hands of her husband . 
She reported that the community had advised her to go back to India because the 
abuser happened to be an important community leader and fundraiser for commu-
nity causes . In this case, there was pressure coming from the community not to speak 
out about her problems because it was felt the community’s reputation might suffer 
a setback . In some states of Northern India, extended family norms exert a control-
ling influence . Exposure of sexual abuse is still suppressed in some Indian immigrant 
communities . Many young men from these communities hold down security jobs 
that require night shifts . Under these circumstances, wives have to fear the father-in-
law who stays at home with them . He may make sexual advances toward them . They 
feel helpless, face constant tension, and cannot speak out .
In extreme cases, Indian immigrant women prefer legal intervention to going to 
shelters, according to social workers and some of the victims . This is largely a result 
of rigid thinking about being middle class . The immigrants do, in fact, come primar-
ily from the middle class, which is seen as having a caste-like status . Women face the 
dilemma of losing their community status and support network if they leave their 
husband’s house . Going to shelters or transition houses and then moving into public 
housing means a woman has to move away from her community . This presents an 
additional setback for Indian women who, as we have seen, are heavily dependent 
on their community and on networking with other immigrants from their home 
country . Immigrant women, to reiterate, see social isolation as something very dif-
ficult to bear .
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Conclusion
The policies of the North American countries, especially Canada, against domestic 
violence are generally more developed than in India . However, these policies do not 
appear to be meeting the complex needs of abused Indian immigrant women . Mul-
tiple layers of domination and other barriers keep these women in subjugation . It is 
essential to understand the dynamics of this subjugation process . The operant factors 
are family hierarchy, historical gender inequalities, plus the complexities and pres-
sures that come from belonging to an ethnic community . However, in some cases at 
least, Indian immigrant women combine to prevent a further escalation of violence . 
Moreover, the role and impact of community cannot be ignored, even if it is imag-
ined . Some studies have cautioned against strategies that directly challenge existing 
structures and beliefs, since these are likely to be regarded as culturally sensitive . Such 
strategies may even induce a backlash (Garg 2001; Kishwar 1999) .
This research reinforces the important part played by belonging to family and 
community in the lives of Indian immigrants . The experiences of immigrant women 
show that they prefer intervention to come from within the family, rather than from 
state structures such as the police or shelter homes . Even back in India, a similar 
tendency is observed among abused women . For immigrants, there is a sense of be-
longing first to the family and then to the ethnic community . The problems facing 
immigrant Indian women need to be seen in this context . Therefore, the challenge 
for policymakers is to raise awareness of domestic violence within the immigrant 
communities themselves, and to establish networks of culturally specific institutions 
to support immigrant women . Strategies such as staging folk dramas during the 
Ganesh festival (a practice used earlier in India to subvert the colonial regime) or re-
viving the reformist tradition through community-based organizations (as has been 
done in Bengal or Maharashtra) can be useful in this regard . Active outreach by the 
Canadian and US governments to progressive elements within the immigrant com-
munity is also needed . More immediately, abused Indian women need to be linked 
up with facilities that provide social support and reduce isolation, rather than ‘res-
cued’ or removed from their abusive situation .
Implications
The gender roles of South Asian women and the barriers they face cannot be prop-
erly understood without unraveling the complex process of belonging to their own 
community and culture . As a result, Indian immigrant women find it difficult to 
access existing welfare benefits or to avail themselves of shelter and transition houses . 
There is a need to develop greater legal awareness and enlist community support 
when countering the domestic violence these women face . Existing accepted chan-
nels – such as those relating to community cultural activities – should be explored 
to ensure community support . This is essential in an era of increasing budget cuts to 
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domestic abuse programs . Even so, current policies may not be sensitive enough to 
address the welfare needs of immigrant Indian women .
Several advocacy groups and activists are pressing for more changes in policies to 
counter the problem of violence against women . South Asian groups and activists, as 
well as leading feminists, have all stressed the need to understand diversity within the 
feminist movement . While agreeing that North American and particularly Canadian 
domestic violence policies are, on the whole, laudable, there is still an outstanding 
need to address the varied cultural experiences of Indian immigrant women .
Future Research
This exploratory research is necessarily limited by its small sample size . Yet the need 
to press on with binational research to understand women’s needs in both India and 
North America is underscored by the study . Future research needs to keep in view 
the increasing scale of transnational migration and the challenges facing immigrants, 
not just in terms of settling into and adapting to their host countries, but also in 
terms of belonging to a home culture and community . A gender-sensitive analysis of 
the domestic violence issue could benefit policymakers by allowing them to create 
secure zones within the private space of Indian immigrant women . In an era of in-
creasing transnational migration, this challenge needs to be addressed by researchers 
and policymakers alike .
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The Call of Home and Violence of Belonging: 10 
Diasporic Hinduism and Tamils in Exile
Kamala Ganesh
Introduction
To escape the trauma of violence and civil war, more than a million ethnic Tamils 
have emigrated from Sri Lanka since 1983 . Today, they live in different pockets 
of the globe, and are interlinked through a powerful transnational network . As a 
diaspora, they are defined by a shared commitment to the cause of Tamil national-
ism in Sri Lanka . The million-plus Tamils who have emigrated since 1983 consti-
tute a distinct and influential niche within the four million strong Tamil diaspora .1 
Indeed, the broader Tamil diaspora dating from pre-colonial times is composed of 
several historical and cultural layers, with varying inclinations towards assuming a 
Tamil ethnicity . In the pre-colonial period, mercantile traders and financiers like the 
Nattukkottai Chettiars spread throughout Southeast Asia, merging and mingling 
with local cultures . As their numbers increased during the colonial period, so too 
did the intricacy of their enterprises, and the community flourished . People and 
money circulated through well-honed networks between South India and Malaya, 
Burma, Straits settlements, Siam, Java, and Indo-China, enabling considerable busi-
ness success (Kudaisya 2006: 60–61) . Due to their itinerant modes of business, these 
emigrant communities did not develop a strong diasporic consciousness, with Tamil 
1 Tamils across the globe number 70 million spread in 50 countries of the world of which 61 million 
are in Tamil Nadu, 5 million in Sri Lanka (Sivasupramaniam n .d .) .
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functioning as the mother tongue rather than as the ethnicity . At the same time, 
for the Tamil-speaking indentured labor migrants in Malaya, Fiji, Mauritius, the 
Caribbean, and South Africa, Tamil ethnicity would became an integral element 
of diasporic self-assertion . For the most part, this assertion of identity was either a 
response to host country policies and politics, as was the case in Malaysia, or to the 
dynamics of interaction with other diasporic Indian communities, as was the case 
in South Africa . Post-independence and post-liberalization Tamil migration from 
India to the West and to English-speaking countries like Australia and Singapore 
was mostly composed of upper and middle caste, highly qualified, professionals . 
For these migrants, being Tamil was more casual and functional than based on deep 
ethnic identification . Today, for example, spoken Tamil is interlaced with English, 
with many second generation migrants not speaking Tamil at all . In contrast to these 
previous waves of emigration, the post-1983 Tamil diaspora from Sri Lanka,2 a lan-
guage-based ethnicity has mutated into a powerful force expressed through the no-
tion of biological species-hood, conveyed in the popular term Tamil Inam . Such an 
unusual evocation is not an assertion of citizenship rights in the adopted land, but 
rather invokes a politics of primordiality and belongingness to the homeland from 
which they were forcibly displaced .
For a language to take on the mantle of ethnicity is a complicated process: for it 
to become an ethnicity in the Indian context, a language has to coincide with region, 
and bridge caste and religious divides . In the past hundred years, Tamil ethnicity has 
shaped two powerful movements on the subcontinent: the Dravidian movement in 
the Tamil region of India, and the Tamil nationalist movement in Sri Lanka . The 
continuation and offshoot of the latter in the diasporic context is the focus of this 
chapter . The Dravidian movement, which arose in Madras Presidency in the 1930s, 
was based on the perception that the Tamil region, with its ancient language, robust 
literary tradition, and distinctive cultural ethos of two millennia, had been sidelined 
by Sanskritic and Aryan domination from North India and by local Tamil Brahmins . 
Tamils were seen by the Dravidian movement as naturally constituting a separate na-
tion . Even the canon and practice of Hinduism had a distinct lineage and markedly 
regional features .3
2 Henceforth in this article, the ‘Tamil diaspora’ refers only to Sri Lankan Tamil migrants, unless oth-
erwise specified .
3 The Dravidianism and Tamil exceptionalism propagated by Periyar E .V . Ramaswamy Naicker has 
been the root of subsequent politics in Madras state (current day Tamil Nadu) (Geetha and Rajadurai 
1998) . While even lay observers have noticed the vast dilution of Tamil exceptionalism (Krishna 2015), 
it continues as an ideological undercurrent . Over the course of time and in the dynamics of democratic 
politics, the secessionist agenda has evaporated . For pragmatic electoral reasons, many compromises 
have been made in the translation of Dravidian politico-cultural ideology into practice . Yet the found-
ing principles, the antiquity, distinctness and distinction of Tamil language and literature has remained 
on the Dravidian agenda . The campaign for the Indian government to recognise Tamil as a classical 
language, which was successful in 2010, is a testimony to this (see for example Vasan 2004) .
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Dating back to 19th century colonial policy and orientalist invocations of the lin-
guistic and cultural divide between Indo-Aryan Sinhalas and Dravidian Tamils, the 
Tamil nationalist movement in Sri Lanka has even deeper historical roots (for a con-
cise history see Wilson 2000; for a detailed account see Kailasapathy 1985) . The 
political manifestations of the Tamil nationalist movement in the mid-to-late 20th 
century drew some inspiration from South Indian Dravidianism, but also developed 
unique features in response to ethnic tensions in Sri Lanka . The growth of mili-
tant and terrorist organizations like the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), 
the mass exodus of Tamils seeking refuge and asylum in other countries, and these 
diasporic waves’ sympathy for the Tamil cause gave the relationship with the home-
land a special emotional color, with Tamil surpassing the stage of mere ethnicity into 
what can be called ‘Tamilism .’
The very condition of diaspora-ness triggers a complex relationship with the 
homeland, a relationship sometimes anchored only in the imagination, to paraphrase 
Anderson (1998) . Even when it remains only a mythic or rhetoric motif, and even 
if it does not actually happen, return remains an ever present focus; so much so that 
diasporas may support the cause of the homeland, whether defined territorially or 
emotively, through concrete actions such as support to the state and its programs . 
For example, the Indian diaspora in the USA famously bailed out their home coun-
try during the 1990 foreign exchange crisis . Indeed, as the Encyclopedia of the Indian 
Diaspora (Lal, Reeves and Rai 2006) notes, this event triggered a radical turn around 
in the Indian government’s hitherto lukewarm attitude towards its diasporas . The 
recent growth in diasporic philanthropy and development aid is another example 
of involvement in homeland welfare without actual ‘return’ (Kapur 2010: 84–161) . 
Sections of the Indian diaspora’s support for the Khalistan and Hindutva exclusivist, 
separatist movements are two recent and problematic examples of diasporic identifi-
cation with the ‘homeland .’ In both cases, “long-distance nationalism” as formulated 
by Anderson (1998) has been articulated in terms of religious identity . In contrast, 
for the transnational Tamil diaspora, violently exiled from Sri Lanka during and after 
the civil war, Tamil language and culture, rather than religion, has been critical to 
the politics of homeland nationalism . Nevertheless, in the articulation of Tamilness, 
a prominent space is occupied by religion, specifically by what can be called ‘Tamil 
Hinduism .’ The flourishing network of temples built by the Tamil diaspora accom-
modates and, at times, propagates such a political assertion of Tamilness . Likewise, 
the devotion to classical Carnatic music is inflected with Tamil Hinduism .
This chapter explores the nature of belongingness among the Tamil diaspora . It 
is based on fieldwork in Germany and Switzerland, but also contains reflections on 
the diaspora in Europe as a whole . With the dispersal of emigrants during and after 
the civil war, members of the same family often found themselves settling in different 
countries . Nevertheless, Tamils throughout Europe have maintained close kinship, 
business, cultural, and community ties and form a cohesive transnational communi-
ty . Tamil temples, in a sense, constitute the face of Hinduism in Europe, for reasons 
that will become evident later . The temples maintain links with diasporic Hinduism 
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at large, as well as with institutions and temples in South India, sourcing services 
and products, and seeking ideological collaboration and legitimation . Yet they have 
kept a distance from Hindutva, which focuses on the politicization of religion, and 
is specific to the Indian context .4
In this chapter, I also examine the Tamil diaspora’s intense religiosity (based on 
Saivism) – a prominent component of Tamil devotionalism – which not only func-
tions as a spiritual anchorage but also adds moral and ethical weight to the political 
engagements of Tamil nationalism . Despite being at the forefront of temple-centered 
Hinduism in Europe, this diaspora has no relationship to Hindutva . I also examine 
the role of classical music in promoting both Saiva devotionalism and Tamil nation-
alism . The incompatibility of Tamil Hinduism in the diaspora with Indian cultural 
nationalism illustrates the irreducibility of the many faceted diasporic Hinduism to 
Hindutva ideology . Like religious nationalism, linguistic ethnonationalism, even if it 
has valid claims to justice, can be violent, totalitarian and exclusive, as the examples 
of diasporic Tamils and diasporic Hindutva discussed in this chapter suggest . Against 
this background, and with its diverse expressions in the individual psyche, in the 
last section I explore the violence of belonging through the narrations of two Tamil 
women, one a music teacher in Münster, and the other a devout member of the reli-
gious community in Bonn .5 Before migrating to Germany, both suffered personally 
in the Sri Lankan civil war, yet their responses to the diasporic engagement with the 
homeland politics are in stark contrast to one another .
On Belonging, Return and Violence
Does belonging, in the domain of group or collective identity, even in its benign 
manifestations, inevitably entail exclusiveness and exclusions? And is it followed in-
evitably by a slide into violence? The homeland-diaspora relationship is one that has 
potential for illuminating the delicate line between passion and violence .
The existential situation of a migrant group forcibly separated from the home-
land, yet emotionally attached to it, was seen by early scholars as critical to the devel-
opment of a diasporic consciousness . Safran’s (1991) article, which continues to be a 
reference point in diasporic studies, lists six necessary features of a diaspora, with five 
of these associated with the ‘homeland’: dispersal from the homeland; a collective 
memory or myth of ‘home’; the idea of return; commitment to the homeland’s well-
being; and a continued relationship, be it personal or vicarious, to the homeland . 
Safran (1991: 83–84) concludes that even if emigration is voluntary, and individuals 
4 Hindutva, a form of Hindu nationalism is a political ideology as distinct from Hinduism as religion . 
It was elaborated upon by prominent Hindu right wing ideologue V .D . Savarkar, who it is believed in-
spired Gandhi’s assassination . It seeks to establish the hegemony of Hindus and the Hindu way of life .
5 The names and some of the personal details of persons (informants) in this chapter have been changed 
slightly to protect their identity .
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or groups hold no plan to actually return, the diasporic consciousness rests on a real 
or imagined relationship with the homeland .
Later scholars have questioned whether all diasporas are so focused on a continu-
ous connection to the homeland and a teleology of return . As Clifford (1994: 304) 
argues, exclusivist paradigms are difficult to maintain . Likewise, Cohen (2008: 6–8) 
argues against overemphasizing the homeland connection; the shared present may 
be more important than a common origin . The homeland relationship is, at the 
level of identity, about making a life in the host country, not about the real ‘back-
home .’ In forging this identity, members of the diaspora seek to combat structural 
inequality and cultural unacceptance by asserting difference and claiming rights as 
citizens of the host country . Brah (1996) underlines the distinction between the 
‘homing desire,’ a mythic place of desire in the diasporic imagination, and an actual 
desire to return . Some regional diasporas, despite being composed of people from 
different countries, share historic linkages as well as a rich high and popular material 
culture of consumption, with public arenas and economic channels for cooperation 
and communal enjoyment cutting across the national origins or religious beliefs of 
performers and participants (Werbner 2010: 76) . The countries in the Indian sub-
continent are a striking illustration of this point . Although members owe political 
allegiance to various homelands, the South Asian diaspora is an example of a ‘com-
plex diaspora’ (ibid .) with a shared history and culture . Indeed, for double and triple 
diasporas (which have relocated from their first destination and may therefore have 
more than one homeland as a reference point), the concept of ‘homeland’ becomes 
even fuzzier .
Importantly, these arguments undermine the centrality given to the relationship 
with the homeland in the ideal-typical Jewish diaspora, which had initially been held 
up as a model in diaspora studies . In excluding a substantial segment of migration, 
especially voluntary migration for better opportunities in education or work, the 
classic definition of diaspora has been too narrow .
Nevertheless, there is a continuing case for discussing the specificities of forced 
migration as a special category of diaspora; this is not to portray forced diasporas 
as quintessential in some way, but rather to focus on the diasporas’ collective work 
of memory, commemoration, and mourning, processes which lead to multifarious 
forms of moral and material connection with the homeland . As Tölölyan argues, 
a diaspora born of catastrophe inflicted on the collective suffers trauma, which in 
turn shapes much of its cultural production and political commitment . As such, it 
is helpful to distinguish such diasporas from a dispersion that is the consequence of 
individual and chain migration motivated by economic reasons; for in such com-
munities, nostalgia may be strong, but commemoration and collective mourning are 
less prominent (Tölölyan 2007: 649) .
Traumatic expulsions of entire communities for political reasons have created 
several ‘stateless’ diasporas, such as Tamils, Kurds and Palestinians, for whom the 
homeland is not only symbolic, but also a political rallying point (Sheffer 2003: 
154–59) . To them, the homeland remains relevant in a substantive way: return may 
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not literally happen, yet re-turn – travel to the homeland, remittances, cultural ex-
change, political lobbying, and various contingent efforts to maintain other benign 
links with the homeland – does (Tölölyan 2007: 650) . The experience of trauma, 
exile, and the relative economic and political security achieved in the new adopted 
land also triggers and enables a form of re-turn to the homeland through the finan-
cial and moral support and promotion of political violence .
This is indeed the case with the Tamil diaspora, which has two striking features: 
its extreme preoccupation with the issues of Tamil nationalism and justice back in Sri 
Lanka, and the harnessing of its own cultural capital to reinforce and propagate the 
Tamil cause through language, literature, art, and especially through religion .
Re-Turn to the Homeland: Overseas Hindutva
My fieldwork with Tamils exiled in Europe brought home to me how their religious 
fervor was suffused with devotion and piety anchored in the Tamil Saiva regional and 
cultural ethos . As both an insider and an observer in Tamil Nadu itself, this ethos was 
familiar to me, as there was hardly any difference in substance between the two, only 
minor stylistic differences . Yet Tamil Nadu as part of the Indian mainland has had a 
different relationship with political Hinduism than the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora . 
In fact, there are signs of a turn towards Hindutva in Tamil Nadu (see for instance 
Krishna 2015) . This turn is taking place despite the dominance of Dravidianism in 
Tamil Nadu’s recent history and politics, which has made it one of the Indian states 
least amenable to Hindutva .
In recent decades, with new channels of direct contact and communication 
opening up between emigrants and the homeland, the role of diasporas in bolster-
ing violent ethnonationalist and communal conflicts in the homeland have become 
both more intense and more visible . Anderson’s thesis on long-distance nationalism 
(1998) is often invoked as an explanatory framework for this phenomenon . One oft-
cited example is the political right in India’s (and its Hindutva ideology) powerful 
support amongst the large, politically articulate, and economically successful Hindu 
diasporas .
It is often assumed that diasporic Hinduism is deeply implicated in Hindutva, 
and that the relationship is embedded in the very structure of Hinduism, with its 
inherent hierarchies and othering mechanisms . Such a reductive equation of modes 
of belongingness to modes of communal politics is challenged by the chaotic multi-
plicity of diasporic Hinduism, both in its normative and performative dimensions . 
Indeed, the Tamil diaspora – both in Europe and elsewhere – challenges such reduc-
tive assumptions and raises piquant questions on the problems of conflating com-
munalism with religion, on the violent dimensions of belongingness, and on the 
heterogeneities and contrasts within diasporic Hinduism .
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Tamil Diaspora: Tamilness as Ideology and Strategy
Though it is relatively young, a number of scholars have written about the Tamil 
diaspora . I have also drawn on my own fieldwork in Europe (Ganesh 2013, 2014; 
Ganesh and McDowell 2013) . Some key features of the community are common 
across locations, with most fleeing Sri Lanka following the turbulent ethnic con-
flict, seeking refuge and asylum, especially after the devastating Colombo riots of 
1983 . The long and complex history of ethnic conflict between the Sinhala govern-
ment, civil society, and Tamil civilians in Sri Lanka is well documented . With the 
emergence of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) as a key player in the 
early 1980s, the conflict developed into a full-scale civil war .6 Powerful LTTE net-
works abroad mobilized the diaspora’s empathy for the Tamil cause, raising money 
for humanitarian and military purposes, and it is widely believed that the diaspora 
played a role in keeping the civil war going as long as it did . While the majority in 
the diaspora were sympathetic to the cause, they were also ambivalent about or op-
posed to the violence .7 Nevertheless, by exerting moral pressure, playing on guilt and 
threatening relatives back home, the LTTE drew diasporic Tamils into its violent 
Eelam (nationalist) politics (see for instance Wayland 2004) . The pressure the LTTE 
was able to exert within the diaspora must be understood in the context of a history 
of discrimination and suffering in Sri Lanka, with the loss of lives and property, the 
trauma of displacement and asylum, and the struggle to rebuild life from scratch . As 
such, Vimalarajah and Cheran (2010: 7) argue that the diaspora’s commitment to 
Tamil nationalism went and goes beyond specific organizations like the LTTE .
The longing for homeland, the mythical Eelam, as well as the physical home, 
property and relatives left behind in Sri Lanka, have arguably affected the terms of 
the diaspora’s engagement with its host countries . Tamils in Europe have developed 
a reputation for being ‘good immigrants’ (which is obviously also related to the cur-
rent dynamics of immigration policy); they are seen as hard-working, reliable and 
resilient immigrants willing to take up low-paying jobs that others do not want . 
Moreover, they have ‘integrated’ well into the education, employment, and health 
systems, but have largely remained socially aloof, confining their interactions to fel-
low ethnics (Ganesh 2014: 237) . Now young adults, the second generation, have 
integrated better, excelling in higher education . Nevertheless, they too engage with 
homeland politics, albeit differently .
6 The civil war fought between the LTTE and the state military ran between 1983 and 2009 . There 
were phases when the LTTE scored military victories in specific locations and, for a period, ran a parallel 
administration in those areas . Eventually the violent excesses of the LTTE led to an international cam-
paign against it, and it was declared a terrorist organization . In 2009, it was defeated and decimated .
7 In my fieldwork in Europe over five years from 2009 onwards, I came across this sentiment fre-
quently . Whether such views were expressed only in the aftermath of defeat, I cannot prove . But there 
are studies (e .g . Vimalarajah and Cheran 2010) that do point out to various nuances in the diaspora’s 
relationship with LTTE . 
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Diasporas everywhere are preoccupied with issues of cultural identity, with the me-
chanics and politics of survival and recognition in the host country often playing 
a primary role . For Tamils, this is intensified by the politics of the homeland . The 
mobilization of a purportedly unique Tamil identity has been a key strategy in en-
suring, strengthening, and maintaining support from Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora in 
Tamil nationalist politics, ethnic conflict, and the civil war . These identity politics 
have meant that the highly religious Tamil diaspora has remained indifferent to the 
overtures of Hindutva’s religio-cultural nationalism while making itself available to 
the political demands of Tamil linguistic ethno-nationalism . The result is an inward-
looking diaspora with an unparalleled mobilization of what is considered to be au-
thentic Tamil religion and culture . This Tamilness is invoked through language, lit-
erature, arts, marriage and food choices, and modes of dress, worship and behavior . 
What one may call a distinct Tamil Hinduism – as practiced traditionally in Jaffna 
and Tamil Nadu, as well as in the diaspora – provides symbolic capital . Moreover, 
a vigorous system of weekend schools (attended by the majority of children) which 
teach Tamil language, literature, and history, as well as philosophical, musical, and 
cultural traditions intertwined with Tamil Hinduism socializes them to Tamil na-
tionalist goals . Spread across multilingual Europe, the diaspora retains Tamil as the 
language of communication in newspapers, on TV channels and websites, and dur-
ing community gatherings . Tamil ‘culture’ is also performed through classical mu-
sic and dance which focus on Tamil devotional compositions and are conducted in 
Tamil schools, temples or private homes (Ganesh 2014: 238–41) .
In what follows, I will discuss two powerful cultural channels for Tamil nation-
alist politics in some detail, namely temple-centered devotional Saivism, and the 
teaching and performance of Carnatic music .
Tamil Hinduism and Temple Building
The heightened religious consciousness of immigrants as a category has been noted 
by many scholars (see e .g . van der Veer 1994 and Williams 1988: 11) . Regardless of 
denomination, an elaborate and intense expression and performance of religiosity 
both on an everyday level and in public ceremonies is a striking feature of the Tamil 
diaspora .8 Even Tamilness itself, the core ideology of the diaspora, is articulated in 
religious terms .
The majority of Tamils in Europe are Hindus . The theological base of Sri Lankan 
Hinduism is the same as the dominant Saiva discourse in Tamil Nadu, expressed 
through the worship of Siva, Murugan, Amman, and Devi . Inspired by the bhakti 
poetry of the medieval Tamil saints, it draws on the non-Brahmin traditions of Saiva 
Siddhantam and Vira Saivam (Subramaniyam 1994) . Saiva Siddhantam, one of the 
8 Using quantitative data, Baumann and Salentin (2006: 306–310) have demonstrated Tamils’ high 
levels of self-reported religiosity .
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three major Saiva streams, derives its metaphysics not from Vedanta but from the 
Siva Agama and Siva Stotras . A cohesive, non-Vedic Tamil philosophy, metaphysics, 
and temple-based liturgy has been consolidated over more than a millennium, creat-
ing a powerful and regionally rooted devotional Hinduism . It is an allied, parallel 
tradition to Vedic Hinduism, with points of convergence and divergence . With its 
distinct identity, the Tamil Hindu tradition arguably provided fertile soil for the later 
political and social developments of Dravidianism . While in Tamil Nadu, Vaish-
navism also flourished, in Sri Lanka, Saivism has held almost exclusive sway . Over 
the centuries, Vaishnava deities have also become (somewhat) accommodated within 
the Saiva tradition . Saivism has also been in amiable interaction with Catholicism, 
in the sense of devotees participating in each others’ festivals . Diasporic Tamils have 
largely followed the pattern of Saiva worship in Sri Lanka, although interaction with 
pan-Hindu traditions and neo-Hindu sects and cults have made it adaptive, syn-
cretic, and inclusive (Schalk 2004) .
The Tamil diaspora in Europe not only worships in the home, but has also built 
a number of temples . Temples play an important role, acting as a rallying point in 
mobilizing and intensifying Tamil identity around politico-cultural issues . Indeed, 
in Germany alone, nearly 40 temples have been built, whereas Indians (who have a 
much longer presence there) have built only one temple – the Sri Ganesha Hindu 
Tempel, which is still under construction in Berlin . As such, Tamil temples are the 
face of diasporic Hinduism in Europe . Indeed, the efflorescence of temple-based 
Hinduism in Europe is directly attributable to Sri Lankan Tamil religiosity, which in 
turn can be seen as an existential as well as political response to ethnic conflict, war, 
loss and exile at ‘home’ (Ganesh and McDowell 2013; Ganesh 2014) .
The LTTE was careful to remain neutral towards religion: Tamilness was con-
structed as binding people across and beyond religion . Yet the LTTE utilized reli-
gious channels, especially the temple as a forum for propaganda and mobilization . 
After all, the two major ethnic groups in Sri Lanka were largely polarized along 
religious lines: Tamil Hinduism and Sinhala Buddhism, with the latter playing a sig-
nificant role in the conflict . Many temples maintain some concrete connection with 
homeland politics: several are known to be linked directly, as patrons or managing 
committee members, with LTTE sympathizers; some put up posters for National 
Heroes Day in remembrance of soldiers killed in war; and some even hold memo-
rial functions in the temple (a contentious issue that has split temple committees) . 
Swaminatha Kurukkal, a priest at the Durga temple on the outskirts of Zurich, told 
me that during the temple festival, donations for the war were collected outside the 
premises from the assembled devotees . He did not mind when special pujas were 
asked to be held in his temple for individuals who became ‘martyrs’ in the war, for in 
God’s eyes, all who died were equally deserving of his grace . While he too was a sym-
pathizer, he refused to hold a memorial function to collectively mourn the ‘martyrs,’ 
saying that it was an abuse of the temple’s sanctity . This stance was not popular, and 
cost him significant patronage . Driving toward Zurich one morning in May 2009, 
at the height of the war, he heard on Tamil radio that LTTE chief Prabhakaran had 
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been killed . “Though I had grown to abhor the violence that he had unleashed,” he 
said, “at that moment I closed my eyes and shed tears for him and prayed for his 
soul . After all, he had brought the plight of the Tamils in Sri Lanka to the attention 
of the world .”
The transnational character of this diaspora extends to its religious life too . For 
example, temples in Germany are closely connected to those elsewhere in Europe . 
Priests circulate and participate in special festivals elsewhere, when large contingents 
of ritual specialists are needed . They also switch locations, taking up new assign-
ments, while devotees undertake pilgrimages to the powerful temples across Europe . 
Temples are thus bound in a transnational network closely allied to the transnational 
community itself, whose character has been shaped by ethnic nationalism and which 
in turn, as Wayland (2004: 425) demonstrates, has shaped the course of the civil war . 
So it would not be off the mark to argue that temple-centered Saiva Tamil Hinduism 
has played a role in the continuation of the civil war .
Towards a Tamil Saiva music?
A striking feature of the Tamil Diaspora’s engagement with art and culture is its pa-
tronage of South Indian classical Carnatic music . This is remarkable because, both 
in South India and in the Indian diaspora at large, Carnatic music is an elite pursuit . 
Even though it is a creative source for a vast range of folk and popular musical genres, 
as a style in itself Carnatic is a niche genre, with few individuals learning, pursuing, 
or performing it . Before the reforms of the early 20th century, Carnatic music and 
Bharatanatyam dance had been patronized by the temple and court, and were the 
hereditary preserve of traditional Devadasi communities . After the reforms, Carnatic 
music became the domain of a different, primarily Brahmin, elite . Prior to reform, 
the dominant languages of the compositions had been Telugu and Sanskrit . In its 
home in the Tamil speaking regions, these factors added to Carnatic music’s aura 
of being difficult to learn, ‘not for everyone,’ and requiring long training . Even the 
move in the 1940s, spearheaded by the influential community leader and philan-
thropist Annamalai Chettiar, to propagate Tamil Isai – Carnatic music based com-
positions in Tamil – did not radically enhance the accessibility and popularity of the 
form . Terada (2008) documents the initial hostility to Tamil Isai from influential 
institutional centers like the Music Academy . Eventually, both sides retreated from 
their extreme positions, and compositions in Tamil became included in mainstream 
concerts . Still, the style, its teaching, and performative components arguably remain 
heavily influenced by Brahmanical culture (Krishna 2015) .
Barring the small group of traditional priests who officiate at the temples, the 
Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora is for the most part not Brahmin . Rather, the diaspora is 
composed of various castes, including the high-caste Vellalas, and a number of mid-
dle- and low-ranking castes, and Dalits . Indeed, due in part to the unifying power of 
the Tamil nationalist movement, the Tamil diaspora is not a highly caste-conscious 
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community . In practically all the towns where Tamils live, individual teachers provide 
lessons in Carnatic music classes, either at home or in institutional settings . Young 
girls and boys are encouraged, even compelled, by their families and communities to 
attend . In the courses, emphasis is laid on teaching compositions in Tamil, and more 
so, on devotional compositions in the name of Siva, Murugan, and Devi – all deities 
of the Saiva pantheon . A place to perform these songs is offered in the Saiva temples, 
where devotees sing Tamil devotional songs as part of liturgical ceremonies . As such, 
classical music teaching focuses on religious and devotional content, and discourages 
abstraction and improvisation .
The emphasis on classical music and dance in the diaspora traces back to Jaffna’s 
cultural heritage and literary and artistic activities . Prior to the violent conflicts, 
members of the diaspora had maintained strong links with the classical arts scene in 
Tamil Nadu . Music teachers in the diaspora had usually trained at the Ramanathan 
Academy of Fine Arts at the University of Jaffna, and some had undergone train-
ing in Chennai in the Adyar Music College or the Kalakshetra of music and dance . 
Senior musicians like Sattur Subramanian, Maharajapuram Santhanam and others 
from Chennai used to give performances in Jaffna . Culturally Jaffna and Chennai 
were in close interaction for a very long time, until the civil war disturbed the rela-
tionship . The links with both Jaffna and Chennai continue in the diaspora, but the 
emphasis is no longer on acquiring professional skills, and rather on maintaining 
links with cultural roots and community identity .
Belonging and Violence: Two responses
Miriam George’s work (2009: 112–115) on psychological distress among Tamil refu-
gees shows how they display a resilience to cope through self-healing, adopting per-
spectives that allow them to find meaning in their suffering . The sagas of fear, loss 
and sorrow that the refugees narrate are surely related to the displays of extreme piety 
during temple worship . Indeed, it is clear that healing and psychic reintegration into 
a stable personality spectrum are powerful needs that the temples meet .
The role of temples in healing was especially evident in the activities of Vimalakka, 
a deeply religious community leader in Bonn . A devotee engaged in temple-centered 
worship and activities, Vimalakka was also an activist for Tamil nationalism . “With-
out these temples here in this foreign land, we would have gone mad,” she told me, 
referring to the struggle to survive and succeed in the new country . Her life story il-
luminates the role of women in war and peace, and more disquietingly, in supporting 
ethnic conflict . Vimalakka’s childhood and young adulthood in Jaffna were steeped 
in the mythological lore, ritual and philanthropic practices of the Saiva Siddhanta 
sect . Her faith enabled her to negotiate heavy family responsibilities with fortitude, 
and imbued her life of personal sacrifice with meaning . Supporting extended family, 
feeding the poor, and performing rituals gave a fullness and grace to her life that her 
work at a textile mill could not . Following the unspeakable horrors of the 1983 riots, 
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in which Vimalakka lost close relatives and her home and livelihood were destroyed, 
she fled to Germany . Starting from scratch, first as an illegal immigrant, then by 
working as domestic help, school cleaner, kitchen assistant, and in other low paying 
jobs, she slowly built a stable life for herself and her extended family . Throughout, 
she remained anchored in the religious beliefs and ritual practices of the Saiva canon . 
Today, she is a pillar of the community in its temple building and philanthropic 
activities . This role has given her the strength to move on and leave the horrific past 
behind .
In Germany, Vimalakka has continued to provide food, shelter and succor to 
her family and friends, and her circle has expanded to include all Tamil migrants, 
including nationalists, militants, and terrorists . As we passed an acquaintance in the 
train station, she waved to him and told me that he had remained an active ‘Tiger’ 
until the end of the war; when the wife of a family friend died, she came back from 
the funeral and reported to me how many ‘Tigers’ had attended . Indeed, Vimalakka 
herself actively participated in the Tamil diaspora’s mobilization of support for the 
war, and her husband, a political activist, linked to the Transnational Government of 
Tamil Eelam (TGTE) .9 Having always led a simple, pious life, she became increas-
ingly politicized – a supporter of the LTTE who subscribed to its chauvinism, justi-
fying its violent methods as a response to the cruelty and injustice meted out by the 
Sinhala army and government . In doing so, Vimalakka embodies the link between 
culture, gender, and violence and the way women become mobilized as participants 
and agents in identity-building . When victims of violence support retaliatory vio-
lence, how do we begin to understand it without contextualizing their perception 
(and facts) of historical wrongs?
Veni, a music teacher in Münster, responded to trauma in the opposite way . 
Throughout my conversations with her, she was consistently critical of the LTTE’s 
political style, and especially its attempts to mobilize support for the war . She con-
fronted LTTE supporters whenever they interfered with her work . She too had ex-
perienced the trauma of the ethnic conflict and civil war in Sri Lanka . Her family 
was connected to some of the Tamil nationalist parties, but she abhorred the violent 
methods of the LTTE . Not restricting her stories to those of the Sinhala army, she 
also recounted atrocities perpetrated by the LTTE – how young men and women 
were forcibly drafted into the organization, how they were trained to kill their own 
kin who might support other Tamil organizations, and how they hunted out sus-
pected informers and killed them and destroyed their properties . Her own mother 
and brothers had to face brutality from the LTTE and had barely escaped being shot . 
Here in Germany too, the LTTE had extorted money from Tamils, ostensibly for 
the rehabilitation of children orphaned in the war, but in reality to fund their violent 
activities and to buy arms .
9 The TGTE is a Tamil Diaspora organization which considers itself a government in exile and is de-
voted to keeping the idea of a separate state of Eelam for Tamils . Its numerous activities and campaigns 
can be followed on http://www .tgte-us .org .
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Trained in Jaffna and Chennai, Veni teaches music to different groups of students in 
her home . Predominantly girls, the students go from five years old into their teens . 
During the evenings, parents coming in to drop and pick up children spend some 
time chatting with each other, exchanging community news and gossip .
Tamil compositions make up the majority of the lessons . Students also learn 
songs in other languages, such as Sanskrit and Telugu, and songs in praise of non 
Saiva gods; Veni herself is not an exclusive Saiva worshipper, having been influenced 
by her father’s deep faith in Vaishnavism . Her students are trained to take examina-
tions from the Academy of Fine Arts in London . The committee members / teachers 
of the institution, several of whom are Indian teachers based in London, make annu-
al visits and evaluate the student performances and award certificates and diplomas .
Like other teachers in Germany, Veni’s students perform a concert during the an-
nual Navaratri festival . These performances are typically a ‘Vani Vizha,’ a celebration 
in honor of Saraswati, the presiding deity of the arts . The concert becomes a com-
munity occasion to parade her students’ cultural accomplishments and also becomes 
an opportunity to perform and display their cultural belonging .
At the Vani Vizha in 2010, the proceedings started a good hour later than an-
nounced, with people trickling in slowly . By the time the show started, the hall 
was overflowing, with over 300 people in the audience . In public and work life 
in Germany, Tamils observe strict norms of punctuality . But here, the pace of the 
function was leisurely, the mood festive – one of community bonding . The formal 
inauguration was performed by the priest of the Mariamman temple, who invoked 
the blessings of the goddess Saraswati . To create an ambience of religious devotion, 
the hall and the stage were decorated with flowers and icons of various deities . The 
accompanying percussionist on the mridangam was Kausikan, a young man, born 
and brought up in Germany, an engineer by profession, pursuing music as a seri-
ous hobby . His mother had learnt music at the Ramanathan Academy in Sri Lanka . 
Like many other serious musicians in the diaspora, he had learnt Carnatic vocals 
and the mridangam from senior Chennai musicians during visits to India, while 
they were touring in Germany, and later through Skype lessons . Kausikan was also 
well-informed about the current Carnatic music scenario, the prominent musicians, 
their styles and strengths, their abilities and where they were performing . Despite the 
students and musicians associated with Veni being fiercely loyal to her, they did not 
all share her approach .
For Veni, Carnatic music was not exclusivist, rather it was a medium for a broad, 
eclectic Hinduism . She had an open and flexible approach to her music, her religion, 
and her nationalism . When I met Veni again in 2013, she said she had stopped 
holding Vani Vizha . The previous year, members of the community had threatened 
her because they found the style of music she taught and the function itself not suf-
ficiently Saiva Tamil nationalist . Veni was disgusted more than frightened by their 
threats, and decided to stop the concerts rather than cave in to their demands .
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Conclusion
These two examples of Vimalakka and Veni have been consciously invoked to repre-
sent opposite ends of the spectrum of Tamilist belongingness that fuels the identity 
of this diaspora . The widespread opinion that this diaspora entirely caved in to co-
ercive pressure from the LTTE and contributed to the continuation of the civil war 
is not borne out even in the case of Vimalakka . Even though an LTTE sympathizer, 
she arrived at this position through her own experience of war, loss and migration, 
and has exercised considerable agency in rebuilding her life in Germany, creating a 
sense of community and reinventing the temple traditions of Sri Lanka in the new 
environment . In the case of Veni, an abhorrence of violence and a desire for more 
inclusive, universal values is prominent .
Such examples show us that while the Tamil Diaspora has been united in its 
quest for justice in Sri Lanka, there are internal differences and debates on the ways 
to achieve it . A community in toto cannot be slotted as supporting militancy and 
terrorists . Nor can a religion like Hinduism be equated with political forms like Hin-
dutva . Diasporic Tamils in exile stand as a testimony to the difficulties of assuming 
homogenous approaches to issues of belonging .
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People’s transnational mobilities, their activities to build homes in their countries of residence and their connectivities have resulted in multiplicities of belonging to encountered, 
imagined and represented communities operating within various political contexts. Migrants 
and their descendants labor to form and transform relations with their country of origin and of 
residence. People who see their origins in India but are now living elsewhere are a case in point. 
They have been establishing worldwide home places, whose growing number and vibrancy 
invite reconsideration of Indian diasporic communities and contexts in terms of ‘India(s) 
beyond India.’ Issues of belonging in Indian diasporas include questions of membership not 
only in the nation of previous and present residence and/or the nation of origin, but also in 
other communities and networks in political, economic, religious and social realms at local, 
regional or global levels. Yet, belonging – and especially simultaneous belonging – to various 
formations is rarely unambiguous. Rather, belonging in all its modes may entail dilemmas that 
arise from inclusions and exclusions. Bearing in mind such processes, the contributions to this 
volume endeavor to provide answers to the question of what kinds of diiculties members 
of Indian communities abroad encounter in connection with their identifications with and 
participation in specific collectivities. The underlying argument of all the essays collected is 
that members of Indian diasporas develop strategies to cope with the dilemmas they face in 
connection with their sense of belonging to particular communities, while they are subjected 
to specific power relationships. Thus, the volume sheds light on the ways in which dilemmas of 
belonging are being negotiated in intercultural fields.
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